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Abstract
This thesis is divided into three chapters. Even though the three chapters have 
different aims, they all concerned with corporate finance. The first chapter concerns 
venture capital and chapters two and three deal with corporate governance.
The first chapter deals with a special kind of security used in venture capital con­
tracting -participating convertible preferred stock. Participating Convertible Preferred 
(PCP) stock is similar to convertible preferred stock but comes with participation 
rights. Participating rights allow the holder to participate in earnings along with com­
mon shareholders. PCPs play an im portant role in venture capital exits. The two major 
forms of exit observed in venture capital are initial public offerings (IPOs) and trade 
sale. Typically, a PC P stake is converted into common equity during an IPO exit but 
not converted in case of trade sales. We develop a model where VCs can signal the 
quality of their venture by costly conversion. We show that PCPs have the required 
features to implement the signalling mechanism. VCs signal by converting their PCP 
stake into common equity, when they exit from the venture and in the process give 
up some of their cash flow rights. We show that this can also help in alleviating the 
problem of entrepreneurial effort. Finally, we derive empirical implications for the two 
forms of exit.
The second and third chapters are concerned with corporate governance. Firstly, we 
examine the effectiveness of the "comply or explain" approach to corporate governance 
in the UK. Using a unique database of 245 non-financial companies for the period 
1998 — 2004, we perform a detailed analysis of both the degree of compliance with the 
provisions of the corporate governance code of best practice (Combined Code), and
4the explanations given in case of non-compliance. We rank the quality of explanations 
based on their information content. We find an increasing trend of compliance with the 
provisions of the Combined Code, but also a frequent use of standard and uninformative 
explanations when departing from best practice. We then use this data  to analyse 
the extent of moral hazard problem in different groups of companies and the role of 
monitoring in alleviating it.
The third chapter extends the above analysis. We use the dataset to  identify well- 
governed companies by accounting for heterogeneity in their governance choices and 
investigate its association with performance. We find th a t companies th a t depart from 
governance best practice because of genuine circumstances outperform all others and 
cannot be considered badly-governed. On the contrary, we find that mechanical adher­
ence to best practice does not always lead to superior performance. We thus argue th a t 
flexibility in corporate governance regulation plays a crucial role, because companies 
are not homogenous entities.
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Introduction
The thesis consists of three chapters dealing with issues in corporate finance and con­
sists of two distinct parts. The first part, Chapter 1  which is theoretical in nature deals 
with securities used in venture capital contracting and its implications for exit by the 
venture capitalist. It develops a theoretical model to explain the use of a particular 
kind of security -participating convertible preferred stock in venture capital contract­
ing. The theme of the second part is corporate governance Chapters 2 and 3 empirically 
analyse the workings of a flexible regulatory system of corporate governance using an 
unique dataset of UK companies. Chapter 2 studies the "comply or explain" system 
of corporate governance in the UK with a detailed analysis of compliance with a code 
of best practice i.e. the Combined Code and the explanations provided in case of non- 
compliance. Chapter 3 then uses the above data to develop a novel measure of corporate 
governance and relates it to corporate performance.
Various types of convertible securities are widely used in venture capital contract­
ing. Participating Convertible Preferred (PCP) stock is one of them. It is similar to 
convertible preferred stock but comes with participation rights. Participating rights 
allow the holder to participate in excess earnings with the common shareholders in 
case of liquidation. Two of the most common forms of exits observed in venture capital 
are initial public offerings (IPOs) and trade sales or mergers (TS). Most venture cap­
ital agreements provide for mergers or trade sale as a liquidation event, in which case 
the venture capitalist (VC) holding a PC P stake is entitled to participation/preferred 
rights.
In contrast, most agreements provide for autom atic conversion of the convertible 
stake into common equity in case of an IPO. There is therefore a clear dichotomy in 
the treatm ent of "participation/preferred rights" of the VC based on the type of exit 
i.e. IPOs and TS. In giving up the participation and preferred rights during an IPO 
the VC in many cases is giving up a substantial portion of his cash flow rights. The 
question that we address in Chapter 1 is why is the VC prepared to give up his rights 
in case of IPO and why not in case of a TS? We present a model in this chapter, which 
argues that VCs can signal the quality of their portfolio firms while exiting through an 
IPO using costly conversion. We show that the participation and convertibility features 
of PCPs can be used to implement costly conversion. The VC signals to the investors 
by converting the PC P stake into common equity, when exiting from the venture in an 
IPO. Signalling is im portant in case of an IPO since investors in an IPO are relatively 
uninformed about the firm as compared to  those in a TS. We further show th a t this 
can also help in alleviating the problem of entrepreneurial effort. Finally based on the 
model we derive empirical implications for both forms of exit.
Corporate governance failures can have significant economic consequences at both 
macro and micro levels, for markets, market players, economic growth, firms and con­
sumers. Consequently, investors have started leveraging corporate governance while 
building their portfolios so as to enhance long-term investment returns, m itigate risks 
and more generally build a better picture of their portfolio companies. Recent corpo­
rate failures on both sides of the Atlantic has focused attention on the different forms 
of corporate governance regulation. In this part of the thesis we study the workings of 
a flexible regulatory regime of corporate governance and its effect on firm performance. 
The data  for our analysis comes from corporate governance statem ents contained in the 
annual reports of UK companies. We use the UK as the setting of our study because the 
UK pioneered a new flexible approach to corporate governance regulation, known as 
the “comply or explain” system, which is characterised by voluntary compliance with 
a code of best practice and mandatory disclosure. We build a unique dataset by hand 
collecting details of both compliance with the recommended principles of best practice 
and explanation given in case of non-compliance, for 245 non-financial companies over 
a six-year period.
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In Chapter 2 we use this data  to  build a complete picture of the "comply or explain" 
system by highlighting both the benefits and drawbacks of the system. We find that 
the Code works effectively in encouraging compliance. Compliance is monotonically 
increasing from 1998 — 99 to 2003 — 04 but differs significantly among groups of com­
panies. However the analysis of the explanations highlights drawbacks in the system. 
Firstly, for a significant minority of non-compliances no explanations are provided. Sec­
ondly, we find that in a great majority of the cases the explanations are standard and 
uninformative. The propensity to  give general explanations is further amplified where 
agency problems are likely to be serious, e.g. in family-owned companies. Finally, on 
average, companies tend to either stick to the same explanation from one year to next 
or straightaway move to compliance. The analysis suggests that companies do not use 
the flexibility allowed by the Code to fine-tune their governance to changing circum­
stances. Rather, firms often seem to make a fundamental choice between compliance 
and non-compliance.
The voluntary nature of corporate governance in the UK gives us an opportunity 
to study a company’s response to it, in light of the monitoring it faces. We identify 
three distinct groups of companies, those belonging to the FTSE100 index, cross-listed 
on other exchanges (especially in the US) and family-owned companies and then hy­
pothesize (mainly based on past literature) their reaction to  the code. We empirically 
test these hypothesis using our datatset. In line with our hypothesis, we find strong 
evidence that companies cross-listed in the US are more likely to comply. We find weak 
evidence th a t FTSE100 and non-Family owned companies are more likely to comply. 
As regards explanations, we find strong evidence th a t both FTSE100 companies and 
companies cross-listed in the US, when non-compliant, are more likely to provide bet­
ter explanations and less likely to provide lower quality explanations. And finally there 
is some evidence that family owned companies give lower quality explanations. Our 
analysis thus helps shed light on the extent of moral hazard problem facing different 
groups of companies and the role of monitoring through various means to overcome it.
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The search for the link between corporate governance and performance has been a 
constant topic in the recent academic and non-academic literature. The key issue in 
most studies has been the identification of an appropriate measure of good governance. 
In Chapter 3, we build a new measure of corporate governance under a framework 
which assumes that companies are heterogeneous, based on the above data. We measure 
corporate governance by constructing a score which does not penalise companies for 
not fully complying with the Code, provided a valid justification is given. Our score 
takes into account both the level of compliance with the various provisions of the 
Code, and the quality of explanations given in case of non-compliance: a higher score 
does not necessarily mean higher compliance, but might be a result of non-compliance 
coupled with good explanations. We find th a t our measure of corporate governance is 
positively and significantly associated with better performance (measured using both 
stock market as well as operating performance), as against measures based on a tick­
box approach, which are not. Further, companies departing from best practice for valid 
reasons perform exceptionally well and even out-perform the fully compliant ones. In 
contrast, mere compliance with the provisions of the Code does not necessarily result 
in better performance.
We thus show that companies, which have carefully thought about the application of 
the Code to their specific circumstances, are more likely to be well-governed, and this 
is reflected in their performance. We thus argue th a t flexibility in corporate governance 
regulation plays a crucial role, because companies are not homogenous entities.
The analysis of corporate governance in the UK context has both regulatory and 
policy implications. An increasing number of countries are adopting or are in the process 
of implementing codes of best practice based on the UK model. Analysis of such a 
system enables us to clearly infer corporate behaviour and consequently its effect on 
performance. More importantly, if companies have a choice, they can signal to the 
market that they are different in order to  a ttrac t external financing, especially so in 
governance regimes that are less transparent and provide less protection to minority 
shareholders. Our study can thus give directions to policy-makers in countries trying 
to implement corporate governance codes.
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1
Participating Convertible Preferred Stock in 
Venture Capital Exits
1.1 Introduction
Convertibles are the most commonly used securities in venture capital contracting par­
ticularly so in the US. Among these, convertible preferred stock is the security of choice. 
Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) document that nearly 80% of all venture contracts use 
convertible preferred stock. They also find that in nearly 50% of the cases the convert­
ible preferred is participating. Preferred stockholders have preference both in dividends 
and liquidation proceeds compared to common stockholders. "Participating" preferred 
are securities which participate in excess earnings1 with the common shareholder over 
and above their preferred dividend. One of the most im portant features of these secu­
rities is th a t they allocate different cash flow rights depending on whether exit occurs 
through a trade sale (TS), in which the company is sold either to a trade buyer or ac­
quired by another company, or an Initial Public Offering (IPO). We give below simple 
examples which illustrate this feature.
Assume th a t a venture capitalist’s (VC) investment entitles him to $5 million in a 
given venture in the form of a Convertible Preferred (CP), convertible into 50 percent 
of the common equity. Further assume th a t the company is finally liquidated for $12 
million. The VC then can either convert his stake to common equity and receive 50% 
of the proceeds i.e. $ 6  million or he does not convert and can receive his preferred 
proceeds i.e. $5 million.
1 Excess earnings here refers to  the cashflows that equity holders are entitled to after all debt/preferred claims 
have been m et.
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Participating Convertible Preferred (PCP) stock is similar to convertible preferred 
stock, with participation rights. Participating rights allow the holder to participate in 
excess earnings with the common shareholders in case of liquidation. In our example 
assume now that the PCP holder is entitled to participation rights of 50 percent. If 
the VC converts his PCP stake to common equity he is entitled to $ 6  million (i.e. 
50% of $12 million), but if he chooses not to convert he is entitled to $5 million (his 
preferred claim) plus shares to the extent of 50 percent in the remaining equity pool of 
$7 million (i.e. $12 million minus $5 million), thus giving him a total of $8.5 million. 
It is clear from the above examples that the cash flow rights to the holder of the PC P 
varies depending on whether he converts his stake or not. The participating feature 
thus makes conversion more costly for the VC, in particular when the firm’s value is 
high.
There is a dichotomy in the treatm ent of "participation/preferred rights" of the VC 
based on the type of exit i.e. IPOs and Trade Sales/Mergers. Most VC investment 
agreements explicitly treat TS as a liquidation event, in which case the venture cap­
italist is entitled to participation/preferred rights. In contrast, the same agreements 
provides for automatic conversion of the convertible stake into common equity in case 
of an IPO. In giving up the participation and preferred rights during an IPO the VC 
in many cases is giving up a substantial portion of his cash flow rights. The question 
we address in this chapter is why is the VC prepared to give up his rights in case of 
IPO and why not in case of a TS?
We begin by exploring the existing explanations for the use and conversion of PCPs. 
A major reason for use of PCPs is the protection it affords VCs from unscrupulous en­
trepreneurs. This has been eloquently described in the Hotmail Corporation case study 
(Mukherjee (1999)). During negotiations with the VC the entrepreneurs were concerned 
th a t the investors were receiving participating preferred stock in their first round of in­
vestment. The entrepreneurs felt this was unfair because the investors "double-dipped," 
meaning th a t they got back their original investment and then shared in the remaining 
equity pool. The VCs in the case-study countered that the clause was im portant to 
create a disincentive for the entrepreneurs to sell the company early in life at a low 
price. In other words, if the venture is sold very early in its life the entrepreneur will be 
entitled to a return only after all the claims of the VC and other investors are satisfied. 
If this is a valid reason for the issue of these securities (other claims could also fulfill
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this role), it still does not answer the question posed above i.e. why are they treated 
differently in different exit situations?
We propose that VCs use PCPs to signal the quality of a firm. Our assumption 
is th a t signalling is particularly im portant in an IPO since the new shareholders are 
relatively uninformed about company’s value. In contrast, in case of a TS bidding firms 
have the opportunity to conduct due diligence and they also tend to be peers from the 
same industry having in-depth knowledge and are thus relatively well informed. We will 
argue that the VCs convert their stake into common equity and accept a lower stake in 
case of exits through IPOs to signal the quality of the venture to  investors but do not 
do so in case of TS since the buyers are relatively well informed about the value of the 
firm. Thus the relative costs (as compared to TS) of exiting through an IPO creates 
the possibility of a signalling equilibrium in which good firms choose that route. Such 
an "ex-post" equilibrium can also provide ex-ante incentives to the entrepreneur, since 
after an IPO  the VC exits and the entrepreneur remains in control of the venture. In 
contrast, in a TS the entrepreneur loses control of her venture. Thus exit through an 
IPO, provided it happens only when firm value is high has the desirable property of 
rewarding the good entrepreneur with control. This view stands in sharp contrast to 
the “double dipping” argument previously described.
Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) document that the automatic conversion provision 
kicks in, only if the company completes an IPO at a price which is on a median 
around 3.0 times greater than the stock price of the latest financing round. This ratio 
is significantly higher if the price of the prior investment rounds is considered. It is 
therefore quite clear th a t the VC is not prepared to give up control as well as partic­
ipation/preferred rights unless he is assured of a high exit value which supports our 
argument for the use of PCPs.
The role of VCs in certifying IPOs has been well documented. Megginson and Weiss 
(1991) provide support for the certification role of venture capitalists in bringing new 
issues to market. They show that the presence of venture capitalists in the offering firm 
certifies the quality of the issue through their investment in financial and reputational 
capital. By comparing the costs of going public (including underpricing, underwriting 
spreads etc.) for a group of VC backed IPOs with a control sample of non-VC backed 
offers, they find that the costs of going public for VC backed IPOs is significantly lower 
than those for non-VC backed IPOs. They however contend that the mere presence of
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the VC is enough to certify the venture, we take this a step further and argue that VCs 
use the conversion of their stake to signal the quality of the venture.
Black and Gilson (1997) endorse the view that relinquishing control back to entrepre­
neurs is a way to reward good entrepreneurs. They argue th a t in a stock market based 
system like the US (unlike a bank based system like Germany) there is an implicit con­
tract between the VC and the entrepreneur in which the VC agrees to give control back 
to the entrepreneur, if the venture does well, by exiting through an IPO. In case of a TS 
control of the venture is transferred to the acquirer whereas in IPOs control remains 
with the entrepreneur. The authors argue that the opportunity to acquire control is a 
powerful incentive for the entrepreneur much beyond the purely financial gain arising 
out of an appreciation of her stake. Our model while formalising the above argument 
additionally points to the signalling role of PCPs in the VCs’ exit decisions.
To our knowledge Hellmann (2004) is the only other paper that deals with the use 
of convertible preferred stock in venture capital exits. In his paper Hellmann using 
a double moral hazard model shows that pure equity is the optimal security for this 
problem. Convertible preferred equity preserves balanced incentives if the venture re­
mains independent (i.e. an IPO), but allow the VC to extract additional rents if it gets 
acquired (in a TS). The model therefore contends th a t these securities are useful in 
providing incentives to entrepreneurs after the exit event. It is an empirical fact that 
VC and entrepreneurs have lock-in periods (usually 6  months) attached to their stakes 
and usually cannot exit in an IPO. The exit event normally signals th a t the VC cannot 
add any further value and IPO signals th a t the VC is confident of the entrepreneurs 
ability to manage. Also unlike the pre-IPO stage, post-IPO the VC is no longer involved 
in running the venture. He is simply interested in giving up his stake from the venture 
as soon as possible. It is therefore not clear why optimal incentives for post-IPO effort 
to the entrepreneur should be an issue to the VC.
We also contribute to the literature on VC exits. Bergloff (1994) and Bascha and 
Walz (2001) model the trade-offs between IPOs and TS. In both these papers and also 
in the paper by Hellmann (2004) there are conflicts between the entrepreneur and VC 
on the most appropriate method of exit from a venture. Convertible securities can help 
in the selection of the optimal exit strategy by allocating control rights suitably. In 
our model we abstract from this conflict and instead focus on how convertibles help in 
resolving information asymmetry and provide ex-ante incentives to the entrepreneur.
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This chapter is also related to the work of Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004) and 
Aghion, Bolton and Tirole (2001) who examine how liquidity shocks affect a venture 
capitalists desire to exit an investment. In Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004), emphasis 
is on the impact of the stock price informativeness on exit decisions and incentives. 
Some of our comparative statics deal w ith the ability of stock market to  accurately 
price IPOs and can be seen as complementing their study.
Finally, Gilson and Schizer (2002) provide a tax  explanation for the use of convertible 
preferred stock. They argue th a t the use of these kind of securities triggers a tax  subsidy 
for the intensely incentivised management compensation structures that are central to 
venture capital contracting.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 1.2  describes the set-up of the 
model, Section 1.3  sets out the first-best incentives of the entrepreneur and the choices 
facing the VC, Section 1 .4 looks a t the various signalling equilibria, Section 1.5  de­
scribes incentives in the context of signalling, Section 1.6  the comparative statics and 
their empirical implications and finally Section 1 .7  concludes. Most of the proofs are 
provided in the appendix.
1.2 The Model
Consider a model w ith three dates, universal risk neutrality and no discounting. An 
entrepreneur has a project requiring an investment K .  Lacking, the financial means 
she approaches a competitive VC to set-up the project.
Contracts: The VC gets a proportion /  of the cash flows. For the moment we think of 
the security held by the VC as convertible preferred equity. Moreover, the stake comes 
with participation rights and like described in the earlier section the VC can convert 
his stake, at a cost, into a fraction q (<  /  ) of common equity. The entrepreneur is the 
residual claimant.
The issue of security design has received considerable attention in the theoretical 
VC literature. Most papers justify or conclude albeit for different reasons th a t convert­
ible equity is the optimal security in VC contracting. We approach the issue from a 
different perspective. We take the equity claim as given and we focus our analysis on 
the convertible features associated with it. We will discuss later the issue of optimal 
security design.
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Project: After the investment is made at t  =  1 either the venture is good firm 
with a value of V H with probability p  or mediocre with value V L (where V H >  V L). 
The entrepreneur provides effort at cost e which affects the probability of success of 
the venture. If she exerts effort the probability of the venture being good is p  and 0 
otherwise. The effort provided is unobservable and costly.
After the value realization, an investment of I  is needed to take the venture forward. 
This investment is valuable and has a constant rate of return of x. Thus the overall 
value of the firm after investment is either V H(1 + x ) or V L(1 +  x ) as the  case may be. 
We assume th a t unless this investment I  is made, the venture’s value is zero. Both the 
good and mediocre projects are positive NPV i.e. V L{\ +  x)  >  K  +  I ,  it is therefore 
worthwhile to  invest. However, neither the entrepreneur nor the VC can invest in the 
project:
• The entrepreneur because she is wealth constrained.
• The VC because he wants to exit the investment as, for e.g. in Faure-Grimaud 
and Gromb (2004). We consider that VCs have liquidity needs and take the 
(extreme) view that they must exit the investment and have no funds to inject at 
this stage. The justification for this is the fact that VCs generally tend to invest 
in firms through a limited partnership. These limited partnerships have a finite 
life of 10 — 12 years after which they are dissolved. VCs thus tend to invest in the 
first 5 — 6  years of the partnership after which they stop investing. They then try 
and exit their investments so th a t the partnership can be dissolved. We wish to 
capture the exit motive of the VCs by this assumption. The VC is at the stage 
where he has finished investing and is now interested in exiting the venture2.
We can also think of K  and I  as start-up and late-stage investments respectively.
The start-up investment can in fact be a series of smaller amounts k \ , k 2....., kn
provided in stages on achievement of certain milestones by the VC as is usually 
the case in VC investing and the investment I  is late stage investment. It is 
well known that investors providing start-up financing are distinct from those 
investing at later stages. The description in the preceding paragraph aims to 
capture this fact for our model.
"Another interesting research question is to  investigate why VCs partnerships have lim ited life (See Sahlm an  
(l'JUO)). We ignore' th is question and take th is feature as given, but explore in our settin g  tin' im plications of 
tliis for the form of exit.
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The venture value can be observed only by the insiders i.e. the entrepreneur and the 
venture capitalist. The outside investors (both trade buyers and IPO  investors) cannot 
observe the value at the time of investing I.
Exits: The only method of raising I  is either through a Trade Sale (TS) or an Initial 
Public Offering (IPO).
• T ra d e  Sale (T S ): Trade buyers know V .
• In i t ia l  P u b lic  O fferings (IP O ): IPO  investors know V  only with probability 
r <  1 .
Our assumption is that buyers in a TS are more informed (and we analyse the 
case where they are fully informed for simplicity) than the buyers in an IPO. From 
an informational point of view it is well known th a t shares in an IPO are normally 
sold to  buyers through an intermediary. The investors in an IPO  do not have access 
to  the books of the company and usually have to rely on the recommendations of the 
intermediary. On the other hand trade buyers (in an acquisition) who make an offer are 
given access to the company’s books and can conduct due diligence and also in most of 
the cases being from the same industry have a deep knowledge of the industry. Other 
papers in the literature make similar assumptions. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) 
assume that transactions between the firm and outside investors are characterised by 
asymmetric information. In their model a single large investor (like in a TS), can 
overcome this asymmetry with lower cost as compared to investors in an IPO  who face 
a higher cost because of duplication and free-rider problems. Cumming and Macintosh 
(2003) assume that information asymmetry is highest in case of IPOs. They point out 
that in an IPO investors have to rely on market intermediaries to  price a issue, whereas 
in an acquisition the new owner is typically a strategic acquirer - a firm in the same or 
similar line of business who has a keen understanding of the firm’s technology and its 
potential marketability.
Preferences: Both the VC and the entrepreneur may get private benefits from the 
project.
The entrepreneur derives a private benefit if she is in control of the project. This 
usually happens in case of an IPO, where the entrepreneur is left in control after the 
VC exits. We therefore assume th a t the private benefit th a t the entrepreneur gets af­
ter an IPO, B,  is greater than th a t after a TS, b. The existence of private benefits of
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control is a well-documented empirical fact and is also widely used in the control lit­
erature (see Zingales (1995)). Empirical evidence suggests that entrepreneurs continue 
to be involved with the firm even after the IPO. Kaplan, Sensoy and Stromberg (2005) 
analyse the evolution of 49 venture backed firms from early business plan to public 
company and provide evidence about the involvement of founders (entrepreneurs) in 
their ventures. At the time of the business plan, founders are involved with the com­
panies either as a top executive or director in 100% of the firms analysed. By the time 
of the IPO, 92% of the firms continue to have the founder either as a top executive 
or director. The idea that those founders enjoy greater non-pecuniary benefits can be 
justified by the fact that the study also finds th a t the founder is the CEO in 77% of 
the cases at the time of business plan and remains so in 57% of the cases at the time 
of the IPO. Besides other papers in the literature also make similar assumptions for 
e.g. Black and Gilson (1997). Finally, practitioners also agree with this fact. A note by 
a leading law firm Baker and McKenzie on venture capital exit routes3 says th a t "An 
exit through the stock market seems to be favoured by management, since it allows 
them to remain in place and in control."
We similarly assume that the VC gets a private benefit if the firm is good and the 
exit is through an IPO. We think of this private benefit as a reputation effect. Amit 
et al. (1998) show that VCs might try to acquire reputation for presenting only high 
quality ventures in IPOs. Besides it is well known th a t IPOs are the "most glamorous 
form" of exits4. Most VCs want to try and exit through an IPO to prove themselves 
(see Gompers (1996)). It is therefore reasonable to assume th a t IPOs are associated 
with a greater reputation effect for VCs than TS. Thus the VC gets a private benefit, 
only if he exits through an IPO and not a TS. Additionally even when exiting through 
an IPO the reputation gain is definitely likely to be higher if the VC brings a  good 
firm to the market as compared to a bad firm. We therefore assume th a t the VC gets 
a private benefit Z  only if the venture is good and the method of exit is an IPO and 0 
in all other cases.
Control: Finally in our model we assume th a t the VC is in control and makes all 
exit decisions. The fact th a t VC has a major role to play in exit decisions has been
Available at w w w .bakernet.com /B ak erN et/P ractice /C orp orate
*The N ational Venture Capital A ssociation , the trade body o f VCs in the US on its w ebsite, (w w w .nvca.org). 
points out that "The initial public offering is the m ost glam ourous and visible typo of exit for a venture  
investm ent. In recent years technology IPO s have been in the lim elight during the IP t) boom of the last six  
years."
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documented empirically. Bienz and Walz (2006) analyse the structure and evolution of 
decision and control rights for a sample of 464 contracts between the VC and entrepre­
neur in Germany. They find that with the passage of time the VC gets more exit rights 
while relinquishing some of his operational rights. Exit rights gives the VC control over 
the exit decision.
Further in any model it is easy to come up with param eter values such that if the 
entrepreneur is in control the VC doesn’t break even. In such cases giving control to 
the VC is a pre-requisite to get the project off the ground. However, joint control 
might emerge in equilibrium for firms with low funding needs. Our analysis is therefore 
relevant for start-ups and early stage ventures, which are typically characterised, by 
high external funding needs.
1.3 First Best
1.3.1 E n trepreneur’s Incentives
Assume initially that the entrepreneur cares only about private benefits. For reasons 
already described above we focus on IPOs and TS as methods of exit. Thus the entre­
preneur’s incentives to create a venture is given by
P [pB +  (1 -  p)b] +  (1 - p )  £  +  (1 -  7 )b\ > e  + [yB + ( l -  7 )b\ (1.1)
where
p  is the probability that the venture is good if the Entrepreneur exerts effort, 0 
otherwise.
p  is the probability of an IPO given that the venture is good.
7  is the probability of an IPO given that the venture is mediocre.
B  is the private benefit the entrepreneur gets if the exit is through an IPO. 
b is the private benefit the entrepreneur gets if the exit is though a Trade Sale and 
without loss of generality that in the sequel 6  =  0 .
Finally, e is the dis-utility of effort incurred by the entrepreneur.
Thus the entrepreneur’s incentive compatibility simplifies to
pB  [p — 7 ] > e (1 .2 )
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From the above it is clear that the entrepreneur’s incentives to exert effort increases 
w ith /i, the probability of an IPO when the firm value is high, and decreases with the 
probability of an IPO when the firm value is mediocre.
Our assumption th a t the entrepreneur is motivated solely by private benefits is an 
extreme case. We only need that the private benefits are different for IPO and TS. If the 
entrepreneur also cared about monetary benefits, the analysis would not be invalidated 
as rewarding her with an IPO would be a way to reduce the cost of providing incentives.
1.3.1.1 VCs’ Choices
The VC on the other hand is concerned with both cash flows and private benefits. He 
must choose the method of exit. IPOs maximise the incentives of the entrepreneur, 
however informationally they are a t a disadvantage compared to a TS. Also given the 
informational asymmetry between the insiders and the investors, the VC of the good 
venture might not get a fair price.
If there were no information asymmetries between the VC and the investors, the 
venture will have to offer the following stakes in return for the investment I.
If the venture’s value was V H then the investor would demand a share Sfj  which is 
as follows.
S h = V H(l + x) (1'3)
On the other hand if the venture’s value is V L then the investor will be given a stake 
of S l in the venture defined as follows.
S l =  V L{\ +  x) (1'4)
Assuming instead th a t outside investors hold some prior beliefs a th a t the quality 
of the venture is good.
=  [aVH + { l - a ) V L] ( l + x )  (L5)
Consider now the situation from the point of view of a VC who holds a stake of / ,  
tha t may be converted prior to raising new capital into q. Suppose that the venture is 
successful with value, V H , and the VC knows that, he then faces the following trade-off:
• Sell his stake as it is to investors with most optimistic beliefs i.e. highest a. Given 
that we are considering the strategic choice faced by a VC who knows V H this
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amounts to  choosing the form of exit involving the best informed buyers; which 
is the TS;
• The VC can consider the possibility of using the exit mode to signal additional 
information to  the market.
It would be appropriate if the VC chose IPO as the method of exit when V  =  V H as 
it will efficiently reward the entrepreneur, but the VC might be reluctant to do so under 
our assumption th a t other things being equal investors in an IPO  are less informed. It 
is therefore precisely when the firm value is high that the VC may prefer to go for a 
more informed audience, in other words a TS.
The problem is that because of the informational disadvantage of the IPO, the good 
venture does not always get a fair value for the venture. We argue th a t VCs’ can signal 
the firm’s type by converting their preferred convertible stake into common equity in 
case of an IPO. The signal is costly since the VC has to give up his preferred rights. 
In what follows we look at the various possibilities of signalling.
1.4 Conversion as a Signal
We argue th a t one of the ways in which the VC can ensure a fair value for his stake as 
well as preserve incentives for the entrepreneur is to signal to the market by converting 
his PC P stake. To be effective in conveying additional information to the market the 
signalling action should have the following features. F irst to be effective, a signal has 
to be costly. Second, it has to be more costly for the bad type than for the good type. 
As discussed earlier PCPs have the feature whereby on conversion the stake q th a t the 
VC gets is lower than his original stake / .  Conversion thus clearly satisfies the first 
feature. We now look at the conditions under which the second feature can be satisfied.
1.4-1 Conversion w ithout exit choice
We begin by investigating whether a signalling equilibrium exists if there is only one 
method of exit available. VCs thus cannot choose the method of exit but they can 
convert their PC P stake to signal to the market. Denote by r#  E {r, 1 } the probability 
that a given investor discovers the true value of V  after having invested.
The VC can try and signal his type by converting his preferred stake /  to common 
equity q. We look for a separating equilibrium in which the VC of good firm converts
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whereas the VC of the mediocre does not. The analysis of the equilibrium is construc­
tive. A set of investor beliefs is specified, and a program that assures that firms behave 
accordingly is constructed. We begin by assuming th a t investors believe that the VC 
of the good firm converts his stake to common equity to  signal his type. Therefore 
if the investors observe conversion they think that the venture is good and mediocre 
otherwise. Based on their beliefs they accordingly demand a suitable stake in return 
for their investment. Denote by Z r  e  {0, Z }  the VC’s private benefits, where Z r  =  Z  
if the exit is through an IPO.
For such an equilibrium to  exist the following incentive compatibility conditions must 
be satisfied.
9 ( 1  -  S „ )V H(1 +  x)  +  Zr > / ( l  -  S L)(1 +  x)  [ tb V h  +  (1 -  t b ) V l ] +  Zr (1.6)
/ ( I  -  S l )V l (1 +  x) > 9 ( 1  -  SH)(1 +  X) [rB V L +  (1 -  t b ) V h ] (1.7)
If the venture is good the investors accept a stake S jj (1-3) in return for their in­
vestment. The first condition (1.6) simply states th a t the VC’s payout from the good 
venture after conversion of his stake into common equity is greater than not converting 
and being unsure of the price th a t will be offered by the investors. Investors offer the 
correct price with a probability of t b - In line with our assumption the good VC gets 
a private benefit Z r  in case of a successful exit.
Similarly, the condition (1.7) states th a t it is not worthwhile for the VC of the 
mediocre firm to mimic a good firm. By converting his stake to mimic the good, the 
mediocre firm is offered the price of the good firm for the investment I. However, once 
having bought a stake in the venture the investor knows the true value of the firm with 
probability r s • The above conditions lead to the following proposition:
P ro p o s itio n  1  There does not exist a separating equilibrium in which the good VC 
can signal the firm s' type by converting his convertible preferred stake into common 
equity, i f  both types have only one available exit strategy.
P ro o f. See the appendix. ■
It is thus not possible for a VC who has no control over the exit decision but who 
can only convert his holdings to signal the type of company to the market. The reason
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is that even though the good VC is prepared to convert to signal his type, it is easy 
for the mediocre VC to mimic the good. Converting requires the VC to lose /  — q% 
of his shares. This is less costly when the company is mediocre so if this is the only 
instrument available, the mediocre will always mimic.
If there exists no separating equilibrium the VC of the good firm will not convert, 
since conversion results in a lower stake. The above result clearly depends upon the 
fact that there is only one available exit strategy and the fact the investors after their 
investment know the true value of the firm with probability t b -
Finally, notice that if there is only method of exit available it is difficult to satisfy 
the entrepreneur’s IC. The entrepreneur’s IC (1.2) can be satisfied provided there is a 
difference in the probabilities of exit through an IPO, in particular when /z >  7 . In the 
above situation since there is only one method of exit there is no way of satisfying her 
IC, and motivating her to  exert effort.
1.4-2 E xit choice w ithout conversion
Consider now the opposite case where VCs hold a share / ,  of common equity without 
any conversion rights. However, they can exit through either an IPO or TS. Now they 
can use the method of exit to try and signal their type to the market.
We analyse whether a separating equilibrium is possible in which the good exits
through an IPO and the mediocre through a TS. Once again the analysis of the equi­
librium is constructive. Investor beliefs are th a t firms exiting through an IPO are good 
and those th a t exit through a TS are mediocre. The incentive compatibility conditions 
for such an equilibrium are:
/ ( I  -  S „ )V H( 1 + x) + Z >  / ( I  -  S l )V h ( 1  +  x) (1.8)
/ ( I  -  S L)V L(1 + x) >  / ( l  -  SH)(1 +  x)[rV L + ( 1  -  r )V H] (1.9)
The first condition (1.8) is the IC for the good VC which simply states th a t the 
overall payoff to  the good VC when he exits through an IPO is greater than exiting 
through a TS. When the good VC exits through an IPO additionally he also gets the 
private benefit Z  or reputation effect described above. Note that the good VC does not 
get the private benefit Z , if he exits through a TS.
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Similarly, the second condition is the IC for the mediocre VC. It states th a t it is 
worthwhile for the mediocre VC to exit through a TS rather than an IPO. Anyone 
exiting through a TS is believed to be mediocre and investors pay a price S l for 
the initial stake. Subsequently, TS investors know the true value of the venture (with 
probability 1 ) and pay the actual price for the remaining stake of the VC. In contrast, 
in case of an IPO investors pay the actual price of the venture for the VCs’ remaining 
stake, only with a probability r < 1 .
The good VC’s IC (1.8) will always be satisfied but the mediocre VCs’ IC (1.9) will 
never be satisfied. Since V H > V L , for all values of r < 1 , [r V L +  (1 — r ) V H] will be 
greater than V L and by definition ( 1  — Sfj)  is greater than ( 1  — S l )- The right hand 
side of (1.9) will always be greater than the left hand side and mediocre’s IC can never 
be satisfied. Therefore a separating equilibrium in which VCs’ hold common equity 
stakes and the good exits through an IPO and the mediocre using a TS does not exist. 
Similarly, it can be shown that a separating equilibrium with VCs’ holding common 
equity and the good exiting through a TS and the mediocre by an IPO does not exist. 
The above leads us to the following proposition.
P ro p o s itio n  2 There does not exist a separating equilibrium in which VCs can signal 
their firm s’ type by choosing an exit strategy (either IPO or TS), i f  VCs hold common 
equity.
P ro o f. Refer to discussion above. ■
The above result obtains because the mediocre VCs’ incentive compatibility condi­
tion cannot be satisfied. Unlike the case with conversion but no exit choice, in which 
conversion imposes a cost, here the mediocre VC is always better off mimicking the 
good since there is no cost to that strategy. As a result a separating equilibrium can­
not exist without conversion and consequently in such a situation both the good and 
mediocre VC will pool and choose the same exit strategy. Again both the good and 
mediocre VCs choosing the same method of exit is not good for the entrepreneur’s 
incentives and her IC (1.2) cannot be satisfied.
l . f . S  E xit choice with conversion
In this section we look at the presence of a separating equilibrium when both trade 
sale and IPO are available to the VCs as exit strategies and the VCs hold a PCP 
stake, which they can convert. We look for a separating equilibrium in which the good
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converts and exits through an IPO whereas the mediocre does not convert and exits 
through a TS. Thus investors beliefs are that the venture is good, if they observe th a t 
the VC has converted his stake and is exiting through an IPO, and mediocre otherwise. 
In case of an exit through an IPO, the investors do not know the true value of the firm 
even after investment. They observe the true value only with probability r.
Our approach is again constructive. The incentive compatibility conditions for such 
an equilibrium given the investors beliefs are as follows:
[9(1 -  S h )V h ( 1 + x ) \ + Z >  / ( l  -  S l )V h ( 1 +  x)  (1.10)
/ ( I  -  Sl ) V l { 1 +  x) >  9(1  -  SH) [rVL +  (1 -  r )V H] (1 +  x) (1.11)
For a separating equilibrium to exist the investors believe th a t the VC converting 
his stake is good and accept a stake Sh  from that venture. The first condition (1.10) 
simply states that the good VC is better off converting (and accepting a stake q) and 
paying a price Sh  for the investment rather than not converting (and retaining the 
stake / )  being mistaken for a mediocre one and exiting through a TS. As described in 
the setup above the VC gets a private benefit of Z  in case of successful IPO for a good 
firm. It should be clear from the condition th a t for the conversion signal to be credible 
q < f .
The second condition (1.11) similarly states that it is not worthwhile for the mediocre 
to mimic the good and exit through an IPO. The mediocre is better off not converting 
and exiting through a TS. However, even when he converts, the mediocre firm is not 
assured of a high valuation for the remaining stake. Investors (in an IPO) realise the 
true value of the venture with probability r and only with the complementary proba­
bility (1 — r) the firm is mistaken for the good. Theses conditions yields the following 
proposition
P ro p o s itio n  3 There exists a fully separating equilibrium in which the good VC con­
verts his stake into common equity and exits through an IPO provided
1 )a a  f  m - S Q V " ( i + x ) - z  H i - s p v '- )\ (l ~ S , t ) V " ( l + x ) ’ (l-S„)[rV'- + (l-r)V"] /
2)Z > Z mi„ = f ^ [ V L( 1 +  x)  -  I] [ h T ^ p ^ t t t ]
The VC o f the mediocre venture does not convert and exits through a trade sale.
P ro o f. See Appendix ■
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We define the range in which a fully separating equilibrium exists as q £ (qfs^Qf s )- 
The upper bound of the range i.e. qps, defines the threshold above which the mediocre 
VC no longer finds it worthwhile to exit through a TS. Similarly, below the lower bound 
qps the good VC’s payoff from the TS is greater than that of the IPO. Thus a fully 
separating equilibria in which the good converts and exits through an IPO whereas 
the mediocre does not convert and exits though a TS exists only if q lies in this range. 
Notice th a t condition (1) implies th a t q < / ,  indicating that conversion must be costly 
(see Appendix for proof).
The other necessary condition for a separating equilibria to  exist is that the private 
benefits Z  should be a t least equal to Z min as in condition (2) where A V  is equal 
to (V H — V L). The reason why separation is not possible with Z  =  0 is because 
a combination of exit choice (through IPO) and conversion imposes a cost on both 
types. However, this cost is higher for the good type than for the mediocre one. The 
only possibility then for having a  separating equilibrium is th a t the good type should 
be more willing to pay this cost than  a mediocre type (in a way not dissimilar from 
Allen and Faulhaber (1989)). This happens only when Z  is sufficiently large. The good 
VC thus converts to a lower stake and exits though an IPO  because of the reputation 
(private benefit Z) he gains from bringing a good firm to the market. This is crucial 
because given our assumption of TS being informationally more efficient than an IPO 
the firm does not gain in terms of valuation in an IPO vis-a-vis a TS
Next, can we have a separating equilibrium with q =  / ?  W ithout conversion, the 
mediocre type will be tem pted to  go for an IPO, since he stands a better chance of not 
being detected, than sticking to his postulated equilibrium strategy of a TS. Forcing 
conversion to a lower stake as a prelude to an IPO is a way to deter the mediocre from 
mimicking the good type.
Exiting through an IPO is good for the entrepreneur’s incentives. Empirical evidence 
also suggests th a t exiting through an IPO is the holy grail of VC investing. It is well 
documented that returns from an IPO  to VCs are much higher than any other form 
of exit. It is also a requirement of most venture agreements th a t convertible stakes are 
automatically converted into common equity in case of IPOs when certain conditions 
are satisfied.
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1.4-4 O ther equilibria
1.4.4.1 Semi-separating equilibria
We also look at the range of q in which there is a possibility of a semi-separating 
equilibria. In this section we therefore look a t the possibility that the VC of the good 
firm does an IPO with probability p. and a TS otherwise. We investigate whether it 
is possible to have an equilibrium under such circumstances. For the good VC to be 
willing to randomize between separating by converting and exiting through an IPO 
and pooling by not converting and exiting through a TS, the payoff must make the VC 
indifferent between the two. Again for the signal to  be credible we need q < f .  The 
condition for the existence of such a hybrid or semi-separating equilibrium is thus:
[9(1 -  SH)V "(1  + x ) ]  + Z >  / ( I  -  S ) V H( 1  +  x)  (1 .1 2 )
/ ( l  -  S )V L ( 1  +  x)  >  9 ( 1  -  SH) [rVL + ( 1  -  r ) V H] ( 1  +  x)  (1.13)
This condition is similar to  those of the fully separating equilibria, the only difference 
being that in case of a  TS the investors can no longer conclude that the venture is 
mediocre. The investors know that a firm doing an IPO is good, whereas a firm raising 
investment through a TS might be good or mediocre. The investors update their prior 
probabilities of good and mediocre i.e. a  and ( 1  — a)  with the additional information 
about the probability of the good performing an IPO i.e. p. Using Bayesian updating 
the investors arrive at the new share for companies performing TS i.e. S.  This share S  
is given by the following relationship:
( 1  ~  /*)<*
( 1  -  p)a  +  ( 1  — a) V H(l  + x) +
( 1  - Q )
( 1  -  p)a  +  ( 1  -  a
-VL(1 + x)
P ro p o s itio n  4 There exists semi separating equilibria in which the good VC ran­
domises between converting his PCP stake (and exiting through an IPO) and not con­
verting (and exiting through a Trade Sale) provided
D  f  f ( l - S ) V " ( l + x ) - Z  f ( l - S ) V h \
1 )q  \  ( l - S / , ) V " ( l + x )  ’ ( l - S „ ) [ r V ' - + ( l - r ) V " }  j
A V ( l - r )  
rV'- + ( \ - r ) V n2 ) Z  >  Z mm =  [ VL(1 + x ) - t \
The VC of the mediocre venture does not convert and exits only through a trade sale.
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P ro o f. See Appendix ■
Again similar to the condition on q for a fully separating equilibria, the range of q 
which supports the semi-separating equilibria is defined as q e  {qss, q ss )• Note th a t the 
value of Z mm which supports the separating equilibria is the same for both the fully 
separating and the semi-separating equilibria. Z mw is the minimum reputation gain 
required for the good VC to exit through an IPO. The fully separating equilibrium and 
the semi-separating equilibria differ only in terms of the probability of exiting through 
an IPO in the high state. The payoffs to a VC if exit is through an IPO is the same 
for both fully separating and semi-separating equilibria. Therefore the value of Z min is 
the same for both equilibria.
The payoff to the good VC when he does not exit through an IPO  in a semi-separating 
equilibria is higher than in a fully separating equilibrium. This is reflected in the up­
per bound of q in a semi-separating equilibria q ss ,being lower than th a t of the fully 
separating equilibrium i.e. qps.
Comparing the range of q for a fully separating and semi-separating equilibria it can 
be shown th a t qss_ > £S\S > W s  > qss-
It is clear from the above discussion that lower values of q in the range support a fully 
separating equilibria, medium values support both fully separating and semi-separating 
equilibria and low values support only a semi-separating equilibria.
Lower values of q increase the payoffs when the good VC does not convert. However 
the lower bound of q in case of the fully separating equilibria is higher than th a t of 
semi-separating equilibria. This is because in case of the fully separating equilibria if 
the good does not convert and exits through a TS he is mistaken for the mediocre and 
gets only the price offered to the mediocre for the initial investment. This is lower than 
the price the VC is offered in a semi-separating equilibria, since in a semi-separating 
equilibria the good and mediocre might pool in case of a TS and the price offered 
reflects that.
Finally, the lower range supports only a semi-separating equilibria because the upper 
bound is the value of q below which the mediocre VC is not prepared to exit through 
a TS. The VC gets a higher price in a semi-separating equilibria, because of pooling, 
than in a fully separating equilibria. Hence the upper bound of q in a fully-separating 
equilibria is greater than th a t of the semi-separating equilibria.
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It is clear from the above discussion th a t certain values of the param eters support 
both a semi-separating as well as fully separating equilibria. However, the probability 
of exiting through an IPO given V H, is lower in the case of semi-separating equilibria as 
compared to the fully separating equilibrium. Thus from a point of view of incentivising 
the entrepreneur, it is optimal for VCs to commit to  exit through an IPO all other things 
being equal.
1.4.4.2 Pooling equilibria
There is always the possibility of a pooling equilibria for all param eter values. In a 
pooling equilibria both the good and the mediocre venture exit using the same method. 
The entrepreneur therefore does not have an incentive to exert effort and work for a 
good outcome.
1-4-5 Out o f equilibrium beliefs
In the above section we constructed separating equilibria in which the VC of the good 
firm converted his stake and exits through an IPO whereas the VC of the mediocre 
firm does not convert and exits through a TS. In this section investigate if these actions 
by the good and mediocre VCs dom inate the other possible actions open to them. We 
analyse the incentives to deviate for the good and the mediocre VC separately.
1.4.5.1 Good VC deviations
We have already arrived at the param eter values which ensure th a t the payoff to  the 
good VC of conversion and exit by IPO  is greater than not converting and exit through 
a TS. The other actions of the good VC that need to  be evaluated are:-
1 . Conversion and TS
The good VC’s IC condition in case of a separating equilibrium is given by equa­
tion (1.10). This condition ensures th a t the payoff to a good VC when he converts 
and exits through an IPO is greater than  not converting and exiting through a 
TS. This means that if equation (1.10) is satisfied then the VC would not prefer 
converting and exiting through a TS, since by conversion he gets a lower payoff 
as compared to not converting
2. No conversion and IPO
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Second, we evaluate the case if the good VC does not convert and tries to exit 
through an IPO. Assume th a t following this out of equilibrium deviation, in­
vestors believe that the firm is mediocre. The payoff th a t the good VC gets will 
therefore be
/ ( l - S L) ( l+ x ) [ r V "  +  ( l - r ) V L] (1.15)
The investors pay the mediocre firm’s price for the initial investment and since 
exit is through an IPO investors pay V H only with probability r. The payoff to the 
good VC (1-15) is lower in value than the payoff from not converting and exiting 
through a TS. We have already shown in Section 4.3 th a t the good VC prefers 
conversion and IPO to not converting and TS. He will therefore not prefer this 
deviation since it yields a lower payoff. Thus the good VC’s equilibrium choice 
of converting and exit through an IPO dominates all other options.
1.4.5.2 M ediocre VC deviations
We similarly analyse the out-of-equilibrium choices of the mediocre VC and compare 
the payoffs w ith the equilibrium choice. The mediocre VC’s equilibrium choice is not 
to convert and exit through a TS. We have already derived param eter values which 
ensures that choice. Therefore, the other actions that we need to evaluate are:-
1 . Conversion and TS
From equation (1.11) it is quite clear th a t the VC would definitely not prefer 
conversion and exit through a TS, since on conversion he gets a lower payoff.
2. No Conversion and IPO
If the mediocre VC decides not to convert and exits through an IPO, then given 
our assumption investors will assume that he is exiting from a mediocre firm. 
This is because the VC of the good venture converts and then exits through an 
IPO. Since investors assume he is mediocre they will offer a valuation of V L( l +x )  
for his stake. His payoff is thus / ( I  — S i ) V L{ 1 +  x) which is exactly equal to his 
equilibrium payoff from the TS. Thus there is no reason for the VC to  prefer one 
over the other. We therefore assume that in such a circumstance the VC will not 
convert and exit through a TS.
Based on the above we can conclude th a t in case of both the good and the mediocre 
VCs there exists some out-of-equilibrium beliefs that guarantee their equilibrium choices
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of IPO and TS respectively. Those beliefs satisfy standard refinements such as the Cho 
and Kreps (1987) intuitive criterion ensuring th a t their equilibrium choices will domi­
nate all other options available.
1.5 Exit, signalling and incentives
It is clear from the discussion above th a t there exists a separating equilibrium in which 
the good converts and exits through an IPO whereas the mediocre does not convert 
and exits through a TS. Given th a t the entrepreneur’s private benefits are maximised 
in an IPO, exit through an IPO by the good venture can be used to reward her efforts, 
since the success of the venture depends on her efforts. In contrast, if the venture is 
mediocre the VC exits through a TS and the entrepreneur does not get any private 
benefits.
Suppose now that the private benefit Z  th a t the VC gets on exiting a good venture 
through an IPO is stochastic with a probability distribution h{Z)  and cumulative 
probability distribution H(Z) .  One of the reasons for assuming Z  to be stochastic is 
the fickleness of the IPO market. It is well known that IPO  markets tend to operate 
in cycles with periods of intense activity followed by quiet periods. In a quiet period 
even with a good venture, it might not be always possible for the VC to exit through 
an IPO.
Given the above scenario we look a t the probability of an IPO if the venture is 
successful. If no PCPs (or convertible securities) are in place then the VC has no 
means to signal the quality of the venture to  the investors. In such a case no separation 
between the good and mediocre ventures is possible and only a pooling equilibrium 
exists. In a pooling equilibrium the probability p of an IPO when the venture is good 
is equal to 7  the probability of an IPO when the venture is mediocre. As already 
pointed out earlier such an equilibrium is not good for the entrepreneur’s incentives. 
The entrepreneur is motivated to  exert effort and increase the probability p of the 
venture being good so th a t exit is through an IPO and the entrepreneur is in control 
of the venture. However the probability of an exit through an IPO being the same for 
both good and mediocre ventures in a pooling equilibrium, the entrepreneur is better 
off not exerting effort.
If PCPs are in place then there exists the possibility of conversion by the VC to signal 
the quality of the venture. In particular, we have shown that there exists a separating
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equilibrium in which the good converts and exits through an IPO whereas the mediocre 
VC does not convert and exits through a TS. One of the necessary conditions for the 
existence of such an equilibrium is Z  > Z m i n . If this condition is satisfied then a 
separating equilibrium is possible in which p  =  1  and 7  =  0  i.e. the good exits through 
an IPO and the mediocre via a TS. This equilibrium is good for entrepreneur incentives 
since it rewards the entrepreneur with control of the venture.
We now discuss below if indeed there are parameter values of q and /  which ensures 
th a t both a separating equilibrium exists and at the same time the entrepreneur is 
incentivised. The conditions which ensure that a separating equilibrium exists is given 
in Proposition 3. We first note th a t Z m i n  is lower if /  is lower. It is thus easier to 
achieve a separating equilibrium if the initial stake of the VC is not too high. If we pick 
the highest value of q, qps> since this minimises the cost of signalling for the VC, the 
cost /  — qps  is increasing in /  which means th a t the VC loses more when his initial 
investment is bigger. This suggests that a separating equilibrium is more likely if the 
value of /  is not too high.
As discussed above the value of q is pinned down by qps  and provided that K  is 
not too large, we will always be able to find a value of /  small enough such th a t the 
entrepreneur’s IC is satisfied.
(1 -  H ( Z min))B > e/p  (1.16)
Therefore we have
L em m a 1 I f  K  < K , there exists values of q and f  such that a separating equilibrium 
exists and is compatible with the entrepreneur choosing high effort.
P r o o f .  See discussion above, u
Thus there exists values of q and /  such that the VC is prepared to provide funds 
upto the value of K .
1.5.1 Optim al security design
We have so far abstracted from the issue of optimal security design. Our results are 
that for a separating equilibrium to exist, it is necessary th a t q < f .  PC Ps with their 
participating and convertibility features are a way to implement this outcome. This 
still leaves unanswered the question of how to best design the initial stake.
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Given the two point support in our model (V H and V L) our focus on straight equity 
is w ithout loss of generality. A combination of risky debt and equity can replicate the 
payoffs from any optimal security. It would be therefore straightforward to  extend our 
argument to  a situation where the VC holds both debt and equity and could possibly 
convert (at some cost) one or both securities in case of an IPO.
More generally, the conclusion that we can draw from our analysis is th a t the in­
formed party  (the VC in our case) should hold a claim that is sufficiently information 
sensitive, such th a t converting it to  a lower stake conveys some information. We con­
jecture the existence of a trade-off between how much of the claim the VC needs to 
give up for this action to be a credible signal, and the information sensitivity of th a t 
claim.
Finally in a more general model the issues of security design and convertibility should 
be jointly considered. Our point is simply th a t the optimal security should have a 
convertibility feature for any chance of it being used in signalling.
1.6 Comparative statics
We have in the previous sections looked at the conditions required for the existence 
of the separating equilibria. In this section we look a t how the ranges are affected by 
changes in different parameter values.
L em m a 2 The minimum private benefit Z m m  required to sustain a separating equilib­
rium (i) increases with ( 1  — r), the difference in values o f the good and mediocre firms 
A V , with the value of the good firm  V H and with the VC ’s stake after conversion q
(ii) decreases with value o f the mediocre firm  V L and the amount o f investment raised
I .
P ro o f. Rearranging Z m m  we have Z m i n  = f t [ V H(l + x)  -  / ] ( 1  -  r)AV,  the statics 
then follow. ■
Both ( 1  — r) and A V  can be thought of as measures of information asymmetry 
which the outside investors face. An increase in the information asymmetry implies 
that the good VC requires a higher private benefit Z  to convince him to exit through 
an IPO. Further, an increase in information asymmetry increases the probability th a t 
the mediocre VC gets if he exits through an IPO by mimicking the good VC. A higher 
Z  in such circumstances ensures that the good VC gets a higher payoff on exit through
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an IPO. Similarly, a higher Z  is required to  enable the good VC to separate in case of 
a higher q, since again a higher q increases the incentives of the mediocre to mimic. In 
this context it is im portant to note th a t the private benefit Z  enjoyed by the VC of 
the good venture in case of a successful exit through an IPO, is not available to the 
VC of the mediocre venture even when he exits through an IPO. It is for this reason 
th a t Z  plays such a crucial role in our analysis in sustaining a separating equilibria.
An increase in the value of the good firm V H increases the incentives of the VC 
of the good firm to exit through a TS hence an increase in Z  is required to  preserve 
incentives for exiting through an IPO.
An increase in V L with all other things remaining constant reduces the information 
asymmetry thus, requiring a lower Z  to sustain the separating equilibrium
Finally, an increase in the amount of investment I  required increases the stakes S h  
and S l th a t both the good and mediocre have to give up. However, it affects the 
mediocre more than the good venture reducing the incentives of the mediocre to mimic 
and thus a lower Z.
L em m a 3 In  a fully separating equilibrium the range o f q (or f ) supporting the equi­
libria (i) increases as r increases; (ii) increases as Z  increases; (Hi) decreases as V H 
increases ;and (v) decreases as V L increases.
P ro o f. See Appendix ■
An increase in r means th a t the probability th a t investors know the true value of 
firm is very high. Increase in r  slackens the incentive compatibility condition for the 
mediocre VC and in the limit when r  =  1 the investors know the true value of the 
mediocre firm. Overall this increases the range in which a separating equilibrium is 
supported.
An increase in Z  increases the payoff which a good VC gets on exiting through an 
IPO and makes it attractive for the good VC to exit through an IPO. It therefore 
supports a higher range of param eters for the separating equilibrium.
An increase in the value of the good firm V H reduces the range of the fully separating 
equilibria since it affects the incentive compatibility conditions for both the good and 
mediocre VCs. It increases the payoff to  the good if he does not convert and exits 
through a TS and also to the mediocre if he mimic’s the good. Overall this has the 
effect of reducing the range supporting the separating equilibrium.
1.6. Comparative statics 40
Higher V L increases the payoff of a mediocre VC if he exits through a TS and also 
the payoff to a good VC if he does not convert and exits through a TS, thus reducing 
the range supporting the equilibrium.
1.6.1 Em pirical im plications
The first implication concerns the probability of revelation of the firm quality r  in case 
of an IPO. As r  increases the range supporting a separating equilibrium also increases. 
It can be reasonably assumed that r is high for informationally efficient markets like 
the US and UK as compared to  others. In these markets there are a lot of analysts 
following stocks and the probability of getting the value of a stock right after an IPO 
is therefore relatively high implying a high r. We are thus likely to observe more exits 
through an IPO in such markets. Whereas in markets where r  is low the range of 
param eter values supporting the equilibrium is also lower. This will deter a lot of VCs 
who might thus not find it worthwhile to exit through an IPO. This could possibly 
be a reason why we observe more exits through an IPO in the US than in any other 
market. Also for very low values of r  (i.e. r  —> 0) a separating equilibrium cannot be 
sustained at all. Thus the use of Convertible securities is itself redundant. This is again 
borne out by empirical and anecdotal evidence. The use of such securities outside the 
US is not so wide-spread.
The second implication concerns the private benefits of control Z  for the good VC. 
These can be interpreted as reputation effects which help VCs establish themselves 
among their investors. The range th a t supports a separating equilibria is higher if the 
distribution of Z  is higher in the sense of first order stochastic dominance. In the 
dominant distribution it is more likely that Z  > Z mm, which makes it easier to give 
incentives to the entrepreneur through more IPOs. In the real world, Z  is likely to 
be higher for younger VCs who need to establish their reputations as compared to 
older more established VCs. This means th a t the model predicts th a t we will observe 
more exits through IPOs by younger VCs as compared to older VCs. This has been 
empirically confirmed by Gompers (1996) who observes grandstanding by younger VCs. 
He finds that younger VCs are more likely to exit through a venture using an IPO as 
compared to older more established VCs.
The value of Z  itself increases with an increase in the information asymmetry (1 — r). 
Again it can be argued that the information asymmetry is higher for European markets
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as compared to the US. This means that the private benefit Z  required for the VC to 
do an IPO in Europe is higher than the US. This is another reason why we observe 
more venture capital exits in the US through IPOs in contrast to other markets.
During periods of high activity in the VC market like the dot-com bubble we would 
expect valuations of all companies to be high. This means that both V H and V L will 
be high. Higher valuations for companies as discussed above leads to an decrease in the 
range supporting the separating equilibria. The reason for this being that increase in 
valuations of firms increases the payoff th a t a firm gets by not converting and exiting 
through a TS. Thus counterintuitively, our model predicts th a t increases in valuation 
of both the good and mediocre companies leads to lower exits through IPOs.
1.7 Conclusion
This chapter presents a signalling model of exits by VCs. We argue that participating 
convertible preferred securities can be used by VCs to signal the quality of the venture 
a t the time of exit. Exit through an IPO also helps in incentivising entrepreneurs, 
since they are rewarded with control after the VC exits. On the other hand in a trade 
sale(TS) the entrepreneur normally loses control of her venture. However, from the 
VCs point of view IPOs are at an informational disadvantage as compared to a TS. 
The VCs are therefore reluctant to exit through an IPO.
PCPs can help solve this problem. By converting their PCP stake into common 
equity VCs signal the quality of their venture. We show based on our model that there 
exists a separating equilibrium in which the VC of the good venture converts his stake 
and exits through an IPO whereas the mediocre venture exits through a TS. This 
also rewards the entrepreneur with control if the venture is good. We thus provide 
an explanation for the commonly observed phenomenon in venture capital exits i.e. 
automatic conversion of VC’s stake in case of an IPO.
Based on the model we derive comparative statics and arrive at empirical implications 
some of which have been confirmed by previous work.
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Appendix l.A  Appendix to Chapterl
P ro o f(P ro p o s it io n  1). The incentive compatibility condition (1.6) for the good can 
be simplified and rewritten as follows
9(1 -  S H) ^  [rB V H +  (1 -  rB ) V L]
/ ( I  -  SL) -  V H
Similarly the IC (1.7) for the mediocre can be rewritten as
9(1 - S a ) < V L
/ ( I  -  S i )  -  [rB V L  +  (1 -  r B ) V H\
The above conditions will be satisfied only if
V L [tb V h  +  (1 -  tb ) V l ]
[rBV L + ( l - r B) VH\ ~ V H
Simplifying the above leads us to the following condition
0 > ( VH -  V L ) 2
which can never be satisfied for any values of V H and V L,which means that there exists 
no separating equilibrium. ■
P ro o f  (P ro p o s it io n  3). The condition (1.10) for the good can be simplified and 
rewritten as
[ H 1 - S l ) V h ( 1 + x ) } - Z  
9 -  (1 — S h ) V h (1 +  x)  (L-U>
Similarly (1.11) can be rewritten as
/ ( l  — Sl ) Vl
9 -  ( \ - S H)\rVL + ( l - r ) V ” } 1 J
Thus a fully separating equilibrium exists if q lies within the values shown above. This 
gives the first condition for the existence of the fully separating equilibria. We derive 
below the minimum value of Z, Z m\n which ensures that q lies in the range described 
by (1.17) and (1.18). The above conditions imply that
/ ( l  -  Sl )Vl  > [ f ( l - S L)VH(l + x ) ] - Z
(1 -  S h )\t V l  +  (1 -  r ) V H\ ~  (1 -  S h ) V h ( 1 +  *)
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Rearranging and simplifying (1.19) gives us the minimum value of Z, Zmm for which a 
fully separating equilibria exists.
We now show th a t /  > q in the above equilibrium. Rearranging (1.18) we have
^ q { l - S H)[rVL + ( l - r ) V H]
1 ~  ( 1  -  Sl )V l 1 U j
From the above f  > q if 1 > i ) which we can rewrite as *
[ rVL+ { l - r ) V u ]
V* •
is greater than 1 since by definition S l  > S h -  
Also, +y ^ V  ^ > 1, since r V L + (1 — r ) V H >  V L. Therefore f  > q. m 
P ro o f  (P ro p o s it io n  4). We can arrive at the range which supports the semi- 
separating equilibrium using a similar method used above for the fully separating 
equilibrium. The condition (1.12) for the good can be simplified and rewritten as
l / ( i - g ) r " ( i  + « ) ] - z
9 -  ( l - S „ ) V " ( l  +  :r)
Similarly (1.13) can be rewritten as
/ ( I  -  S ) V L
q -  (1 -  S H)[rVL +  (1 -  r)V »] K ’
Thus a semi-separating equilibrium exists if /  lies within the values shown above. This 
gives the first condition for the existence of the semi-separating equilibria. Similarly 
we derive below the minimum value of Z, Z min which ensures th a t /  lies in the range 
described by (1.21) and (1.22). The above conditions imply that
f ( l - S ) V L ^  { f ( l - S ) V H(l + x ) ] - Z  (123)
(1 -  S H)[rVL + (1 -  r ) V H] -  ( 1 -  S h ) V h ( 1 + x )
Rearranging and simplifying (1.23) gives us the minimum value of Z,  Z min above 
which the semi-separating equilibria exists. ■
P ro o f  (L em m a 7). The comparative statics of the various parameters supporting 
the fully separating equilibrium is arrived at by differentiating the upper and lower 
bounds with the respective parameters. For ease of exposition we calculate the impact 
on the range by restating and differentiating the upper and lower bounds wrt / .  The 
results hold if the effects are calculated w.r.t. q.
(i) W ith  re sp e c t to  r
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Differentiating the lower and upper bound of /  with respect to r we have =  
q{l~(i-S^)v>V,l] which can be further simplified as ' Thus
~^=  < 0. Also the upper bound fpsdoes  not depend on r  and hence does not change 
with r. Thus an increase in r results in the lower bound fp s  decreasing which causes 
the entire range to increase.
(ii) W ith  re s p e c t to  Z
Only the upper bound fp s  depends on Z .  On inspecting the value fp s  =  ^7-s /  yy" (l+x)^ ^  
we can immediately see that an increase in Z  increases f ps -  The value of f p s  does 
not depend on Z  and thus is not affected by it. Therefore an increase in Z  result in an 
increase in the range of /  supporting the equilibria.
(iii) W ith  re s p e c t to  V H
Differentiating the upper and lower bounds of /  with respect to V H we have the 
following:
d f F S  q
d V h  ~  (1 -  S L) [vH{i + x)\2
which is clearly >  0. Thus > 0 -  Similarly =  (1_ g / )9[W ^ 2 ( l + x )  wbicb *s  <  b * 
Thus an increase in V H leads to an increase in f p s  and a decrease in f p s  which has 
the effect of decreasing the range supporting the equilibria.
(iv) W ith  re s p e c t to  V L
Differentiating the upper and lower bounds of /  with respect to V L we have the 
following:
dfFS  o J  1 r ft ^v H  ^ I1 " 7’) y H= q{ 1 -  S H)  ^  ---- - >o-r i /r /- , „ J r +  (1 -  r ) — r]QV L ^  ' V > V L j [ VL]2 (1 -  S l )
The above expression is positive if
I  . SV H , (1 — r) V H[r +  ( l - r )—T ) >
( i - s L)2[vL(i + x)}21 ' ' ' v l > -  [v l \2 ( i - s Ly
& ft ’ S’Simplifying it can be shown that it is not true, thus dv 'L < 0. 
Similarly,
O f f s  q { l - S H) V H{\ + x)  + Z  I
d V L V H{l + x)  ( 1  -  SL)2 [Vl {1 +  x ) ] 2
which is clearly < 0 .
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Thus an increase in V L causes both the lower bound and upper bound to decrease 
resulting in an decreased range of /  supporting the separating equilibria. ■
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2
In Letter but not in Spirit: An Analysis of 
Corporate Governance in the UK
2.1 Introduction
The UK’s response to corporate governance failures in the 1980s (such as the Maxwell 
Communications, Polly Peck and BCCI scandals) has been quite different from the 
recent Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US. Instead of a prescriptive and legislative regulation 
it has adopted a “comply or explain” approach1. Its defining aspect is a voluntary code 
of best practice which companies are free to  choose to follow. Companies in their annual 
reports must state whether they comply with the code and identify reasons for any 
areas of non-compliance. Thus, the main strength of the “comply or explain” approach 
is that it eschews a one size fits all approach and allows flexibility to companies.
The “comply or explain” approach provides us with an unique opportunity to assess 
the voluntary approach to corporate governance in terms of actual rather than  formal 
implementation of the code, i.e. have the companies embraced the genuine spirit of the 
code or do they simply follow the letter of its recommendations? More generally, the 
UK approach to corporate governance has been adopted as a benchmark by numerous 
countries2. The answers to the above questions will not only suggest improvements
1 According to  Sir Derek Higgs (tlie; author o f the Higgs R eport on the role and effectiveness o f non-executive  
directors published in January 2003) “/< ( th e  "com ply  o r  exp la in ~ a p p r o a ch )  o f fers  f l e x ib i l i t y  a n d  in te l l i g e n t  
d is c r e t io n  and. a l low s  f o r  va l id  ex c e p t io n  to the  s o u n d  rule .  T h e  b r i t t l e n e s s  a n d  r ig id i t y  o f  leg i s la t i o n  c a n n o t  
d ic ta t e  the b eh a v iou r ,  o r  f o s t e r  the t r u s t .  I  be l ieve  that, is  f u n d a m e n t a l  to  the eff ec t ive  u n i t a r y  board a n d  to 
s u p e r i o r  c o r p o r a te  p e r fo r m a n c e ."  T he Higgs report was sought by the UK governm ent in response to  the recent 
corporate governance failures in th e U S. T he above statem ent is contained in the introductory letter  of the 
Higgs Report to  the Chancellor o f the exchequer.
“In particular, the O EC D  in its 2004 P rincip les o f C orporate G overnance, s ta tes that countries should follow  
a flexible regulatory m echanism  of corporate governance.
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to the functioning of the code in the UK, but also highlight to other countries in the 
process of setting up their governance systems the conditions under which such an 
approach will function most effectively.
We analyse 245 non-financial UK companies, listed on the London Stock Exchange 
and part of the FTSE350 index over 1998 - 2004. The Combined Code (henceforth, the 
Code), applicable to all listed companies in the UK, was in operation during this time. 
We construct a unique dataset by hand-collecting information from the Corporate 
Governance statem ents included in their annual reports. Amongst other things, we 
collect details of each company’s compliance with the provisions of the Code and the 
exact explanations provided in case of non-compliance.
We begin by evaluating compliance with the Code’s various provisions. We observe a 
monotonic increase in the propensity to comply with the provisions over time. By the 
end of 2004, more than half of the companies in our sample are fully compliant with 
the Code (as compared to 10% in 1998), and on average less than 10% of all firms do 
not comply with any given single provision.
Next we examine the non-compliant companies’ explanations. We find that firms 
often give uninformative explanations of why they do not comply with a given provision. 
Specifically, we rank explanations from the least informative to the most informative, 
based on the level of detail given by the company. First, for an average of 17% of 
provisions not complied with over the sample period, no explanations are provided. 
Second, even among those th a t provide explanations in 50% of the cases, these are 
standard and uninformative.
We then explore how the explanations evolve over time. We find that companies 
th a t do not comply in a year provide the same explanation, year after year as their 
explanations rarely change. Companies th a t cease to comply with a provision tend not 
to provide an informative explanation as to why this is the case. Therefore firms seem 
to be making a fundamental choice between compliance or non-compliance, rather than  
using the flexibility given by the code.
The voluntary nature of the corporate governance further enables us to identify the 
intensity of moral hazard problems in various groups of companies’ based on their 
response to the code. We would expect groups of companies which are more strongly 
monitored like those belonging to the FTSE100 index or cross-listed on other exchanges 
to be more likely to comply with the code as well as provide better explanations in case
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of non-compliance. By empirically analysing compliances and explanation for different 
groups of companies, we find evidence th a t companies belonging to  the FTSE100 index 
and companies cross-listed on US exchanges are more likely to  comply with the Code 
as compared to companies not part of the FTSE100 index or those not cross-listed. 
FTSE100 companies and cross-listed companies are also more likely to provide better 
quality explanations. Further, we find some evidence th a t family owned companies are 
less likely to comply or provide better quality explanations. The results thus point 
to the fact that the severity of the agency problem is different in different groups of 
companies.
The chapter develops as follows. Section 2.2  provides the background to the evo­
lution of corporate governance in UK . Section 2 .3  describes the data. Sections 2.4 
and 2.5  analyses the trends in compliances and explanations in an univariate setting. 
Section 2.6  sets out the hypotheses and empirical strategy. Section 2 .7  describes the 
results and finally Section 2 .8  presents additional robustness checks and concludes..
2.2 Background
The UK is a pioneer in corporate governance regulation. The UK’s reaction to corporate 
governance failures in the 1980s (e.g., Maxwell Communications, Polly Peck, and BCCI) 
was not prescriptive and legislative like the recent Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and led the way 
to a new form of regulation known as the “comply or explain” approach.
The “comply or explain” approach was introduced for the first time in 1992 by 
the Cadbury Report. The defining aspect of this approach was the introduction of a 
voluntary code of best practice characterised by shareholder pressure for its adoption. 
In particular, it is mandatory for companies to state in their annual reports whether 
they comply with the Code and to identify and give reasons for any areas of non- 
compliance in light of their own particular circumstances. As neither the form or content 
of this part of the statement is prescribed, companies have a free hand to explain their 
governance policies in the light of the Code. It is for shareholders to evaluate this part 
of the company’s statement. According to Sir Adrian Cadbury, the “comply or explain” 
approach is preferable to statutory measures because it does not commit companies to 
a one-size-fits-all approach and thus diminishes the risk of complying with the letter, 
rather than the spirit of the Code.
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The Code has since then been modified several times but has all along retained the 
original principle of the “comply or explain” . After the Cadbury Report, there have 
been various committees in the UK reporting on different aspects of corporate gover­
nance. The Combined Code published in June 1998, consolidates the work of all the 
earlier committees and was incorporated into the Stock Exchange Listing Rules in De­
cember 1998. The Combined Code was in force continuously for the period between 
1998 to 2004, following which it was updated by the Higgs Committee recommenda­
tions. The Combined Code contains both principles and detailed provisions, on various 
aspects of governance (e.g., board structure, committees composition, and service con­
trac ts’ length). The major provisions of the Combined Code are listed in Appendix
2.A.1 and Appendix 2.A.2 traces the evolution of the code over time.
The concept of principles as opposed to strict regulation originating in the UK from 
the Cadbury Code in 1992, has been recommended internationally in the OECD Prin­
ciples of Corporate Governance. The OECD Principles were agreed in 1999 and then 
revised in 2004 and have formed the basis for corporate governance initiatives in both 
OECD and non-OECD countries alike. The OECD principles do not advocate a one- 
size-fits-all approach to governance.3 W ith the exception of the US, the majority of 
OECD countries and a great number of non-OECD countries have adopted corporate 
governance codes that work on the “comply or explain” principle . 4
2.2.1 Related Literature
The empirical literature on corporate governance, especially in the US context, is vast 
(see Becht, Bolton and Roell (2002) for a detailed survey). To the best of our knowledge, 
there is no other academic paper that analyses the implementation of the Combined 
Code in detail. Most of the existing studies deal with the implementation of some of the
’To quote; an O EC D  recom m endation: “Com panies should report their corporate governance; practices. and 
in a nuinhe;r of countries such disclosure is now m andated as part o f the regular repenting. In several countries, 
com panies must im plem ent corporate governance principles set. or endorsed, by th e listing authority w ith  
m andatory reporting on a "comply or explain" basis. D isclosure of th e governance structures and policies e>f 
the company, in particular the division o f  authority be;twe:e;n shareholders, m anagem ent and board m em bers is 
im portant for the assessm ent of a com pan y’s governance." (O EC D  Princip les o f C orporate Governance. 2004)
’Exam ples of the adoption o f the "com ply or explain" m echanism  to corporate governance can be found 
in many countries. T he Hong Kong C ode on Corporate G overnance Practices is sim ilar to  th e U K ’s Code. 
Singapore has a new 2005 revision of its Code of Corporate G overnance, which is also very sim ilar to the UK 
and Hong K ong Codes. In New Zealand, th e C om m ission’s consultation  during 2003 elicited a clear preference 
for principles over rules. A lso African countries are adopting sim ilar approaches to the UK . for instance the 
King' s C ode in South Africa and the P S C G T  Principles and Sam ple C ode of B est Practice in K enya. A m ong tin; 
other countries that chose tin; “com ply or explain" approach we can also m ention: A ustralia. A ustria. Belgium . 
Canada. China. Germany. Indonesia. Ireland. Italy. Korea. M alaysia. M exico. Poland. P ortugal. Spain, and 
Sweden. Set' the World Bank Toolkit Dt v d o p i n q  ( 'o rp o r t i l c  ( ' , o v ( m u n c c  C o d t s  o f  li i s l ,  P r u r l i r t  . (2005) for a 
com plete lis t.
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recommendations of the Cadbury Committee. Our study is the first to comprehensively 
analyse the working of the "comply or explain" system in the UK over a period of 
time. We analyse not only the level of compliance with the individual provisions of the 
Combined Code of best practice, but also the quality of explanations provided in case 
of non-compliance.
Dahya, McConnell and Travlos (2002) look a t top management turnover and corpo­
ra te performance for UK companies before and after the Cadbury Code. They find th a t 
poorer performance is associated with higher turnover and this relationship is signifi­
cantly stronger following adoption of the Cadbury Code. They further conclude th a t 
this increased sensitivity to performance is mainly due to  an increase in non-executive 
(or outside) directors.
Similarly Dedman (2003) investigates if the Cadbury Code has lead to reduced man­
agerial entrenchment. Based on a sample of UK listed firms between 1990 and 1995, 
she finds that the Cadbury Code has not reduced the agency problem of managerial 
entrenchment in large UK firms. However, similar to  Dahya et al. (2002) she does find 
a relationship between company performance and CEO departure.
Conyon and Peck (1998) study the impact of various governance variables and pres­
ence of remuneration committees on executive pay. They conclude that executive pay 
and corporate performance are more aligned in companies having a m ajority of non­
executive directors and remuneration committees.
Furthermore there are studies by accountancy firms and consultancies which look 
at the degree of compliance with the Combined Code. Grant Thornton (an accoun­
tancy firm) produces an annual Corporate Governance Review. The review sets out 
the compliance of FTSE350 companies with the Combined Code and the explanations 
provided for the internal control provisions of the code. Similarly, the consulting firm 
Deloitte has recently produced a report on the effectiveness of the Directors Remu­
neration Report for the Department of Trade and Industry. However, such studies are 
narrower in scope and focused only on specific aspects of the Code.
2.3 Data Description
We analyse 245 non-financial companies belonging to the FTSE 350 index as of 31st. 
December 2003, for the period from 1st December 1998 to 30th June 2004. We exclude 
the 105 financial companies because the regulatory environment for those companies
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differs significantly from th a t of non financial companies. Those regulations, although 
not part of the Combined Code, may well interact with its provisions, and have impli­
cations for corporate governance.
The Combined Code consists of a total of 11 provisions, out of which we analyse the 
following eight provisions relating to:
1 . The separation of Chairman and CEO.
2. The appointment of a Senior Non-executive Director.
3. The to tal number of Non-executive Directors.
4. The proportion of Independent non-executive directors.
5. The term s of Service contracts.
6 . The nomination committee.
7. The remuneration committee.
8 . The audit committee.
The following three provisions were not analysed.
1 . Directors’ re-election.
2. Pay linked to performance.
3. Internal control systems
All companies in the sample complied or intended to comply on provision relating 
to directors’ re-election. Judging the effective level of compliance of the provisions 
pertaining to pay-linked to performance and internal controls required additional 
information which is not available to us.
For each year, we hand-collected the following information from the corporate gover­
nance statem ents and directors’ remuneration reports in each company’s annual report.
•  The statem ent of compliance with the eight provisions of the Combined Code, 
and the exact explanation given in case of non compliance.
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• The Board of Directors’ composition, with the indication of the total number 
of executive and non-executive directors, and th a t of independent non-executive 
directors.
• The composition of the audit, remuneration, and nomination committee,
The annual reports are downloaded from the Mergent Online database. Information 
is missing for some companies in some years. This could be due to a new company 
listing during the sample period or Mergent Online’s data being incomplete . 5 We collect 
cross-listing information from Compustat Global. Information about the membership 
to the FTSE100 index is obtained from FTSE.
Finally, we collect ownership data  for two periods, i.e. 31/12/1998 to 30/06/1999 
and 01/07/2003 to 30/06/2004. The ownership data  for the first period is obtained 
from Faccio and Lang (2002) and pertains to 1996. Ownership for UK companies is 
fairly stable and therefore we use it as a reasonable approximation of the ownership 
structure for 1998 — 99. D ata for the last period was gathered from Thomson One 
Banker Ownership module. Thomson Ownership data  being available quarterly, we 
use data  for the quarter which is closest to the financial year-end of the company.
2.3.1 Descriptive S ta tistics
Table 2.1 shows the total number of companies in our sample for each period. As the 
companies do not have the same financial year ending, we group them in homogeneous 
periods. Each time period includes all companies having their financial year endings 
between 1st July and 30th June (inclusive). The first period however is much shorter, 
since the Combined Code came into effect only from 31st December 1998. We thus 
have a total of 1,287 company-year observations divided into six time periods. W ith 
the exception of the first two periods, we have at least 2 0 0  companies in each period. 
The table further shows the number of companies in each period belonging to the 
FTSE100 index and those that are cross-listed on other exchanges across the world.
Table 2.2 shows the sample’s industry composition. We classify companies in 12 
industry groups as in Campbell (1996). The companies in our sample are spread evenly 
across the 12 industry groups. All industry groups, except petroleum have 100 or more 
observations.
11 Table' 1 gives details o f the number of com panies for which inform ation is available in each period.
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Finally, Table 2.3 provides a classification of our sample by Ownership Structure. 
The ownership structure is calculated at the 10% threshold. A company is said to be 
owned by a particular type of shareholder if their percentage holding in the company 
exceeds 10%. We classify ownership into different categories a la Faccio & Lang (2002):
•  Family: A family (including an individual) or a firm that is unlisted on any stock 
exchange.
•  Non Family: A firm which either widely held (has no single shareholder) at the 
1 0 % level or whose shareholders are widely held.
• State: A national government, local authority or government agency.
• Miscellaneous: Charities, voting trusts, employees, cooperatives etc.
The table shows that a m ajority of firms during both periods have dispersed own­
ership structures. Companies owned by families form a greater proportion 30% during 
1998 — 99 as compared to 15% in 2003 — 04.
2.4 Non-compliances and explanations
This section presents the trends in the degree of compliance with the Code across years 
classified into various groups.
2-4-1 Compliance
Table 2.4 presents the periodwise percentage of fully compliant companies. A company 
is said to be fully compliant in a given period if it is compliant with all the eight pro­
visions of the Code. The table shows that the overall compliance rate is monotonically 
increasing over time. The percentage of companies complying with all the provisions 
increases from 10% in 1998 — 99 to 56% in 2003 — 04. The average across all periods is 
33%. FTSE100 members have a higher rate of compliance (37%) as compared to non- 
FTSE100 firms (31%). The percentage of cross-listed companies which are fully com­
pliant with the Code is 42%, against 31% for non-crosslisted companies. Family-owned 
companies show a lower rate of compliance (2 0 %) than non-family owned companies 
(43%).
Table 2.5 presents the provisionwise analysis of compliances and explanations. The 
average percentages of compliances are very high (more than 85%) for five of the
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eight provisions analysed. The compliance percentage is highest (96%) for the provision 
pertaining to the number of non-executive directors, and lowest (57%) for the duration 
of service contracts. The percentage of non-compliances for which an explanation is 
provided is close to or above 70% for all the provisions. Provisions pertaining to  audit 
committee and nomination committee show the highest proportion of cases when an 
explanation is provided (90%), whereas the remuneration committee is associated with 
the lowest number of cases when an explanation is present (69%).
Table 2.6 presents the industrywise classification of non-compliances and explana­
tions. The percentage of companies fully compliant is highest for Utilities. It ranges 
from a maximum of 44% (Utilities) to  a minimum of 23% (Construction).
2-4-2 N um ber o f non-compliances
In Table 2.7 we present the average number of non-compliances per non-compliant 
company. The average number of non-compliances decreases monotonically from 2.05 
in 1998 — 99 to 1.57 in 2003 — 04. FTSE100 firms have lower average number of non- 
compliances (1.65), as compared to non-FTSElOO firms (1.87). Cross-listed companies 
which do not comply with the Code have a lower average number of non compliances 
(1 .6 6 ), as compared with non-crosslisted (1 .8 6 ).
The average number of non compliances is significantly higher for family owned com­
panies in both the periods (2.35 versus 1.59). The average number of non compliances 
in family owned companies increase in 2003 — 04 as compared to 1998 — 99 (2.26 versus 
2.58), whereas it falls for non-family companies (1.87 versus 1.29). In particular, in the 
period 2003 — 04 the average number of non compliances of family owned companies 
is two times th a t of non-family companies (2.58 versus 1.29).
Table 2.6 presents the industrywise picture of non-compliances. The average number 
of non compliances per company is highest for capital goods (2 .1 2 ), and lowest for basic 
industry (1.60).
2.5 Quality of Explanations
Flexibility is the crucial aspect of the “comply or explain” approach to corporate gov­
ernance. Companies can either comply with the provisions of the code or, they can opt 
out by providing a suitable explanation. The explanation given when departing from 
best practice is therefore representative of the companies’ flexibility when choosing
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their optimal governance structure. The Combined Code does not prescribe a format 
th a t companies have to follow when giving such an explanation, but simply says that 
the explanation has to  be narrative and refer to the company’s unique circumstances :6 
We however find different degrees of "narration" and "specific circumstances" in the 
explanations given in the annual reports. In particular, some explanations are more 
informative and provide more detail than others. Consider the following examples of 
explanations:
• The Board has not at present formally appointed a senior independent direc­
tor, other than the Chairman, to whom concerns can be conveyed. Three new 
non-executive directors have been appointed within the last 12 months, and it is 
considered that the Board should be given time to settle into its new composition 
prior to taking such a decision (BBA 1998).
• In determining its overall policy in respect of service contracts, the Committee 
aims to balance the costs associated with any early termination provisions with 
the need to protect GlaxoSmithKline’s intellectual property rights. The Committee 
maintains a close watch, through its advisors, on trends in contractual terms 
amongst other companies in the competitor panel and in the wider market place. 
It is committed to ensuring that, in achieving this balance, its processes are fair, 
while limiting as far as possible the scope fo r ‘rewarding failure’. The Committee 
has considered the recent guidance produced by the Association o f British Insurers 
and the National Association o f Pension Funds in the UK. It will take this into 
account, alongside market practice, when reviewing contractual terms.
Executive Directors are employed on service contracts under which the employing 
company is required to give 2 f calendar m onths’ notice o f termination and the 
Executive Directors are required to give 12 calendar m onths’ notice.
Executive Directors’ service contracts contain ‘garden leave’, non-competition, 
non-solicitation and confidentiality clauses.
11 “In. the j i r s t  pari,  o f  the  s t a t e m e n t ,  the e o m p a n y  w i l l  he required  to report,  on h o w  it a p p l i e s  the  piine.ipl.es  
in  the  Combined . C o d e .  HV m a k e  c lea r  in  o u r  r e p o r t  th a t w e  do n o t  p r e s c r ib e  the. f o r m  o r  c o n te n t  o f  this  
p a r t  o f  the  s t a t e m e n t ,  the. in t e n t io n  be ing that, c o m p a n i e s  s h o u ld  h a ve  a free  h a n d  to exp la in  th e i r  g o v e r n a n c e  
p o l i c ie s  in  the li ght o f  the p r in e ip l e s ,  in c lu d in g  a n y  s p ec ia l  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  a p p ly in g  to th e m  w h ich  h a v e  led to a 
p a r t i c u l a r  a p pro a ch .  It. m a s t  be f o r  s h a r e h o ld e rs  and. o th e r s  to  e v a lu a te  th is  part,  o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  s t a t e m e n t .  
[ . . ]  In  o u r  repo r t  we m a k e  c lear  th a t  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u ld  be. r ea dy  to e x p la in  th e i r  g o v e r n a n c e  p o l i c ie s ,  in c lu d in g  
a n y  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  ju s t i f y i n g  d e p a r tu r e  from, bes t p r a c t i c e :  a n d  th a t  th o s e  c o n c e rn e d  w i t h  the  e v a lu a t io n  o f  
g o v e r n a n c e  s h o u ld  do  so  w i th  c o m m o n  s en se ,  a n d  with  du e  regard  to c o m p a n i e s '  in d iv id u a l  c i rc u m s ta n c es ."  
(P oints 4 and 0 o f tin- Proaniblo to tlio Combined Coda)
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The Remuneration Committee currently believes that one year contracts would 
not be in the best interest of GlaxoSmithKline with regard to offering a globally 
competitive overall remuneration package and securing maximum protection fo r  
its intellectual property rights.
The Remuneration Committee believes that the current termination payments due 
under Executive Director’s contracts are justified because they represent fair and 
reasonable compensation in the event that the contracts are terminated, given 
market practice and the associated restrictions arising from  the need to protect 
intellectual property. (GlaxoSmithKline, 2002).
The contents of above mentioned explanations are narrative and contain verifiable 
and specific elements, unique to the company. BBA, for instance, justifies the non 
appointment of a senior figure in the board with the presence of new board members 
and the consequent difficulty to appoint a senior figure in such a newly constituted 
board.
On the contrary, consider the following explanations:
• The Board has not identified a senior independent non-executive director, as spec­
ified by the Code, because it considers such an appointment to be unnecessary at 
present (Reuters 1999).
• The board believes that this arrangements (i.e. service contracts greater than 12 
months) are in the best interests o f the company (Rentokil Initial 1998).
• Although M r Wilson has the combined role o f Group Chairman and Chief Execu­
tive, the Board considers that the requirements o f the Code are satisfied and that 
the combination of these roles does not work to the disadvantage of the Company 
or its shareholders (Wilson Bowden pic 2001).
• The company ensures that it recruits to the board only individuals o f sufficient 
calibre, knowledge and experience to fulfil the duties o f a director appropriately. 
The company does not have any non-executive directors on the board (A.2.1,
A .3.1, A .3.2, A .6.1). The directors are mindful o f the provisions o f the Com­
bined Code in this regard and regularly review the situation.
The company ’s nomination committee is made up o f the chairman and managing 
directors. There are no non-executive members on the committee (A .5.1).
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The company does not have a formal remuneration committee (B. 1.1-3, B .1.9-10,
B.2.1-6, C.2.3) but the emoluments o f the directors are the subject o f appraisal 
by the chairman and the managing directors taking into account individual per­
formance and market conditions.
The company does not have an audit committee (C.2.3, D.3.1, D.3.2) but the 
board as a whole regularly monitors internal controls and also ensures that an 
objective and professional relationship is maintained with the auditors. (W .M . 
Morrison 2004).
The above explanations clearly fail to identify specific circumstances for departing 
from best practice. For instance, Reuters justifies the non appointment of a senior 
figure in the board as simply necessary at the present, w ithout further details. Such 
explanation is far less informative and detailed than  the one provided by BBA. At the 
extreme, the company W.M. Morrison does not give any explanation as to  why there 
are no executive directors on the board.
We therefore classify the explanations of non-compliances by searching for the pres­
ence of verifiable and specific elements relating to the company’s circumstances in 
their narrative statements. Such classification requires some subjectivity, which we try  
to limit by using an objective criteria of classification based on both verifiability and 
informativeness. We do not make any judgement as to  whether the explanations pro­
vided are valid from a business perspective. So, in that respect, our identification can 
be termed optimistic. Our classification of explanations is simple to implement and 
easy to replicate, since it classifies explanations from the least to the most informative, 
after checking for their actual veracity. We use the following classification:
• No explanation (Type Oj: W hen no explanation is provided.
• General (Type \): A  general or non-specific (to the company) explanation is 
provided. In this category we include explanations which use standard phrases 
and do not provide any specific details. For e.g. explanations asserting th a t the 
non-compliance is “in the best interests o f the company ”, “a market practice1'1 or 
simply “as necessary”.
• Inline (Type 2): An explanation which is general in nature but repeats words 
from the combined code provision. For instance, provision B1.10 states th a t “re­
muneration committees shoidd, within legal constraints, tailor their approach in
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individual early termination cases to the wide variety o f circumstances'". Some 
companies justify the rolling service contracts with more than one year notice 
period for executive directors for “the mitigation o f early term ination”, w ith­
out giving any further details. Therefore, when a circumstance or words from 
the combined code provision is repeated in the company’s corporate governance 
statem ent without any additional information we classify this as an Inline (Type 
2 ) explanation.
• Limited (Type 3): An explanation which provides more information than General 
or Inline but still falls short of being unique to the company’s circumstances. For 
e.g., in case of the non-compliances arising due to rolling service contracts of 
more than one year, some companies explain th a t this is place for “guarantee­
ing long term projects”. This adds some more information unlike the General or 
Inline. However, it still does not relate to the company’s circumstances by mak­
ing available further information about the company’s development and projects 
which would help in clarifying the explanation.
• Transitional (Type 4): An explanation which points to a transitional situation 
facing the company due to which it is temporarily not compliant. Examples in­
clude unforeseen resignation of a director or an internal restructuring arising due 
to a merger.
• Genuine (Type 3): Explanations are those that we judge “genuine” and in the 
spirit of the combined code. Such explanations are specific to the company 
and motivated in detail and also the information given is verifiable. We actu­
ally checked if the information reported was referring to the company’s unique 
circumstances and if it was correct. For instance, the pharmaceutical company 
GlaxoSmithKline justifies the 24 months’ notice of term ination for its directors 
to protect its intellectual property rights. This company further states that ex­
ecutive directors’ service contracts contain “gardening leave” , competition and 
confidentiality clauses which are relevant to  its business. The explanation thus 
provided is specific to the business/industry it is operating in and the justifica­
tion for non-compliance is directly related to those circumstances. We therefore 
classify such explanations as Genuine and accord it the highest quality in our 
scheme.
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In what follows we analyse the quality of explanations given by various companies 
using different methods of classification.
Table 2.8 presents the yearwise distribution of the quality of explanations accord­
ing to our classification. An average 17% of non-compliers (across all years) provide 
no explanations a t all. When an explanation is given, the m ajority of times it is ei­
ther General (Type 1) (26%) or Inline (Type 2) (25%). In fact, Type 1 and Type 
2  explanations together account for more than 50% in most years. Of the remaining 
explanations, Transitional (Type A) accounts for 16% followed by Genuine (Type 5) 
at 9% and Limited (Type 3) with 8 %. These statistics highlight the tendency to give 
explanations with little information when departing from best practice. In fact, the 
average quality of explanation is constantly between 2 and 3, with a peak of 2.63 in 
2003 — 04 (see Graph 1 ).
We also analyse (table not shown) the percentage distribution of the quality of ex­
planations by industry. Petroleum companies give explanations with an average quality 
of 3.11, followed by Basic Industry with an average quality 2.98. The high average in 
both these industries, are in fact driven by a higher frequency of Genuine (Type 5) 
explanations. For Basic Industry Type 4 and Type 5 explanations comprise nearly 50% 
of the total. In contrast, Capital Goods have a higher proportion of Types 0,1 and 2 
explanations (nearly 90% of the total), thus reducing the average quality to 1.46.
Table 2.9 shows th a t explanations for non-compliance with the senior non executive 
director provision perform the best in the sample. Overall, they have one of the lowest 
percentage of no explanations (11%), and the highest percentage of Type 5 explanations 
(18%). The provisions relating to the Audit and Nomination Committee have the 
lowest percentage of Type 0 explanations (9%). There were no Type 5 explanations 
for the provisions pertaining to separation of the roles of C EO /Chairm an and the 
recommended number of non executive directors in the board. Explanations related 
to the Remuneration Committee tend to be general (Type 1, 44%). W hen we group 
Type 1, Type 2 and Type 3 explanations, and Type 4 and 5 together, we observe 
th a t the m ajority of companies do not give detailed explanations, especially in case of 
non compliance with the Nomination Committee (76%). All these results have to be 
judged, in light of the fact that there are fewer companies which are not compliant with 
provisions relating to the audit, nomination and remuneration committee as compared
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to the provisions relating to  the senior non executive director or to  the length of service 
contracts.
We believe th a t an im portant determinant of the quality of explanations is their 
diversity. For instance, in the case of the designation of a senior non executive director, 
companies offer a variety of circumstances to  justify non-compliance: some companies 
point to the risk of division in the board, others to the existence of a strong non­
executive presence on the board etc. In contrast, some companies justify the non- 
compliance with the Remuneration Committee provision as to be "in the company’s best 
interest" or because "the company’s interests are aligned with the other shareholders". 
Similar explanations are often given when the majority of non executive directors are 
not independent. For instance, some companies state th a t the arrangements in place 
are "appropriate for the nature and culture of the company", or the appointed non­
executives have "deep industry knowledge". In our view, diversity of explanations are 
an im portant factor which make the “comply or explain” approach work (see Appendix
2.A.3 for a detailed discussion).
In summary, when analysing any one of the eight principles we find that out of one 
hundred company-year observations, roughly ninety comply. Out of the remaining ten 
cases, two do not provide any explanation and with the exception of the senior non 
executive director and audit committees, there are then six instances of unconvincing 
explanations. Pertinently, we identify approximately two cases of genuine explana­
tions. Furthermore there is possibly a positive time trend with regard to the quality 
of explanations as the percentage of specific explanations improves after 2 0 0 1 , but on 
diminishing non-compliances.
Table 2.10 presents the quality of explanations for different categories and the pat­
terns are similar to those observed for explanations. FTSE100 companies on average 
give higher quality explanations than non-FTSElOO companies. Cross-listed companies 
tend to give an average higher quality of explanation (2.50) than those not cross-listed 
(2.08). The average quality of explanation provided by a non-family company is higher 
(2.56) than that provided by a family owned company (2.18).
2.5.1 Transition M atrix
The Transition M atrix presented in Table 2.11 analyses further patterns in explana­
tions. The m atrix traces how an explanation evolves from one type to another (or
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directly to compliance), from one period to the following one. In all rows (except Type 
4) we observe th a t the diagonal elements have the highest percentage, which indicates 
the tendency to stick to the same explanation (or no explanation) year after year. Only 
in case of transitional explanations, a change to compliance dominates. Importantly, 
the second highest transition for all explanations (except Type 4) is to comply. This 
means that companies either stick to the same explanation or comply.
2.6 Hypotheses and Empirical Set-up
In this section, we investigate if indeed the Code has succeeded in addressing moral 
hazard issues either through compliance or through the explanations which compa­
nies provide. The main objective of the Code is to limit agency problems between 
shareholders and management and amongst shareholders. The Code being voluntary, 
and further since there is no regulator designated to monitor the compliance with the 
Code, we should expect to see differences in patterns of compliance and explanations, 
amongst different groups of companies. Specifically, based on the descriptive statistics, 
we identify three such groups of companies:
• Companies belonging to the FTSE100 index.
• Companies cross-listed on other exchanges.
• Family owned companies.
We discuss below each group in turn  to develop our hypotheses.
2.6.1 F T SE 100  membership
Companies belonging to the FTSE100 index are amongst the largest companies on 
the London Stock Exchange. They are usually the most high profile companies on the 
exchange and are closely tracked both in the financial media and by analysts. They 
a ttract a lot of attention since the performance of the FTSE100 index is widely re­
garded as a proxy for the general health of the market. Besides there is an emerging 
literature which suggests that media coverage has an effect on the firm policies, par­
ticularly on governance violations. Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales (2007) analyse the 
actions of an investment fund in Russia, the Hermitage Fund, that consciously used a
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media strategy for companies in its investment portfolio which it felt were guilty of cor­
porate malfeasance. The authors find that increased coverage in the press (especially 
the Anglo-American media) increases the probability th a t a governance violation is 
reversed. The reasons for such behaviour is the detrimental effect th a t media coverage 
(of violations) has on the managers’ as well as on the regulators’ reputations.
It is therefore straightforward to extend the above argument to companies belonging 
to the FTSE100 index. Given the higher level of monitoring we should expect lower 
moral hazard issues amongst FTSE100 companies. Since the Code is based on "com­
ply or explain" a company can "explain" rather than comply with the provisions of 
the Code, we should therefore expect to find FTSE100 companies giving better quality 
explanations. However, the behaviour of companies as regards compliances is not clear- 
cut. This will depend on how the markets and the media perceive non-compliances. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that a box-ticking mentality prevails, which is biased to­
wards compliance with the Code . 7 In such circumstances we would indeed expect to 
observe FTSE100 companies more likely to comply with the code. However, it can 
equally be argued that a company not complying with some provisions of the code but 
explaining the reasons for not doing so, is also following the code and market partic­
ipants should recognise that. Overall thus the effect of FTSE100 membership on the 
probability of compliances is likely to be ambiguous.
2.6.2 Cross-listing
The next group that we investigate are companies cross-listed on other exchanges. 
Our earlier section shows that amongst companies that cross-list, most (around 90%) 
cross-list on US exchanges.
The ability of controlling shareholders or managers to take private benefits from 
their firms is an im portant aspect of corporate governance as it represents an impor­
tan t source of potential agency conflicts with shareholders. A number of papers have 
suggested th a t one useful way to “bond” managers not to take excessive private benefits 
is to cross-list the firm’s stock on an exchange th a t imposes higher legal and regula­
tory costs than the firm’s primary exchange. Coffee (2002) and Stulz (1999) were the
1 T he following quote from the Financial T im es of l()th  March. 2005 further illustrates the point "A ls o  th e i r  
i s  a w id e s p r e a d  fe e l in g  in the Hrilish. bo a rdro om s  th a t  in s t i t u t i o n a l  in v e s t o r s  are r e s p o n d i n g  loo m e c h a n i s t i c a l l y  
to the c o m p ly  o f  e.i p la in '  approach, o f  the ( ’o m b in e i t  ( 'o de .  p a y i n g  to lit  t ic a t t e n t io n  to the c i r c u m s t a n c e s  o f  
in d iv id u a l  b u s i n e s s e s  a n d  d is rega rd in g  good e x p la n a t io n s  o f  n o n - c o m p l i a n c e . ~
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first to propose the bonding hypothesis. Coffee’s studies emphasise the legal “bonding” 
mechanisms to which the firm is exposed on cross-listing in the US. The firm can now 
be subject to enforcement by the SEC and also faces prospect of class action from 
investors. In the case of UK firms it can plausibly be argued th a t there is no additional 
benefit from "bonding" since they already operate in a sophisticated regulatory and le­
gal regime, unlike firms from less developed markets. Even if there are no legal reasons 
to “bond” for UK firms, Coffee argues we have to consider the role of “reputational 
intermediaries” in the US markets, such as underwriters (in the case of capital-raising 
listings), auditors, debt-rating agencies, securities analysts as well as the exchange 
themselves (via listing requirements), in providing additional scrutiny or monitoring. 
Cross-listing is therefore likely to encourage companies to comply especially on those 
provisions which form part of the listing requirements in the other exchange. Managers 
of companies may also use cross-listing to signal that they are honest. We would expect 
such managers to be less subject to  agency problems. Given their reputation for hon­
esty, we should thus observe managers providing better quality explanations in case of 
non-compliances. Thus cross-listed companies should definitely do better in terms of 
explanations and probably in terms of explanations too as compared to  companies not 
cross-listed.
2.6 .3  Ownership
Finally, we investigate the impact of ownership structure on moral hazard. Ex-ante we 
would expect the agency problem in family-owned companies to be lower than in com­
panies with dispersed owners, since interests between managers and owners are better 
aligned. Also communication between owners and managers are much likely to be better 
in family-owned companies than those with dispersed owners. However, the combined 
code provisions place a lot of emphasis on board composition and independence. In 
fact seven of the eight provisions pertains in some way to this feature of the code. The 
monitoring function in a family owned company is usually performed by the family, 
who are typically the largest shareholders which in turn leads to non-compliance with 
the provisions of the combined code (especially those pertaining to independence of di­
rectors and committees etc.). Similarly, as regards explanations since family-companies 
are monitored by the family and we would expect them to communicate directly with 
the family owners and not necessarily in the annual report. Therefore even though we
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expect family firms to be better monitored this is more likely to be done privately by 
family rather than publicly in the market.
In case of family firms we would expect agency problems to arise between a domi­
nant coalition of management and controlling (family) shareholders and non-controlling 
shareholders. Ali, Chen and Radhakrishnan (2007) analyse disclosures by family firms 
and find th a t for a sample of US firms between 1998 to 2002, family firms tend to 
disclose less information about their corporate governance practices than non-family 
firms. According to them "Maintaining lack o f transparency o f corporate governance 
practices may facilitate getting family members on board without much interference 
from non-family shareholders." Besides, it is difficult to see how dispersed small share­
holders can exert pressure to force the dominant coalition to either comply or explain. 
Given the above we hypothesize that family ownership will lead to lower compliances 
as well as lower quality explanations.
2.6.4 Em pirical Setup
In order to test our hypotheses, we regress the compliance dummy and dummies for 
types of explanations against each of the following: FTSE100 dummy, Cross-listing 
dummy and Family Ownership dummy alongwith controls.
Compliance dum m yt = f t{ X t , Controlst) +  et (2-1)
Type5 dum m yt = f t{ X t , C ontrolst ) +  €t (2-2)
Type0 dum m yt — f t (Xt ,  C ontrolst) +  e* (2.3)
where Compliance dummy (model 2.1) is a variable which takes the value 1 if a 
company is compliant with all eight provisions of the combined code in a particular
year and 0 otherwise. Type 5 dummy (model 2.2) takes a value 1 if a company in
any year gives at least one explanation of Type 5 for any of its non-compliance and 0 
otherwise. TypeO dummy (model 2.3) assumes a value 1 if a company either does not 
give an explanation of gives a Type 1 explanation for at least one of its non-compliances 
and 0  otherwise.
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X t is an independent variable which can be one of the following depending on the 
hypothesis being tested.
•  FTSE100 dummy which assumes a value of 1 if the company is part of the 
FTSE100 index during that year and 0 otherwise.
•  Cross-listing dummies for US, Europe and others. The dummy US has a value 1 if 
the company is cross-listed on any exchange in the US and 0 otherwise. Similarly 
EU is assigned a value 1 if the company is cross-listed on any European exchange 
and 0 otherwise. Finally, Others has a value of 1 if the company during the year 
is listed any other exchange (not in the US or Europe) across the world.
•  A Family dummy with a value 1  if a company at the 10% threshold is owned by 
a family or unlisted company and 0  otherwise.
We control for various firm characteristics which might affect a company’s deci­
sion to comply with the code. In particular, we control for age, growth opportunities, 
profitability and leverage8. We use log of Age, log of market to book value of equity 
calculated at the end of the financial year, return on assets defined as earnings before 
interest and tax  upon total assets and leverage defined as the long term debt upon 
total assets. Additionally, we also control for industry characteristics (based on the 12 
industry groups in Campbell (1996)) and time by using industry and year dummies 
respectively.
We run a probit regression using the above models and calculate pooled robust stan­
dard errors by clustering at the firm level. The variable of interest in the regressions is 
X t and its coefficient will indicate the incremental probability of complying/explaining 
of a company belonging to a particular group.
2.7 Results
Table 2.12 presents the results of the probit regression based on the model (3.8) with 
the FTSE100 dummy as the independent variable. Panel A shows the results of the 
regression without industry and time dummies. Panel B adds industry dummies to the 
model and Panel C shows results with both industry and time dummies. The results
s Wo do not control for size, since m em bership o f FT SE 100 index and tlie Cross-L isting dum m ies them selves 
proxy for size;.
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show th a t the FTSE100 dummy is both positive and significant (at the 10% level) in 
two of the three specifications, suggesting that companies belonging to  the FTSE100 
index are more likely to comply with the Code than non-FTSElOO companies. The 
results show th a t there is a 9% higher chance of FTSE100 companies complying as 
compared to  non-FTSElOO companies. However, with the inclusion of both industry 
and year effects this incremental probability drops to 7% and the coefficient is no longer 
statistically significant.
Table 2.13a shows the results of a probit regression using model (2.2) once again 
w ith the FTSE100 dummy as the independent variable. The results shows that the 
coefficient of the FTSE100 dummy is positive and significant (at the 5% level) in all 
the three specifications. This indicates that FTSE100 companies have an approximately 
7% (varying between 6.4% to 7.2% based on the specification) greater probability of 
providing a Type 5 explanation as compared to non-FTSElOO companies. This effect 
is robust and the coefficient is significant even in the full specification when we include 
all controls, industry and year dummies. Table 2.136 shows the results of model (2.3) 
for FTSE100 dummies. The coefficient of the FTSE100 dummy in all the panels is 
negative and significant (at the 5% level). Thus FTSE100 companies display a lower 
propensity of providing a Type 1 or no explanation for non-compliances. Once again 
this effect is robust across all specifications and the difference in probabilities is over 
10%.
Table 2.14 shows the results of regression of model (3.8) with the cross-listing dum­
mies as the independent variables. The dummy US is positive and significant (at the 
10% level) in all three specifications, whereas the dummies EU and Others are positive 
but not significant a t all. The results therefore show th a t as regards compliance, cross­
listing in the US m atters but not anywhere else. In fact, companies cross-listed in the 
US have a 1 1 % greater chance of complying with the Code as compared to companies 
which are not cross-listed. These results thus provide clear support for the bonding 
hypothesis. Only companies cross-listed in the US "bond" as argued above either for 
legal reasons or because they face additional scrutiny. We do not observe any impact 
of listing on other exchanges (other than the US) since presumably those markets are 
not as developed as London.
Tables 2.15a and 2.156 testing the effect of cross-listing on explanations show a 
similar pattern. Companies cross-listed on US exchanges are more likely to provide a
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Type 5 (highest quality) explanation and less likely to provide either a Type 1 or no 
explanation. Companies cross-listing in the US are around 10% (varying from 9.7% to 
12.4% and significant at the 5% level) more likely to  provide a Type 5 explanations As 
a m atter of fact, none of the companies cross-listed on EU and other exchanges provide 
any Type 5 explanation. Table 2.156 shows that the coefficient for US is negative and 
significant at the 5% level. This indicates that as compared to companies th a t are 
not cross-listed, companies cross-listed in the US have an approximately 14% lower 
probability (varying from —15.5% to —12%) of either providing no explanation or a 
Type 1  explanation. Once again coefficients of those cross-listed in the EU and Others 
are not significant.
Tables 2.16, 2.17a and 2.176 present the results of the above models using family 
dummies. Before discussing the results we must add a caveat here. Our data  on own­
ership is not complete. We have data  on ownership only for two periods i.e. the first 
and last. Ownership data  for periods in between are missing which might affect the 
results. Table 16 provides weak support for our hypothesis. The family dummy in the 
regressions are negative and significant (at the 5% and 10% levels respectively) in two 
out of the three specifications. This indicates th a t family companies are less likely to 
comply with the code as compared to non-family companies. Table 2.17a shows that 
none of the family dummies in the regression with Type 5 variables are significant. This 
suggests th a t there is no difference in the probabilities of giving a Type 5 explanation 
between family owned companies and others. Finally, we find weak evidence to  suggest 
th a t family owned companies are more likely to give a Type 1 or no explanation (Ta­
ble 2.176). The coefficient of the family dummy is positive but significant only in one 
specification.
To summarise, we find strong evidence that companies cross-listed in the US are 
more likely to comply. We find weak evidence (not robust across all specifications) 
th a t FTSE100 and non-Family owned companies are more likely to comply. As regards 
explanations, we find strong evidence that both FTSE100 companies and companies 
cross-listed in the US, when non-compliant, are more likely to provide better explana­
tions and less likely to provide lower quality explanations. And finally there is some 
evidence th a t family owned companies give lower quality explanations.
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2.8 Robustness and concluding remarks
In other regressions (not presented) we investigate the effects of various groups on Type 
2 and Type 3 explanations. The results are qualitatively similar to those presented 
above. We have shown that as expected FTSE100 and Cross-listed companies face 
greater scrutiny. Family companies whereas do not seem to face much monitoring from 
outside shareholders.
Given the above, it would be interesting to check the amount of time companies in 
various groups take to move from non-compliance to compliance. Since these companies 
(FTSE100, Cross-listed etc.) do not face the same level of agency problems, they should 
be subject to lower pressure to comply as compared to their counterparts. By a similar 
argument, we would expect companies giving lower quality explanations to face the 
greatest pressure to comply as compared to those giving higher quality explanations.
To test the above we calculate the average time taken to compliance by companies 
in the various groups. Table 2.18 presents the results of this analysis. We observe 
that FTSE100 companies overall take an average of 2.58 years to comply as compared 
to 2.32 years for non-FTSElOO companies. Similarly, companies cross-listed in the 
US on average take a longer time 2.47 years to comply compared to 2.36 years for 
companies not cross-listed. Family companies at 2.95 years on average take lesser time 
to comply then non-family companies (3.04 years). The results thus confirm our ex-ante 
expectations, companies that can afford to remain non-compliant for longer (like the 
FTSE100, Cross-listed), take more time to comply. However we must point out th a t 
none of the differences between the groups are statistically significant.
As regards the speed of compliance given the quality of explanation we find th a t 
the overall time to compliance for our entire sample is 2.39 years and if we exclude 
transitional explanations (Type 4 ) 9 companies giving no explanation (Type 0) comply 
the quickest with an average of 2.55 years as against the slowest 3.70 years taken by 
companies giving a Type 5 explanation. The differences in speed as compared to the 
Type 5 speed are statistically significant. This confirms the idea th a t good explanations 
can be a way to fend of shareholder pressure to comply.
Our preceding analysis shows th a t monitoring of companies varies based on the group 
to which they belong. Further, anecdotal evidence suggests th a t if at all there is any
Com panies giv ing transitional explanations hv definition should com ply the fastest. The; results clearly show
this.
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shareholder pressure on corporate governance issues, this usually takes place after pe­
riods of bad performance. The case of W.M. Morrison can be used to illustrate this 
form of shareholder activism. W.M. Morrison has always been not compliant with most 
(i.e., six out of eight) provisions of the code and either no explanation was offered or 
a poor quality explanation was provided by the company. Shareholders apparently did 
not raise this issue as long as the performance of the company was good. In 2004, W.M. 
Morrison completed the takeover of Safeway, after which (in July), W.M. Morrison an­
nounced its first profit warning in its 106 year history. This was followed by three more 
warnings in quick succession, which led to shareholder pressure and the appointment 
of David Jones as its first non-executive director in March 2005. In its annual meeting 
in May 2005 the company revealed its inability to  forecast the financial position for 
the coming year. Shareholder pressure further intensified which led to the appointment 
of three more independent non-executive directors in July 2005 and a fourth in Sep­
tember 2005. In the meantime the CEO of the company, Bob S tott resigned and Sir 
Ken Morrison stepped back from operational responsibilities. It is easy to  check th a t 
although until July 2004, the stock price performance of Morrison was in line with the 
market. After that date, Morrison significantly under performed the FTSE100 index 
to the extent of nearly 40% upto July 2005.
We believe that Morrison’s case illustrates some features common to many compa­
nies. In particular it makes the point that the intervention by shareholders in m atters of 
corporate governance is usually not pre-emptive. This highlights, possibly a  significant 
cost of the flexibility offered by the Code, in th a t it does not foster shareholders’ incen­
tives to take pre-emptive actions. Our analysis therefore suggests th a t the monitoring 
function is working for some kinds of companies but not under all circumstances.
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2.9 Tables
TABLE 2.1. Yearwise D istribution
T his tab le shows the to ta l number of com panies analysed across the different periods.
1998 -  99 1999 -  00 2 0 0 0  -  0 1 2 0 0 1  -  0 2 2002 -  03 2003 -  04 All
C om panies 162 2 0 0 2 2 2 232 240 231 1287
O f which  
FT SE 100 42 58 64 75 70 6 8 377
Crosslisted in 
-U SA 37 47 54 60 62 57 317
-O thers 2 3 4 4 6 4 23
TABLE 2.2. Industrywise Distribution
T he table classifies the to ta l com pany year observations based on their industry group, as in C am pbell (1996).
In d u s try
C o m p an y  y ea r 
o b se rv a tio n s
Petroleum 41
Consumer Durables 178
Basic Industry 2 0 0
Food & Tobacco 2 2 2
Construction 232
Capital Goods 240
Transportation 231
Utilities 118
Textiles and Trade 90
Services 176
Leisure 137
Total Observations 1287
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TABLE 2.3. Ownership Structure
T he tab le shows the ownership structure o f com panies in the first (1998-99) and last period (2003-04). 
O wnership is calculated at the 10% threshold. T he ownership data for th e period 1998-99 is im puted from the  
Faccio &; Lang (2002). available on the Journal o f Financial E conom ics website. D ata  for th e period 2003-04 is
from Thom son Ownership.
1998 -  99 2003 -  04
Non-family Companies 80 174
Family Companies 57 32
State Companies 1 0
Miscellaneous 9 5
T o ta l 147 2 1 1
TABLE 2.4. Yearwise Non-Compliances and Explanations
T he table shows the yearwise com pliance percentage of fully com pliant com panies (com pliant w ith all eight 
provisions o f the code). T he com pliance percentage is shown for various categories for each period.
F T S E 1 0 0 C ro ss-lis ted F am ily  O w n ed
P e rio d Yes N o Yes N o Yes N o A ll
1998 -  99 14.3% 8.3% 15.4% 8 .1 % 8 .8 % 1 0 .0 % 9.9%
1999 -  00 17.2% 19.7% 17.3% 20.7% 19.0%
2 0 0 0  -  0 1 26.6% 24.1% 32.8% 23.2% 24.8%
2 0 0 1  -  0 2 42.3% 29.9% 45.6% 31.0% 34.1%
2002 -  03 48.6% 57.1% 54.1% 39.0% 42.1%
2003 -  04 60.3% 54.6% 67.2% 53.5% 40.6% 60.9% 56.3%
A v erag e 37.1% 30.7% 41.8% 30.5% 2 0 .2 % 43.9% 32.6%
TABLE 2.5. Provisionwise Non-Compliances and Explanations
T h e table shows the provisionwise d istribution of non-com pliances and explanations. % C o m p  I ind icates the  
percentage o f com panies com pliant w ith th e provision analysed across all the periods. % l ix p ln  is th e percentage  
of non-com pliances for which explanations are provided across all periods.
In d u s try
%
C o m p l
%
E x p ln
CEO /Chairm an 89.9% 8 6 .2 %
SNED 76.5% 89.1%
Number of NEDs 95.5% 74.1%
Independent NEDs 92.1% 72.3%
Service Contracts 56.7% 85.5%
Remuneration. Committee 8 6 .6 % 69.4%
Audit Committee 91.7% 90.6%
Nomination Committee 8 8 .2 % 90.7%
A ll p ro v is io n s 32.6% 83.0%
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TABLE 2.6. Industrywise Non-Compliances and Explanations
T he table shows the industryw ise distribution of non-com pliances and explanations. % C o m p l  ind icates the  
percentage o f com panies com pliant w ith all eight provisions analysed. A v e r a g e  N C  is the average num ber of  
provisions on which com panies are not com pliant. A v e r a g e  Expin  is the average num ber of non-com pliances for 
which explanations are provided. C a p  is the difference between A v e r a g e  N C  and Average Expln , and it 
indicates the average n u m b e r  of non-com pliances for which no explanations are provided.
In d u s try
%
C om pl
A v e rag e
N C
Petroleum 31.7% 1.93
Consumer Durables 26.4% 1.69
Basic Industry 30.4% 1.60
Food & Tobacco 40.0% 1.93
Construction 23.1% 1.62
Capital Goods 34.7% 2 . 1 2
Transportation 39.0% 1.62
Utilities 44.1% 1 . 8 8
Textiles and Trade 30.0% 1.79
Services 36.9% 1.97
Leisure 27.7% 2 . 0 1
A v erag e 32.6% 1.81
TABLE 2.7. Number of Non-compliances
T he table shows the average number of non-com pliances (per non-com pliant com pany) for various classifications for each period. T he difference betw een average non-com pliances of the  
two respective categories is shown in the difference colum n (D iff). *,**> and *** indicate sta tistica l significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively based on a t-test..
F T S E 1 0 0 C r o s s - l i s t e d F a m i l y  O w n e d
P e r i o d Y e s N o D i f f . Y e s N o D i f f . Y e s N o D i f f . A l l
1998 -  99 1.78 2.15 -0 .37 2 . 0 0 2.07 -0 .07 2.27 1.87 0.41* 2 . 0 5
1999 -  00 1.79 2.05 -0 .26 1.79 2.04 -0 .25 1 . 9 8
2 0 0 0  -  0 1 1.70 1.92 - 0 . 2 2 1 . 6 6 1.92 -0.26 1 . 8 6
2 0 0 1  -  0 2 1.65 1.75 - 0 . 1 0 1.62 1.75 -0 .13 1 . 7 2
2002 -  03 1.36 1 . 6 6 -0 .30 1.38 1.65 -0 .26 1 . 5 8
2003 -  04 1.48 1.61 -0 .13 1.36 1.63 0.27 2.58 1.29 1 . 2 9 * * * 1 . 5 7
A l l  p e r i o d s 1 . 6 5 1 . 8 7 - 0 . 2 2 * * * 1 . 6 6 1 . 8 6 - 0 . 2 2 * * 2 . 3 5 1 . 5 9 0 . 7 6 * * * 1 . 8 1
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TABLE 2.8. Yearwise Quality of Explanations
The table shows the percentage of T.vpo 0, 1. 2. 3. 4 and 5 oxplanations for oar.h poriod. Type 0 indioatos absonco of explanation: Type 1 indicates a general explanation  provided; Type
2 is an explanation  Inline w ith the Code: Type. 3  is a L im ited explanation: Type  4 indicates T ransitional circum stances; Type  5 is a genuine explanation. T he quality of explanation
provided as per the above classification is increasing from 0 to 5 (see Section 5 in the paper for a com plete description). WL. Avg .  is the m ean of the w eighted average quality of
explanation  of each com pany during the. year, calculated bv weighting all the explanations given by a com pany w ith its respective type.
P e r i o d T y p e  0 T y p e  1 T y p e  2 T y p e  3 T y p e  4 T y p e  5 Wt. Avg.
1998 -  99 19.3% 24.7% 21.3% 6.7% 20.7% 7.3% 2 . 1 8
1999 -  00 18.1% 26.9% 26.3% 8.4% 10.9% 9.4% 2 . 0 7
2 0 0 0  -  0 1 16.8% 30.3% 24.5% 1 0 .0 % 9.0% 9.4% 2 . 0 4
2 0 0 1  -  0 2 16.7% 27.0% 27.8% 7.2% 1 2 .2 % 9.1% 2 . 1 5
2002 -  03 16.4% 23.2% 25.9% 7.7% 19.6% 7.3% 2 . 2 3
2003 -  04 1 2 .6 % 2 0 .8 % 23.3% 5.7% 30.2% 7.6% 2 . 6 3
A ll p e r i o d s 1 7 . 1 % 2 6 . 0 % 2 4 . 9 % 7 . 8 % 1 5 . 8 % 8 . 5 % 2 . 1 9
oo
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TABLE 2.9. Provisionwise Quality of Explanations
T he table shows the percentage o f T ype 0, 1. 2, 3. 4 and 5 explanations o f  each provision. Typ e  0 ind icates  
absence o f explanation; Ty pe 1 indicates a general explanation provided; Type 2  is an explanation  Inline w ith  
the Code; Type. 3  is a L im ited explanation; Type 4  indicates T ransitional circum stances; Type 5  is a genuine  
explanation . T he quality o f explanation provided as per the above classification is increasing from 0 to  5 (see  
Section 5 in the paper for a com plete description). Wt.  Avg .  is the m ean of the weighted average quality o f 
explanation of each com pany during the year, calculated by weighting all the explanations given by a com pany  
with its respective type.
P ro v is io n T y p e  0 T y p e  1 T y p e  2 T y p e  3 T y p e  4 T y p e  5
CEO /  Chairman 13.9% 19.2% 11.5% 32.3% 22.3% 0 .0 %
SNED 10.9% 19.9% 0 .0 % 25.5% 25.8% 17.9%
Number of NEDs 25.9% 36.2% 15.5% 0 .0 % 22.4% 0 .0 %
Independent NEDs 27.7% 41.6% 11.9% 0 .0 % 11.9% 6.9%
Service Contracts 17.7% 2 2 .2 % 39.2% 3.4% 8.9% 8.7%
Remuneration Committee 30.6% 44.1% 4.7% 0 .6 % 14.7% 5.9%
Audit Committee 9.4% 2 0 .8 % 35.9% 0.9% 25.5% 7.6%
Nomination Committee 9.3% 15.9% 60.2% 0 .0 % 9.9% 3.9%
A ll P ro v is io n s 17.1% 26.0% 24.9% 7.8% 15.8% 8.5%
TABLE 2.10. Quality of Explanations
The table shows the average quality of explanations for various classification for each period. The weighted average quality of explanation  for each com pany is first calculated  by w eighting  
each explanation given by its respective type, which is then  used to calculate the mean for all com panies in that group. T he difference betw een average quality of th e tw o respective  
categories is shown in the difference colum n (D iff). *,**, and *** indicate significance at the lQ'/ i, 5'X, and 1%  level respectively.
F T S E 1 0 0 C ro ss-lis ted F am ily  O w ned
P e r io d Yes N o D iff Yes N o D iff Yes N o Diff.
1998 -  99 2.22 2.16 0.06 2.32 2.13 0.18 2.16 2.17 -0 .01
1999 -  00 2.34 1.96 0.38*** 2.47 1.93 0.56***
2000 -  01 2.37 1.91 0.46** 2.53 1.88 0 .6 6 ***
2001 -  02 2.36 2.06 0.30 2.52 2.03 0.49**
2002 -  03 2.42 2.17 0.25 2.49 2.15 0.34
2003 -  04 3.01 2.49 0.53* 2.80 2.58 0.22 2.22 2.98_j -0.76**
A v erag e 2.42 2 . 1 0 0.32*** 2.50 2.08 0.42*** 2.18 2.56 -0.38**
TABLE 2.11. Transition Matrix
Tin1 table shows the evolution of the quality of explanations given by a com pany from one period to the next. T ype 0 indicates absence of explanation; Type  / indicates a general 
explanation provided: Type. 2  is an explanation  Inline w ith the Code: Type '3 is a Lim ited explanation: Type 4 indicates T ransitional circum stances; Type 5  is a genuine explanation. 
T he figures arc in percentages and have to be read row-wise, e.g. the figures in the colum n T ype 0 indicate the to ta l percentage of explanations (across all periods) that either rem ained  
T ype 0 (52.23% of the cases) or m oved to T ype 1 (6.07% ), T ype 2 (4.86% ), T ype 3 (2.43% ), T ype 4 (8.50% ), T ype 5 (0.40%) or C om pliance (25.51% of th e cases) in the next period.
T y p e  0 T y p e  1 T y p e  2 T y p e  3 T y p e  4 T y p e  5 C o m p lian ce
T y p e  0 52.23 6.07 4.86 2.43 8.50 0.40 25.51
T y p e  1 2.67 70.05 6 . 6 8 1.07 8.56 0 . 8 10.16
T y p e  2 4.37 0.87 65.60 0 . 0 0 8.45 1.17 19.53
T y p e  3 0.92 1.83 5.50 66.97 11.93 0.92 11.93
T y p e  4 1.52 1.52 1.52 0.51 10.66 0.51 83.76
T y p e  5 1.67 0.83 1.67 0.83 8.33 74.17 12.50
C o m p lian ce 0.39 0.27 0.37 0.13 0.49 0 . 0 1 98.33
00
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TABLE 2.12. FTSE100 Membership and Compliance
T his tab le shows th e results o f a m arginal effects probit regression T he dependent, variable is C om pliance dum m y  
which takes a value o f 1 if a com pany is compliant, w ith  all the eight provisions o f the Com bined C ode and 0 
otherw ise. T he independent variables are F T SE 100 dum m y which has a value o f 1 if  the com pany is m em ber 
of th e F T SE 100 index and 0 otherw ise. L n(A ge) is log(age), L n(M T B  ) is log(m arket to  book value o f equity). 
R eturn on A ssets defined as earnings before interest and taxes divided by tota l assets and D e b t/A sse ts  defined  
as to ta l debt divided by tota l assets. P a n e l  A  shows results w ithout industry and year dum m ies. P a n e l  B  
includes industry dum m ies based on the industry group of the company. P a n e l  C  includes both industry and 
year dum m ies. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in  parentheses. and *
denote  th at the coefficient is sta tistica lly  significant at the 1, 5 or 10 percent levels respectively.
Panel A Panel B Panel C
C o m p lian ce C o m p lian ce C o m p lian ce
D e p e n d e n t v a riab le d u m m y d u m m y d u m m y
F T S E 1 0 0  d u m m y 0.0938* 0.0912* 0.0681
(0.0505) (0.0523) (0.0557)
L n  (A ge) -0.0468** -0.0448** -0.0456**
(0.0187) (0.0189) (0.0198)
L n  (M T B ) -0.0580** -0.0814*** -0.0571**
(0.0237) (0.0261) (0.0275)
R O A 0.0512 0.2133 0.2589
(0.2671) (0.2763) (0.2736)
D e b t/A s s e ts 0.1456 0.1231 0.0393
(0.1482) (0.1565) (0.1635)
In d u s try  d u m m ies No Yes Yes
Y ear d u m m ies No No Yes
O b se rv a tio n s 1087 1087 1077
W ald  x* 17.86 23.72 119.45
P ro b  >  x 2 0.0031 0.0699 0 . 0 0 0 0
Log L ikelihood - 6 6 6 . 2 2 -659.61 -595.19
R z 0.0278 0.0374 0.1245
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TABLE 2.13a. FTSE100 Membership and Explanations
T his tab le shows the results o f a m arginal effects probit regression T he dependent variable is a T ype 5 dum m y  
which takes a value o f 1 if a com pany gives an explanation o f T ype 5 (h ighest quality) on any of its non- 
com pliance in a particular year and 0 otherw ise. T he independent variables are F T SE 100  dum m y which has a 
value 1 if the com pany is a mem ber o f the F T SE 100 index in that year and 0 otherw ise, Ln(A ge) is log(age), 
L n(M T B  ) is log (m arket to  book value of equ ity). Return on A ssets defined as earnings before interest and 
taxes divided by to ta l assets and D e b t/A sse ts  defined as total debt divided by to ta l assets. P a n e l  A shows 
results w ith out industry and year dum m ies. P a n e l  B  includes industry dum m ies based on the industry group  
of the com pany. P a n e l  C  includes both industry and year dum m ies. R obust standard errors clustered at the  
firm level are reported in parentheses. *♦*.**. and * denote that the coefficient is sta tistica lly  significant at the  
1, 5 or 10 percent levels respectively.
Panel A Panel B Panel C
T y p e  5 T y p e  5 T y p e  5
D e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le d u m m y d u m m y d u m m y
F T S E 1 0 0  d u m m y 0.0722** 0.0635** 0.0709**
(0.0381) (0.0350) (0.0364)
L n(A ge) 0.0270* 0.0187 0.0175
(0.0148) (0.0129) (0.0126)
L n (M T B ) -0.0032 -0.0014 -0.0061
(0.0131) (0.0139) (0.0143)
R O A 0.0172 0.0186 0.0260
(0.1548) (0.1214) (0.1233)
D e b t/A s s e ts 0.1711* 0.2251*** 0.2377***
(0.0947) (0.0769) (0.0774)
In d u s try  d u m m ies No Yes Yes
Y ear d u m m ies No No Yes
O b se rv a tio n s 1087 1087 1077
W ald  x 2 16.29 32.97 45.54
P ro b  > x 2 0.0061 0.0047 0.0015
Log L ikelihood -326.49 -303.39 -295.58
R 2 0.0416 0.1094 0.1298
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TABLE 2.13b. FTSE100 Membership and Explanations
T his tab le shows the results o f a m arginal effects probit regression T he dependent variable is a T ype 0 Dum m y  
which takes a value o f 1 if a com pany either gives no explanation  or an exp lanation  of T ype 1 (lowest quality) on 
any o f its non-com pliance in a particular year and 0 otherwise. T he independent variables are F T SE 100 dum m y  
w hich has a value 1 if th e com pany is a mem ber of the F T SE 100 index in th at year and 0 otherw ise, Ln(A ge) is 
log(age), L n(M T B  ) is log(m arket to  book value o f equity), Return on A ssets defined as earnings before interest 
and taxes divided by to ta l assets and D e b t/A sse ts  defined as total debt divided by to ta l assets. P a n e l  A shows 
results w ith out industry and year dum m ies. P a n e l  B  includes industry dum m ies based on the industry group  
o f the company. P a n e l  C  includes both industry and year dum m ies. Robust standard errors clustered at the  
firm level are reported in parentheses. ***,+*. }lnd * denote that the coefficient is s ta tistica lly  significant at the 
1. 5 or 10 percent levels respectively.
Panel A Panel B Panel C
T y p e  0 T y p e  0 T y p e  0
D e p e n d e n t v a riab le d u m m y d u m m y d u m m y
F T S E 1 0 0  d u m m y —0.1375*** -0.1148** -0.1013**
(0.0486) (0.0510) (0.0534)
L n (A g e) 0.0298 0.0364* 0.0364*
(0.0199) (0 .0 2 1 0 ) (0.0216)
L n (M T B ) 0.0572** 0.0490** 0.0306
(0.0226) (0.0241) (0.0256)
R O A -0.2398 -0.2164 -0.2273
(0.2660) (0.2729) (0.2656)
D e b t/A s s e ts 0.1064 0.0837 0.1361
(0.1623) (0.1663) (0.1728)
In d u s try  d u m m ies No Yes Yes
Y ear d u m m ies No No Yes
O b se rv a tio n s 1087 1087 1077
W ald  x 2 15.48 30.80 80.25
P ro b  > x 2 0.0085 0.0093 0.0000
Log L ikelihood -677.94 -659.93 -622.35
R 2 0.0237 0.0496 0.0940
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TABLE 2.14. Crosslisting and Compliances
T h is tabic shows the results o f a marginal effects probit regression T he dependent variable is C om pliance D um m y  
which takes a value o f 1 if a com pany is com pliant w ith  all th e eight provisions o f th e Com bined C ode and  
0 otherw ise. T he independent variables arc C ross-L isting dum m ies for U S, E urope and O thers which have a 
value of 1 if tin; com pany has a secondary listin g  in any other stock exchange in either the US, E urope or any 
other countries (for e.g. A ustralia, South Africa) respectively  and 0 otherw ise, L n(A gc) is log(age), L n(M T B  ) 
is ]og(m arket to  book value o f equity), R eturn on A ssets defined as earnings before interest and taxes divided  
by tota l assets and D e b t/A sse ts  defined as to ta l debt, d ivided  by to ta l assets. P a n e l  A  show s results w ithout 
industry and year dum m ies. P a n e l  B includes industry dum m ies based on the industry group o f the company. 
P a n e l  C  includes both industry and year dum m ies. R obust standard errors clustered at the firm level are 
reported in parentheses. ***.*♦. and * denote th at th e coefficient is sta tis tica lly  significant at th e 1, 5 or 10 
percent levels respectively.
Panel A Panel B Panel C
D e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le
C o m p lian ce
d u m m y
C o m p lian c e
d u m m y
C o m p lian ce
d u m m y
C ro ss-L is tin g  d u m m ies  
-U S 0.1015*
(0.0610)
0.1098*
(0.0637)
0.1167*
(0.0678)
-E u ro p e 0.0381
(0.1536)
0.0290
(0.1578)
-0.0063
(0.1392)
-O th e rs 0.0706
(0 .1 2 0 1 )
0.0674
(0.1315)
0.0632
(0.1258)
L n (A g e) -0.0462**
(0.0190)
-0.0429**
(0.0196)
-0.0440**
(0.0204)
L n (M T B ) -0.0593**
(0.0241)
-0.0853***
(0.0261)
-0.0639**
(0.0281)
R O A 0.1462
(0.2858)
0.3285
(0.2918)
0.3846
(0.2938)
D e b t/A s s e ts 0.1597
(0.1494)
0.1315
(0.1580)
0.0434
(0.1656)
In d u s try  d u m m ies No Yes Yes
Y ear d u m m ies No No Yes
O b se rv a tio n s 1087 1087 1077
R 2 0.0287 0.0391 0.1278
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TABLE 2.15a. Crosslisting and Explanations
This table shows the results o f a m arginal effects probit regression T he dependent variable is a T ype 5 dum m y  
which takes a value o f 1 if a com pany gives an explanation of T ype 5 (h ighest quality) on any of its non- 
com pliance in a particular year and 0 otherw ise. T he independent variables are C ross-L isting dum m ies for US, 
Europe and O thers which have a value o f 1 if the com pany has a secondary listin g  in any other stock  exchange  
in either the US, Europe or any other countries (for e.g. A ustralia , South Africa) respectively and 0 otherw ise, 
L n(A ge) is log(age), Ln(M TB  ) is log(inarket to  book value o f equ ity), R eturn on A ssets defined as earnings 
before interest and taxes divided upon to ta l assets and D e b t/A sse ts  defined as to ta l debt divided by to ta l assets. 
P a n e l  A  shows results w ithout industry and year dum m ies. P a n e l  B  includes industry dum m ies based on the  
industry group of the company. P a n e l  C  includes both industry and year dum m ies. R obust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level arc reported in parentheses. ***.*♦. and * denote th at th e coefficient is s ta tistica lly  
significant at the 1. 5 or 10 percent levels respectively.
Panel A Panel B Panel C
D e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le
T y p e5
d u m m y
T y p e5
d u m m y
T y p e5
d u m m y
C ro ss-L is tin g  d u m m y
-U S 10 0.1239***
(0.0557)
0.0965**
(0.0483)
0.0979**
(0.0486)
L n(A ge) 0.0246*
(0.0150)
0.0192
(0.0128)
0.0181
(0.0126)
L n (M T B ) - 0 . 0 1 1 0
(0.0140)
-0.0057
(0.0143)
-0.0093
(0.0148)
R O A 0.1355
(0.1580)
0.1216
(0.1258)
0.1251
(0.1282)
D e b t/A s s e ts 0.1563*
(0.0930)
0.2266***
(0.0774)
0.2355***
(0.0779)
In d u s try  d u m m ie s No Yes Yes
Y ear d u m m ies No No Yes
O b se rv a tio n s 1087 1087 1077
W ald  x 2 16.53 32.14 46.63
P ro b  > x 2 0.0055 0.0062 0 . 0 0 1 1
R 2 0.0595 0.1203 0.1385
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TABLE 2.15b. Crosslisting and Explanations
T his tab le shows the results of a m arginal effects probit regression T he dependent variable is a T ype 0 D um m y  
which takes a value o f 1 if a com pany either gives no explanation or an explanation  o f T yp e  1 (low est quality) 
on any o f its non-com pliance in a particular year and 0 otherw ise. T he independent variables are C ross-L isting  
dum m ies for US, Europe and Others which have a value of 1 if the com pany has a secondary listin g in any other  
stock exchange in cither the US. Europe or any other countries (for e.g. A ustralia . South Africa) respectively  
and 0 otherw ise, L n(A ge) is log(age), L n(M T B ) is log(m arkct to  book ). R eturn on A ssets defined as earnings 
before interest and taxes divided by tota l assets and D eb t/A sse ts  defined as tota l debt divided by to ta l assets. 
P a n e l  A  shows results w ithout industry and year dum m ies. P a n e l  B  includes industry dum m ies based on the  
industry group of th e com pany. P a n e l  C  includes both industry and year dum m ies. R obust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level arc reported in parentheses. **+.**. and * denote that the coefficient is s ta tistica lly  
significant at the 1, 5 or 10 percent levels respectively.
Panel A Panel B Panel C
D e p e n d e n t v a riab le
TypeO
d u m m y
TypeO
d u m m y
TypeO
d u m m y
C ro ss-L is tin g  d u m m y  
-U S -0.1558***
(0.519)
-0.1199**
(0.0569)
-0.1251**
(0.0581)
-E u ro p e 0.0652
(0.1458)
0.1913
(0.1826)
0.2884
(0.1841)
-O th e rs -0.4632
(0.0925)
-0.0151
(0.0942)
-0.0107
(0.0942)
L n(A ge) 0.0324
(0.0203)
0.0400*
(0.0214)
0.0413*
(0 .0 2 2 0 )
L n (M T B ) 0.0624***
(0.0227)
0.0556**
(0.0244)
0.0389
(0.0261)
R O A -0.4150
(0.2782)
-0.3555
(0.2887)
-0.3746
(0.2831)
D e b t /  A sse ts 0.1058
(0.1641)
0.0958
(0.1696)
0.1590
(0.1772)
In d u s try  d u m m ies No Yes Yes
Y ear d u m m ies No No Yes
O b se rv a tio n s 1087 1087 1077
R 2 0.0253 0.0499 0.0979
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TABLE 2.16. Ownership and Compliances
T his table shows the results o f a m arginal effects probit regression T he dependent variable is C om pliance dum m y  
w hich takes a value o f 1 if a com pany is com pliant w ith  all the eight provisions of the Com bined C ode and 0 
otherw ise. T he independent, variables are Fam ily dum m y which has a value o f 1 if the com pany is owned at the 
lO'/c level by a fam ily or unlisted com pany and 0 otherwise. Ln(A ge) is log(age). L n(M T B  ) is log(m arket to  
book value o f equity), Return on A ssets defined as earnings before interest and taxes divided by to ta l assets 
and D eb t/A sse ts  defined as total debt divided by tota l assets. P a n e l  A  show s results w ith out industry and year 
dum m ies. P a n e l  B  includes industry dum m ies based on the industry group o f the com pany. P a n e l  C  includes 
both industry and year dum m ies. Robust standard errors clustered at th e firm level are reported in parentheses. 
***.**, and * denote th at the coefficient is s ta tistica lly  significant at the 1, 5 or 10 percent levels respectively.
Panel A Panel B Panel C
C o m p lian ce C o m p lian ce C o m p lian c e
D e p e n d e n t v a riab le d u m m y d u m m y d u m m y
F am ily  d u m m y —0.1318** -0.1295* -0.0455
(0.0599) (0.0639) (0.0766)
L n (A g e) -0.0270 -0.0194 -0.0156
(0.0231) (0.0237) (0.0276)
L n (M T B ) -0.0663** -0.0815** -0.0639
(0.0320) (0.0362) (0.0366)
R O A -0.0705 0.0795 0.4164
(0.3289) (0.3371) (0.3621)
D e b t/A s s e ts 0.2709 0.1556 -0.1782
(0.1807) (0.1957) (0.2236)
In d u s try  d u m m ies No Yes Yes
Y ear d u m m ies No No Yes
O b se rv a tio n s 342 342 339
W ald  x 2 16.24 23.71 98.78
P ro b  > x 2 0.0062 0.0702 0.0000
Log L ikelihood -217.98 -214.12 -172.65
R 2 0.0360 0.0531 0.2317
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TABLE 2.17a. Ownership and Explanations
T his tab le shows the results o f a m arginal effects probit regression T he dependent variable is a T ype 5 dum m y  
which takes a value o f 1 if a com pany gives an explanation of T ype 5 (highest quality) on any of its non- 
com pliance in a particular year and 0 otherw ise. The independent variables are Fam ily dum m y which has a 
value o f 1 if the com pany is owned at the 10% level by a fam ily or unlisted com pany and 0 otherw ise. L n(A ge) is 
log(age). Ln(M T B ) is log(m arket to  book value o f equity), R eturn on A ssets defined as earnings before interest 
and taxes divided by to ta l assets and D eb t/A sse ts  defined as to ta l debt divided by tota l assets. P a n e l  A  shows 
results w ithout industry and year dum m ies. P a n e l  B  includes industry dum m ies based on the industry group 
of th e company. P a n e l  C  includes both industry and year dum m ies. R obust standard errors clustered at the 
firm level are reported in parentheses. ♦**.**. an(] * denote that the coefficient is sta tistica lly  significant at the 
1. 5 or 10 percent levels respectively.
Panel A Panel B Panel C
T y p e5 T y p e5 T y p e5
D e p e n d e n t v a riab le d u m m y d u m m y d u m m y
F am ily  d u m m y 0.0013 - 0 . 0 0 0 1 -0 .0167
(0.0329) (0.0309) (0 .0 2 2 1 )
L n (A g e) 0.0308** 0.0242** 0.0205**
(0.0142) (0.0119) (0.0993)
L n (M T B ) -0.0137 -0.0124 -0.0128
(0.0154) (0.0151) (0 .0 1 2 1 )
R O A 0.2223 0.2209 0.2308
(0.1551) (0.1507) (0.1277)
D e b t/A s s e ts 0.1443* 0.2088** 0.2308
(0.0918) (0.0919) (0.0837)
In d u s try  d u m m ies No Yes Yes
Y ear d u m m ies No No Yes
O b se rv a tio n s 342 318 309
W ald  x 2 1 2 . 2 2 30.50 50.75
P ro b  > x 2 0.0318 0.0065 0 . 0 0 0 1
Log L ikelihood -87.55 -76.93 -68 .40
R 2 0.0482 0.1454 0.2334
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TABLE 2.17b. Ownership and Explanations
T his tab ic shows the results o f a m arginal effects probit regression T he dependent variable is a T ype 0 Dum m y  
which takes a value o f 1 if a com pany either gives no explanation or an explanation  o f T y p e  1 (lowest quality) 
on any o f its non-com pliance in a particular year and 0 otherwise. T he independent variables are Fam ily dum m y  
which has a value o f 1 if the com pany is owned at the 10% level by a fam ily or un listed  com pany and 0 otherw ise. 
Ln(A ge) is log(age), L n(M T B  ) is log(m arket to  book value of equity). R eturn on A ssets defined as earnings 
before interest and taxes divided by to ta l assets and D eb t/A sse ts  defined as to ta l debt divided by to ta l assets. 
P a n e l  A shows results w ithout industry and year dum m ies. P a n e l  D includes industry dum m ies based on the  
industry group of the com pany. P a n e l  C  includes both industry and year dum m ies. R obust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. ***.+*. and * denote that th e coefficient is sta tistica lly  
significant at th e 1. 5 or 10 percent levels respectively.
Panel A Panel B Panel C
TypeO TypeO TypeO
D e p e n d e n t v a riab le D u m m y D u m m y D u m m y
F am ily  d u m m y 0.0952* 0.0919 0.0372
(0.0601) (0.0634) (0.0680)
L n(A ge) 0.0238 0.0181 0.0196
(0 .0 2 0 2 ) (0.0226) (0.0254)
L n (M T B ) 0.0635*** 0.0677** 0.0514*
(0.0247) (0.0268) (0.0260)
R O A 0.0582 0.0483 -0.1272
(0.3260) (0.3467) (0.3133)
D e b t/A s s e ts 0.0613 0.1410 0.2722
(0.1793) (0.1874) (0.1971)
In d u s try  d u m m ies No Yes Yes
Y ear d u m m ies No No Yes
O b se rv a tio n s 342 332 315
W ald  x 2 12.74 23.46 76.95
P ro b  >  x 2 0.0259 0.0531 0.0000
Log L ikelihood -193.14 -185.45 -152.03
R 2 0.0301 0.0536 0.1971
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TABLE 2.18. Speed of Compliance
T he tab le shows the average number o f years and average number of stages for com panies in various categories, 
giving a particular type o f explanation to  m ove to  com pliance. T he difference between speed o f the tw o respective  
categories is tested for sta tistca l significance using a T -test. Similarly, the differences in the overall speed  
o f com pliance given the quality o f explanation is tested  for statistsica l significance w ith  that o f the T yp e 5 
explanation and *.**. and *** indicate significance at the 10(X . o 'X . and l ‘X level respectively.
F rom F T S E 1 0 0 C ro ss-lis ted F am ily  O w ned
E x p la n a tio n Yes N o Yes N o Yes N o A ll
T y p e  0 2.77 2.50 2.72 2.49 4.00 2.58 2.55***
T y p e  1 3.00 3.11 3.00 3.09 3.25 4.13 3.08**
T y p e  2 2.87 2.52 2.67 2.61 3.33 2.17 2.63***
T y p e  3 3.23 3.00 3.10 3.12 1 . 0 0 3.84 3.11*
T y p e  4 1.19 1 . 2 1 1.29 1.19 1 . 0 0 1.29 1 . 2 1
T y p e  5 3.10 4.30 3.25 4.00 0 . 0 0 4.43 3.70
A ll T y p es 2.58 2.32 2.47 2.36 2.95 3.04 2.39
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Appendix 2.A Appendix to Chapter 2
2.A .1  Provisions o f the Combined Code analysed
•  C h a irm a n  a n d  C E O
Principle
There are two key tasks at the top of every public company - the running of the board 
and the executive responsibility for the running of the company’s business. There should 
be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the company which will ensure a 
balance of power and authority, such th a t no one individual has unfettered powers of 
decision. (Section 1 , A.2 .)
Code Provision
A  decision to combine the posts of chairman and chief executive officer in one person 
should be publicly justified. (A.2.1)
• S en io r N o n -e x ecu tiv e  D ire c to r  (S N E D )
Code Provision
W hether the posts are held by different people or by the same person, there should 
be a strong and independent non-executive element on the board, with a recognised 
senior member other than the chairman to  whom concerns can be conveyed. The chair­
man, chief executive and senior independent director should be identified in the annual 
report. (A.2.1)
• B o a rd  C o m p o sitio n  a n d  N o n -E x ecu tiv e  d ire c to rs
Principle
The board should include a balance of executive and non-executive directors (includ­
ing independent non-executives) such that no individual or small group of individuals 
can dominate the board’s decision taking. (A.3)
Code Provisions
- Non-executive directors should comprise not less than one third of the board (A.3.1)
- The majority of non-executive directors should be independent of management 
and free from any business or other relationship, which could materially interfere with 
the exercise of their independent judgment. Non-executive directors considered by the 
board to be independent should be identified in the annual report (A.3.2)
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• S erv ice  C o n tra c ts  a n d  C o m p en sa tio n
Code Provisions
- There is a strong case for setting notice or contract periods at, or reducing them 
to, one year or less. Boards should set this as an objective; but they should recognise 
th a t it may not be possible to achieve it immediately. (B.1.7)
- If it is necessary to offer longer notice or contract periods to new directors recruited 
from outside, such periods should reduce after the initial period. (B.1.8)
• N o m in a tio n  C o m m itte e
Principle
There should be a formal and transparent procedure for the appointm ent of new 
directors to the board.
Code Provision
Unless the board is small, a nomination committee should be established to  make 
recommendations to the board on all new board appointments. A m ajority of the 
members of this committee should be non-executive directors, and the chairman should 
be either the chairman of the board or a non executive director. The chairman and 
members of the nomination committee should be identified in the annual report (A.5.1)
• R e m u n e ra tio n  C o m m itte e
Principle
Companies should establish a formal and transparent procedure for developing pol­
icy on executive remuneration and for fixing the remuneration packages of individual 
directors. No director should be involved in deciding his or her own remuneration. (B .l)
Code Provisions
Remuneration committees should consist exclusively of non-executive directors who 
are independent of management and free from any business or other relationship, which 
could materially interfere with the exercise of their independent judgment. (B.2.2)
• A u d it  C o m m itte e
Principle
The board should establish formal and transparent arrangements for considering 
how they should apply the financial reporting and internal control principles and for 
maintaining an appropriate relationship with the company’s auditors. (D.3)
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Code Provision
The board should establish an audit committee of at least three directors, all non­
executive, with w ritten terms of reference which deal clearly with its authority  and 
duties. The members of the committee, a m ajority of whom should be independent 
non executive directors, should be named in the report and accounts. (D.3.1)
2. A .2 Evolution of the UK Code over time
C a d b u r y  R e p o r t  
D e c e m b e r  1 9 9 2
C o m b i n e d  C o d e  
J u n e  1 9 9 8
R e v i s e d  C o m b i n e d  C o d e  
J u l y  2 0 0 3
I n  f o r c e  f o r  c o m p a n i e s  
w i t h  y e a r - o n d  o n  o r  a f t e r 3 0 / 0 0 / 1 9 9 3 3 1 / 1 2 / 1 9 9 8 3 1 / 1 0 / 2 0 0 4
P r i n c i p l e C o m  p l y  o r  E x p l a i n C o m p l y  o r  E x p l a i n C o m p l y  o r  E x p l a i n
P r o v i s i o n R e c o m m e n d a t i o n R e c o m m e n d a t i o n
N o  o f  
P r o v . R e c o m m e n d a t i o n
N o  o f  
P r o v .
C h a i r m a n / C E O S e p a r a t i o n S e p a r a t i o n 1 S e p a r a t i o n 1
H o l e  o f  111r 
C ' l i a i i  m a n
R m i n i n g  t h e  
h o a r d
R u n n i n g  t h e  
h o a r d 1
C l e a r  f u n d  i o n s  
e n u m e r a t e d 1
I n d o p e n d e n e e  
o f  t h e  C h a i r m a n N o t  s p e c i f i e d N o t  s p e c i f i e d 0 S t r i n g e n t  c r i t e r i a  ( 8 ) 2
R o l e  o f  s e n  i o r  
n o n - e x e c u t i v e  d i r  ( S N E D ) N o t  p r e s e n t
S e n i o r  m e m b e r  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  c h a i r m a n  
l o  w h o m  c o n c e r n s  c a n  b e  c o n v e y e d 1
A v a i l a b l e  l o  s h a r e h o l d e r s  i f  t h e y  
c o n c e r n s  c a n n o t  b e  s o l v e d  t h r o u g h  
n o r m a l  c h a n n e l s
1
N  o n - K x c c u t  i v e  
H i r e r  t o r s  i N R D s )
COAll ^  ^  o f  t h e  h o a r d 1 ^  ^  o f  t h e  h o a r d 1
I n d e p e n d e n t  N  E l ) s  
C r i t e r i a  o f  i n d e p e n d e n c e
N o t  s p e c i f i e d  
N o t  s p e c i f i e d
M  a j o r i i  y  
N o t  s p e c i f i e d
1
0
M a j o r i t y  e x c l u d i n g  t h e  c h a i r m a n  
S t r i n g e n t  c r i t e r i a  ( 7 )
1 +  1 p r i n c i p l e
N o m  i n a l  i o n  C o m  m  i t  t o  
C r i t e r i a
M a j o r i t y  N E D s  
N o t  s t a t e d
M a j o r i t y  N E D s  
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5
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2.A .3 Detailed Provisionw ise Analysis
In what follows, we will provide a detailed analysis of the compliances and the expla­
nations related to  each provision of the Code. In particular, we will discuss the trend 
in compliance, the quality and the most used explanations.
• Chairman/CEO  (A.2 .1 )
The general principle indicates the division between who is in charge of running 
the board and who has executive powers as best practice. The specific code pro­
vision specifies the figures of who should run the board (the chairman) and who 
should run the company’s business (the chief executive office, CEO), claiming 
th a t these two roles should not be combined. The provision however does not 
explicitly take into account the figure of the "executive chairman". There are 
some cases where the executive chairman is formally separated from the CEO, 
but with some executive powers of decision. This generates a unequal interpre­
tation of the principle. In fact, in presence of an executive chairman separated 
from the CEO, some companies claim to be fully compliant, while some others 
state the non compliance in the m atter and provide a justification.
The different interpretation of the provision appears in our data. We find 40 
companies with an executive chairman th a t do not consider it a point of not 
compliance, and 6  companies recognizing the executive role of the chairman and 
providing an explanation. In both circumstances, a decreasing trend in the per­
centage of non compliance appears. Clearly, the magnitude of the non compliance 
differs: when the presence of an executive chairman is considered a m atter of not 
compliance, the percentage of not-compliant companies is about 1 0 % more than 
the case when only what it is stated in the corporate governance statem ent is 
considered (2 0 %).
• Senior Non-Executive Director (A.2.1)
The Combined Code states that, irrespective of whether the roles of chairman 
and CEO are combined, board members should address any concerns about the 
combined role of C hairm an/CEO  or the Chairm an’s acts to a senior non-executive 
director (SNED).The provision aim at limiting the likelihood th a t the power is 
too heavily concentrated in the hands of an executive director and a chairman.
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The creation of this "trinity" at the top of a company (Chairman, CEO, SNED) 
has attracted  criticism of possible divisions on the board.
The absence of a SNED is one of the most occurrent non-compliance items, 
together w ith the service contracts’ length. The overall trend shows a constant 
decreasing number of the non-compliances, from about 43% in the first period to 
below the 1 0 % in the last period, when only one company refrains from providing 
any sort of explanation. We found a great variety in the explanations provided, 
which we carefully analysed. Of the all provisions analysed, the absence of a SNED 
has the highest number of Type 5 explanations (18%). Explanations falling in the 
Type 3 and Type 4 taxonomy are the most commonly used (25%).
We further check the inter-temporal consistency of the explanations. We find 
that all the companies initially stating th a t the SNED "is not necessary" or 
"the chairman is enough, hence it is not appropriate to nominate a SNED", 
end up in changing their prospective and complying. A similar trend is found 
in the explanations justifying the absence of a SNED because of the chairm an’s 
independency or the strong NEDs’ presence and calibre. Furthermore, the only 
company not appointing a SNED because it feels it is not "appropriate for the 
nature and culture of the company", eventually complies.
Finally, we examine the likelihood of not appointing a SNED and combining the 
C EO /C hairm an roles. Roughly 1 out of 4 companies with an executive chairman 
in every period does not opt for nominating a SNED. The same choice is made in 
a lower percentage by the companies with combined role CEO /Chairm an. Both 
decisions are quite debatable in the light of the SNED function. Indeed, the SNED 
should limit potential pitfalls connected with the chairm an’s conduction in the 
board, even more when there is not a complete separation of executive powers 
and "a clear division o f responsibilities at the head o f the company".
•  Non-executives representation (A.3.1)
The Combined Code does not assess neither the definition of a non-executive 
director or his role. Only recently, the revised Combined Code contains, for the 
first time, a formal description of a non- executive director’s role and increases 
the non executive representation in the board from one th ird  to one half.
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In m atter of non compliance, we find very few companies with a total number of 
non-executive directors comprising less than  one th ird  of the board since the be­
ginning of our sample. The percentage of not compliances is constantly decreasing 
and well below the 10% across all the periods analysed. In the last period, only 
1.7% of the companies do not comply. However, non compliant companies with 
this provision either do not provide any justification or give a general explanation.
• Independent non-executive directors (A.3.2)
This is perhaps one of the most indeterminate and vague provision of the Com­
bined Code, because a  definition of "independence" is not given. The assessment 
of independency is indeed left to the board’s judgm ent, which may be biased 
towards "too wide" and general views of managerial freedom from any business 
interference. This lack has been recently filled by the Revised Combined Code, 
where there is a more comprehensive definition of independence.
In line with the general pattern , there is a monotonically increase in the compli­
ance rate, up to 95% in the last period. In the earlier periods, we can observe 
few cases where the non executives’ independence is not stated, a tendency that 
disappears in the years. O ther more common explanations justify departure from 
best practice with the experience and independent view of the managers.
• Service Contracts and Compensation (B.1.7, B.1.8)
The innovative aspect introduced by the Combined Code is that all executive 
directors must have rolling service contracts with the company terminable on 
one year notice. This should limit the due compensation to be paid in case of 
early termination and incentive the CEO dismissal in case of poor performance of 
the company. The non compliance in respect with the service contracts’ provision 
is the most common m atter of violation of the Combined Code, although strongly 
decreasing across years. I t falls from 6 6 % in the first period to 20% in the last 
period, with an average 1 0 % drop between two consecutive periods.
The Combined Code partially works with regard to the quality of the expla­
nations. In the last period, there are no Type 1 explanations, and no companies 
declare that " there are no plans to amend the service contracts", "the existing ser­
vice contracts need to guarantee long-term projects" or th a t "non compliance is in 
the company 7s in terest". Very few companies still argue that the non-compliance
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with the provision helps in retaining and attracting managers of sufficient calibre 
or expertise, or simply assert that it is "a common market p r a c t i c e It is how­
ever surprising to  observe a non-decrease in the lack of any justification. Further, 
it is quite controversial and only slightly decreasing over periods, the fact th a t 
some companies do not explicitly highlight the presence of contracts with no­
tice of more than one year in the corporate governance statem ent as a m atter of 
non compliance. The above companies might have misinterpreted the code pro­
visions, since a justification regarding the executives with a pre-Combined Code 
service contract of more than 1 year should be present. More serious is the case 
of the companies neither making a non-compliance statem ent nor providing a 
justification.
Finally, we analyse the intertem poral consistency of the explanations. The com­
panies asserting the necessity of having contracts with more than  one year notice 
in order to "retain or attract high calibre managers", easily change their expla­
nation. In particular, of the total 42 companies claiming the need of contracts 
with more than 1 year’s notice periods, only 3 companies remain consistent with 
this explanation. On the contrary, 22 companies opt for compliance, 9 companies 
declare that the new hired executive directors will be compliant with the code 
provision and 8  companies modify the existing explanation; of these 8  companies, 
5 eventually move towards compliance. A similar pattern  appears also in the jus­
tifications related to the "nature o f the industry" or to  "a common widespread 
market practice", or when it is stated to be "in the company’s best interest". Of 
the 6  companies asserting their unconditional willingness of not modifying the 
existing contracts, 6  end up in complying with no motivations underlying their 
change in intentions, while 3 opt for other kinds of explanation.
• Remuneration Committee (B.2.2)
Despite not very high the percentage of non compliances, the code provision 
related to the existence and composition of a remuneration committee is very 
interesting. This is the only case, among all analysed provisions, where the per­
centage of non-compliances is not decreasing across years, and always above the 
average 10%. To this percentage of non-compliant companies, we might add some 
"suspicious" cases of asserted independence. In fact, some companies state  the 
independence of their non-executives despite an existing long tenure or the exis­
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tence of business relations. The companies believe th a t the independence view of 
the non-executives is not affected by the above situations. However, these justi­
fications may be quite controversial in the light of the effective independence.
The most common explanation provided is related to the firm’s belief th a t the 
Chairman (when not considered independent) or the CEO "should serve on the 
remuneration committee", with no further clarifications though. The quality of 
the explanations, when any, is standard. Overall, Type 0 and Type 1 explanations 
are far commonly used by the largest majority of companies. It is surprising to 
observe the relative high number of companies providing no explanations in case 
of not compliance: only in the period 2002/03, the lack of explanations amounts 
to 31% of the companies.
We however observe an inconsistency in our data. We indeed check whether the 
total number of members constituting the remuneration committee is greater 
than the total number of declared independent non executive directors. Quite 
unexpectedly, we found some cases where the above inequality is holding. In 
order to rule out any possible inaccuracy, we analysed again the annual reports 
in question. Again quite surprising, we had the confirmation of the accuracy in 
our data, together with a sort of inconsistency in the contents of the annual 
reports. The companies at hand assess in the Board o f directors’s section the non 
independence of some of the non-executive directors, who are on the contrary 
considered independent when part of the remuneration committee. We report 
an example of the apparent existing inconsistency provided by British American 
Tobacco (2000):
Directors. The board of the Company currently has 7 non executive Directors. The 
majority of the non-executive Directors are independent as set out in the Code. 
In this context, two of the non-executive Directors are not considered to be in­
dependent fo r  all purposes because of the shareholders they represent
The Remuneration Committee. The Committee comprises all the no-executive Direc­
tors. The Board continues to consider that all non-executive Directors on the 
Remuneration Committee are independent for these purposes"
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Therefore, the level of independence of non-executives constituting the board of 
directors is differently judged when the same are members of the remuneration 
committee.
• Audit Committee (D.3.1)
The percentage of non compliant companies is below 13% each period and does 
not follow a specific pattern. Non compliance with this provision is related to  3 
aspects: when there is not a majority of independent non-executive directors, or 
the committee is not exclusively made of non-executives directors, or the number 
of its members is inferior to 3. In the majority of the non compliant cases, the 
committee consists of a number of members less to 3. It is also interesting to 
observe that almost half of the compliant companies have an overall number in 
the audit committee not exceeding the 3 members, the minimum required by 
the Combined Code. Apart from the transitional explanations, the most frequent 
used explanations concern the size of the board and the assertion of the m anager’s 
experience. It is always surprising to observe some companies not providing any 
explanation (on average 1 0 %).
• Appointments to the Board (A.5.1)
Differently from the remuneration and audit committees’ provisions, indepen­
dency of non executives is not required for the composition of the nomination 
committee. A majority of non-executive members should comprise the committee, 
which may not be constituted if the board is small. The Code Provision however 
does not define specific circumstances or examples under which a board is consid­
ered to be small. Of the total 54 non compliant companies, on average they have 
a smaller number of members in the board as compared with the entire sample, 
particularly in the non-executive component. In line with the general trend, we 
observe a strong decrease in the non compliances related to the existence and the 
composition of a nomination committee: this percentage goes from 21% to  4.3% 
in the last period.
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3
One Size does not fit all, after all: Evidence 
from Corporate Governance
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we investigate the effects of corporate governance on performance in 
the context of a flexible regulatory regime. The novel contribution of this study is the 
use of a unique dataset that identifies companies’ governance behaviour across time and 
the level of information conveyed to market participants in order to understand: 1 ) to 
what extent the heterogeneity of companies is reflected in their governance choices and 
how it affects performance and 2 ) how market participants can effectively discriminate 
between well governed and badly governed companies.
Academics and non-academics tend to quantify corporate governance by looking at 
various aspects like board characteristics, anti-takeover provisions, ownership structure, 
and then relate these to performance. The typical methodology quantifies adherence 
to certain provisions or the magnitude of some components. For instance Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick (2003) (henceforth GIM) construct an index based on the number 
of anti-takeover provisions in a company’s charter and show th a t it is related to  per­
formance. Commercial data agencies use a similar mechanical tick-box methodology 
to  rate a company’s quality of governance. However, recent empirical evidence1 shows
’ The analysis over a more recent period by Core et al. (2006) shows that the index used by GIM is not 
sta tistica lly  related to  stock market perform ance. Bobchuek. Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) find that only som e 
provisions, am ong the fourty-four used by GIM. are correlated w ith firm value and stockholder returns. Larcker 
et al. (2004) em pirically dem onstrate that the typ ical structural indicators of corporate governance have very 
lim ited ability to  explain organisational performance and that the result o f sim ilar studies are often contradictory. 
B erglof and von T hadden (2000) criticise La Porta et al. for their controversial construction o f investor protection  
indicators.
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th a t this approach does not completely capture all aspects of corporate governance and 
consequently its association with performance.
One reason why establishing this link may prove empirically difficult could be that, 
in m atters of corporate governance, one-size-does-not-fit-all. Consider the adoption of 
anti-takeover charter provisions ( “ATPs” ) by a company. Most of the debate focuses on 
shareholders’ welfare maximisation and it is widely argued th a t ATPs are likely to be 
a manifestation of managerial entrenchment and hence reduce shareholder value. How­
ever, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that managers pursuing shareholder 
value maximisation put such defences in place with the aim of either discouraging value 
decreasing takeovers or commanding high prices from good acquirers (Hannes 2002). 
In particular, when looking at various governance criteria, it may be realistic that in 
some cases deviating from a  principle is optimal.
The presence of diversity amongst companies has crucial implications for research 
in corporate governance. An index which identifies better governed companies by 
analysing adherence to governance provision(s) discards relevant information and im­
poses a one-size-fits-all framework on what is expected from companies. This aspect 
is further complicated by the existence of heterogeneous corporate structures, which 
are left unexplained by more standard models. Not recognising the existence of het­
erogeneity among firms by de facto  imposing one-size-fits-all approaches would raise 
efficiency issues. Indeed, there are many arguments for and against each regulatory pro­
posal, recommendation or governance criteria. Further, it is well recognised th a t better 
governance can lead to better performance. This highlights the crucial importance of 
identifying good governance.
Most studies investigating the relation between corporate governance and operating 
performance focus on the US, where the approach to corporate governance is essen­
tially m andatory in nature, as epitomised by the Sarbanes-Oxley Law. Such a system 
advocates a one-size-fits-all approach to corporate governance, as all companies have 
to comply with the law. However, in the rest of the world attention is focused in estab­
lishing codes and standards against which to assess companies. Therefore, the US is not 
representative of most countries. We therefore investigate the governance behaviour in 
a flexible regulatory regime, where companies can make different governance choices 
reflecting their unique circumstances.
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We chose UK as the setting of our analysis as it pioneered a principle-based ap­
proach to  corporate governance. This approach consists of a Code of best practice, 
which contains principles and provisions relating to various aspects of governance in 
a company. It is characterised by voluntary compliance with the Code provisions, and 
m andatory disclosure: companies have to reveal in their annual reports whether they 
are complying with the Code and, if not, explain why (also known as the “comply or 
explain” approach). This regulation has been in force for about 15 years, thus making 
the UK an ideal environment for studying governance choices and their effects.
The data  for our analysis comes from corporate governance statem ents contained in 
the annual reports of UK companies. We construct a unique dataset by hand collecting 
details of both compliance and explanation in case of non compliance for 245 non- 
financial companies over a six year period. We then measure the quality of corporate 
governance on the basis of compliance with the various provisions of the Code as well 
as on the quality of explanations given in case of non-compliance. In a nut-shell, our 
approach is based on the assumption that a firm that does not comply, but identifies 
specific circumstances justifying departure from best practice, is no less well-governed 
than a company which is fully compliant. This allows us to fine-tune the identification 
strategy for well-governed companies. We then use this measure to investigate the effect 
of governance on performance.
Our analysis highlights several interesting results. If corporate governance m atters for 
performance, a measure th a t does not account for companies’ different choices should 
fail to  deliver such association. Indeed, we find that a  measure which accounts for 
different choices by companies of corporate governance is significantly associated with 
performance as against measures based on a tick-box approach, which are not. We find 
th a t companies departing from best practice for valid reasons perform exceptionally 
well and out-perform the fully compliant ones. In contrast, mere compliance with the 
provisions of the Code does not necessarily result in better performance. Our findings 
are robust to various specifications: endogeneity, cross-sectional dependence and selec­
tion issues, different measures of performance and control variables, and alternative 
constructions of the corporate governance index. Our findings could be interpreted as 
follows, we depart from the one-size-fits-all framework in corporate governance, by 
incorporating in our measure the reasons companies give for not complying. Compa­
nies, which have carefully thought about the application of the Code to their specific
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circumstances, are more likely to provide better explanations of their choice and are 
thus likely to be well-governed, which is reflected in their performance.
We contribute to  the literature in various ways. First, we contribute to  the emerging 
empirical literature on corporate governance by investigating its relationship to corpo­
rate performance. In this regard, we show that corporate governance is much more than 
ticking boxes. Second, we highlight the importance of the “comply or explain” approach 
embracing the one-size-does-not-fit-all concept. We show th a t companies indeed make 
heterogeneous governance choices. The flexibility of the “comply or explain” approach 
allows companies to  choose the structure that best suits them. Our investigation shows 
th a t these choices are associated with superior performance. Our results also suggest 
th a t shareholders and, more generally, market participants do not pay sufficient a tten ­
tion to explanations. There is value in analysing explanations since explanations can 
help separate well-governed companies from badly governed ones.
To summarise, the existing evidence of the link between governance and performance 
is not conclusive. One reason for th a t could be that governance is badly measured since 
it is hard to imagine th a t governance systems are universally bad. Thus a better s tra t­
egy to assess governance quality will be to take into account the specific circumstances 
facing companies. It would be however difficult for researchers to  assess such circum­
stances since there is hardly any information available about it. It is in this context 
that the UK regulation might help as it requires companies to  explain their decision 
of not complying with best practice. In this study we therefore analyse explanations 
and hypothesize th a t firms not complying but providing specific justifications in light 
of their unique circumstances are more likely to  choose not to  comply for good reasons 
than companies th a t do not comply and either not explain or provide a poor quality 
explanation. Such choices should be reflected in their performance. We test this hy­
pothesis by relating corporate performance to two different measures of governance, one 
which just focuses on compliance versus non compliance and second which additionally 
classifies as well governed the non-compliant with good explanations. We then empiri­
cally test and find th a t the second measure of governance is significantly and positively 
associated with performance whereas the first is not. Thus supporting our hypothesis 
that firms providing good quality explanations are more likely to have thought about 
their optimal governance structure, which is reflected in their performance.
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Finally, the analysis of corporate governance in the UK context has im portant regu­
latory and policy implications. An increasing number of countries are adopting or are 
in the process of implementing codes of best practice based on the UK model.2 Analysis 
of such a system enables us to clearly infer corporate behaviour and consequently its 
effect on performance. More importantly, if companies have a choice, they can signal to 
the market that they are different in order to a ttract external financing, especially so 
in governance regimes th a t are less transparent and provide less protection to minority 
shareholders.3 Our study can thus give directions to policymakers in countries trying 
to  implement corporate governance codes.4
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the relation to the 
existing literature. Section 3.3 discusses the motivation and underlying hypothesis, sec­
tion 3.4 the hand-collected dataset and our measures of corporate governance. Sections 
3.5 and 3.6 describe the methodology and results for operating performance. Section 
3.7 relates governance to stock market returns and finally, section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Literature review
There is a growing empirical literature exploring the relation between governance and 
performance. One strand of literature focuses on governance indices. In these papers 
indices are developed based on either compliance with governance provisions or the 
presence of certain provisions in their company’s charter. The effect of these indices 
on performance is then analysed. In one of the most widely cited papers GIM create 
a corporate governance index of US firms to investigate the effects of better corporate 
governance on performance at the firm level. The authors find a positive relation be­
tween stock market returns and the governance index, but the effect of their index on 
operating performance is weak.
-A ccord ing  to  tIk* U nited N ations, th e use o f  "comply or explain" m echanism s in countries allows investors 
and other stakeholders greater access to  inform ation about th e  corporation and is to  be encouraged (Guidance? 
on good Practices in C orporate G overnance D isclosure. U nited N ations Conference on Trade and D evelopm ent. 
20 Septem ber 2005). M oreover, the World Bank R eport on the O bservance of Standards and C odes (ROCs) 
recom m ends to  m any countries the im plem entation of a code o f corporate? governance w ith m andatory reporting  
on a "comply or explain" basis.
5As an exam ple, in 2001 the Sao Pau lo stock Exchange launched a new market segm ent, the N ovo M ercato. 
to  allow com panies that want to differentiate them selves from the other Brazilian com panies by following 
international best practice.
* D esp ite  self-regulation and "comply or explain" m echanism s are no su b stitu tes for real public enforcem ent 
system s (R ajan and Zingalos 1998) and yet. th ey  are not enforced bv them selves and need to  be used by market 
participants to  prom ote good internal corporate governance, codes can coord inate inform ation collection and 
establish standards (B erglof and C laessens 2004).
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Black (2001), Durnev and Kim (2005), Klapper and Love (2004), and Black et al. 
(2005) analyse the impact of governance on operating performance and find a positive 
association. All these papers focus on emerging markets where they are more likely 
to  find a strong relation between well-governed companies and performance. However, 
clear evidence for developed countries is missing. In fact, Bhagat and Black (2002) find 
no correlation between board independence and long-term firm performance. O ther 
studies like Yermack (1996), or Klein (1998) report a negative relationship between 
proportion of independent directors and Tobin’s q. All the above studies use a tick­
box approach to develop measures of governance under the one-size-fits-all framework. 
Our paper departs from this framework and allows for the fact th a t different companies 
make different choices, by using the quality of explanation as a proxy for th a t choice.
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2005) assess the impact of a new set of governance 
rules introduced in 2002 by the U.S. Congress. They find, on average, a positive im­
pact on the value for those firms which were non compliant with the rules before their 
introduction. However, such an impact is negative for small companies, for which the 
costs of implementation seem to be higher than the benefits, thus raising the issue 
about the optimality of a rigid system of governance. Landier, Sraer, and Thesm ar 
(2005) develop an index of internal governance for a company by using the number of 
“independently m inded” top executives. Their argument is th a t such executives even 
though they are formally under the CEO can influence him /her to not undertake value 
destroying projects. Using a large sample of US companies they provide robust em­
pirical evidence that internal governance is strongly related to  corporate performance. 
Their paper thus focuses on internal governance, whereas we refine the traditional 
measures of governance for diverse behaviour amongst companies.
We are not aware of any academic paper th a t analyses the effect of a flexible regu­
latory system on performance and, in our specific case, of the Combined Code. In the 
earlier chapter we document how compliance with provisions of the Combined Code 
evolves over time and analyse the explanations. We find that despite increasing adher­
ence with the Code’s principles, the quality of the explanations does not increase over 
time. Grinstein and Hribar (2004) investigate what reasons the compensation commit­
tee report gives for the bonus to executives in the U.S. They find th a t these committees 
are reluctant to provide such information, and in 49% of the cases they do not justify 
the bonus.
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Most of the academic papers in the UK deal w ith the implementation of the Cad­
bury Committee recommendations (the forerunner of the Combined Code). Dahya et al. 
(2002) look at top management turnover and corporate performance for UK companies 
before and after the Cadbury Code. They find th a t poorer performance is associated 
with higher turnover and this relationship is significantly stronger following adoption 
of the Cadbury Code. They further conclude that this increased sensitivity to  perfor­
mance is mainly due to an increase in non-executive (or outside) directors. Similarly, 
Dedman (2003) investigates if the Cadbury Code has lead to reduction in managerial 
entrenchment. Based on a sample of UK listed firms between 1990 and 1995 she con­
cludes th a t the Code has not reduced the agency problem of managerial entrenchment 
in large UK firms. However, similar to Dahya et al. (2002) she does find a relationship 
between company performance and CEO departure. Conyon and Peck (1998) study the 
impact of various governance variables and presence of remuneration committees on 
executive pay. They conclude th a t executive pay and corporate performance are more 
aligned in companies having a majority of non-executive directors and remuneration 
committees.
3.3 Motivation and underlying hypothesis
The search for association between performance and corporate governance has been a 
constant topic of this empirical literature, but the results are mixed. One reason why 
establishing this link may be difficult from an empirical point is the common use of 
the one-size-fits-all approach to corporate governance. The quality of corporate gover­
nance is measured through indices, which take into account what should be expected 
from companies by imposing a one-size-fits-all framework. Using such a framework, a 
non compliant company will be unconditionally associated with a low score. However, 
the world is not black and white, and the diversity among companies clearly mitigates 
against such a view. There is indeed evidence that companies are heterogeneous and 
even similar firms make different choices (Himmelberg et. al (1999), T itm an and Wes- 
sels (1988)) or have dissimilar practices (Bertrand and Schoar (2003)). Related studies 
show th a t governance structures evolve over time and across industries, and they are 
an endogenous response to the company’s stage of development or industry conditions
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(Gillan et al. (2003), Boone et al. (2005), Agarwal and Knoeber (1996))5. For instance, 
consider the adoption of anti-takeover charter provisions ( “ATPs”). In the literature, 
there are two contrasting arguments in favour or against the ATPs adoption. Accord­
ing to the “Disciplinary Hypothesis” , hostile takeovers replace managers of badly run 
companies, thus being an effective threat against pursuing empire buildings or im­
plementing pet projects. However, Stein (1988 and 1989) argues th a t the disciplinary 
argument is diluted if a market suffers from myopia, and Bebchuk and Stole (1993) 
dem onstrate that in presence of takeover threat managers may under/over-invest in 
the light of short-term  returns. On the contrary, the “Bargaining Power Hypothesis” 
states th a t managers can use ATPs to negotiate a higher takeover premium, thus 
benefiting the company’s shareholders.6 Even though in most of the cases ATPs are 
value decreasing, they may not always be so, and therefore would not be appropriate 
to assume governance failures where those defences genuinely promote shareholders’ 
interests. The investigation using a one-size-fits-all methodology is therefore a priori 
problematic, as it imposes a strait-jacket on an otherwise flexible environment.7
To overcome the issues raised above, we approach the problem from a different and 
more appropriate perspective. We study the relation between corporate governance 
and performance in a one-size-does-not-fit-all regulatory regime. There are at least two 
main reasons for doing so. First, a flexible system is a better environment to investigate 
the relation between governance and performance, since, as argued above, governance 
choices are likely to be heterogeneous. Similarly, it is challenging to establish uniform 
criteria of good corporate governance for different firms as often there is no consen­
sus even about the definition corporate governance, let alone what constitutes good
5 Chidambaram Palia and Zheng (2006) take the argument further and exam ine if  better corporate governance  
"causes" better firm perform ance. Baaed on their analysis they cordcude that firms are in equilibrium  and choose  
their governance endogenously.
f'For an extensive discussion of the two approaches, see H annes (2002). T h e paper highlights th e w ide diver­
gence in actual takeover practices even am ong sim ilar firms, arguing that the choice; o f A T Ps adoption may be 
efficient for shareholders.
‘ Larcker, R ichardson and Tuna (2004) question if corporate governance really m atters in the form o f the  
typical indicators o f corporate governance used in academ ic research and institu tion al rating services. T hey argue 
that the contradictory results in the corporate governance literature are th e consequence o f an easy-way used to  
collect the governance indicators, som e of which are likely to have m easurem ent errors in th e construction (e.g .. 
board independence) or capture just a single aspect o f corporate governance (e.g .. anti-takeover provisions). 
T his is because it is very difficult to capture all the various aspects o f corporate governance, especia lly  so in 
a rigid system  where com panies must com ply w ith  strict regulation and m onitoring is relatively easy. T here is 
however th e dangerous possibility  that, you m ight have ticked all the com pliance boxes, but still be; deficient in  
governance. For instance. Enron was 100'X com pliant under the ex isting  US Code.
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governance.8 Second, flexible approaches to corporate governance are being adopted 
worldwide, making it an interesting question to study from a policy perspective.
In light of this heterogeneity, we use UK as the setting of our analysis since it 
pioneered a flexible regulatory approach to corporate governance. The main premise of 
this approach is th a t because companies are different, it is not appropriate to  impose a 
strict and rigid regulation common to all, but give companies the freedom to choose the 
structure that best suits them. General and widely accepted criteria of best practice are 
embodied in a Code: as they are general, they may not be suitable to all companies, 
who can opt-out of the Code by explaining the reasons. We therefore depart from 
a tick-box approach to corporate governance by taking into account the explanation 
provided by companies in case of departure from best practice and then investigate its 
relation with performance. The explanation specifies to what extent the company is 
different from the others and informs the shareholders of the motivation. Such reasons 
thus reveal information about why adherence to  the Code provisions is not necessarily 
the optimal choice for a company, and what are the specific circumstances th a t have led 
to departure from best practice. In other words, the companies through the explanation 
make clear why one-size-fits-all is not best for them. A company which has considered 
its circumstances and decided against compliance cannot by any means be classified 
as badly governed. Thus companies which provide informative justifications for their 
non-compliance are more likely to have weighed the pros and cons of complying before 
arriving at their decision. Such companies are therefore more likely to be well-governed. 
By a complementary argument, companies giving uninformative explanations are not 
likely to be well-governed. Thus, from the analysis of the explanations provided we can 
infer the quality of companies’ corporate governance.
In Chapter 2, we show that some companies carefully explain the circumstances th a t 
have led departure from best practice whereas others give uninformative and standard 
explanations, while a significant minority do not provide any.<J From a performance 
perspective, we investigate the value of the explanations, if any, and if shareholders 
should pay attention to them when scrutinising the reasons why commonly accepted
s In the inital .section o f the World Bank Toolkit "Developing C orporate G overnance C odes of B est Practice", 
we find eight different quotes defining corporate governance, which highlights the difficulty o f converging to  a 
unique accepted definition o f corporate governance,
“Instead, o f  w h o l ly  e m b r a c in g  the ch a n g es ,  com,panics  are m e r e l y  l i ck in g  boxes  to e n s u r e  th a t  th e y  c o m p ly  
w i t h  the bare m i n i m u m ,  r a th e r  th an  e m b r a c in g  I,he sp i r i t .  T h e  a n n u a l  r e p o r t s  are  o n e  o f  the  f e w  a v e n u e s  open
l.o c o m p a n i e s  to d e m o n s t r a t e  th e i r  c o m m i t m e n t .  I f  th ey  c a n n o t  o r  w i l l  n o t  u se  th e m ,  the s h a r e h o ld e r s  a n d  
p o t e n t i a l  in v e s t o r s  m a y  h a ve  to a s s u m e  the w o r s t" .  (Simon Lowe. Head of B isk M anagem ent Service's, Grant 
T hornton)
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best practice does not fit the company. If explanations m atter, we should observe 
th a t companies providing this additional information should be associated with higher 
performance compared to those failing to provide it. In the end, if the world is not 
black and white and mechanical adherence to fixed provisions is not per se linked to 
superior corporate performance but diversity is, then one-size-does-not-fit-all, after all.
Our investigation follows logical steps. We first test if just compliance (along the lines 
of a box-ticking approach) or both compliance and explanation m atter: the resulting 
evidence will tell us about the value of the explanation. We then investigate whether 
companies within the compliant and non-compliant groups exhibit heterogeneous be­
haviour, and what are the associations with performance.
3.4 Data description
3-4-1 Corporate governance data
The Combined Code was in operation between 31st December 1998 and 30th June 
2004. We analyse 245 UK non-financial companies, belonging to the FTSE350 index as 
of 31st December 2003, during this period. Financial companies are left out from the 
analysis, since the regulatory environment for financial companies differs significantly 
from non-financial ones. The specific regulations for financial companies, although not 
part of the Combined Code, may interact with its provisions and have implications for 
corporate governance (Levine (2004)).
We hand-collected the following information from the corporate governance section 
included in the annual reports, downloaded from the Mergent Online database, of each 
company for each available year:10
• The statem ent of compliance with the Combined Code and the exact explanations 
if any for each non-compliant provision;
• The Board of Directors’ composition, with the indication of the total number 
of executive and non-executive directors, and the number of independent non­
executive directors.
We then classify explanations using the method described in Chapter 2 of the thesis.
1,1 Wo could not find inform ation for all the corn panics for all years because specific annual reports wen' m issing  
or the com pany was previously private.
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3-4-2 Corporate governance score
The UK Combined Code of corporate governance gives indications of good governance 
through its principles. If a company does not comply with those principles, it should not 
be penalized in terms of goodness of its governance, provided an explicative justification 
for its non-compliance is given. W hen evaluating the company’s governance system, the 
mechanical distinction between compliant and non-compliant companies (C /N C ) may 
not entirely describe the full picture under all its aspects, as a  firm explaining in detail 
the reasons for its departure from best practice should not be viewed dilferently from 
a fully compliant one.
We therefore construct an appropriate corporate governance score total score re­
flecting the level of compliance with the Combined Code principles and the quality 
of explanations in case of non-compliance. Following our classification of the quality 
of explanations, we give 5 points in case of compliance with a  provision and 5 points 
as well if the non-compliance is explained in detail. We give 4 points to transitional 
non-compliance situations, 3 points when the justification is limited, and 2 points if 
there is a mechanical quote of the Code statements. Finally, we give 0 or 1 point when 
no explanation or an uninformative explanation respectively, is given. Formally:
Total Score =  (5*No. of compliances) +  (E Quality of explanation for non-compliances)
(3.1)
Therefore, a company fully compliant on all 8 provisions has total score of 40, 
the same as a non compliant company giving all genuine explanations for its non- 
compliances. A company with just one non compliance classified under “type 4” has a 
total score of 39. A company with two non-compliances, one classified under “type 0” 
and the other “type 3” has a total score of 33, and so on.
3-4-3 Accounting and financia l data
All the accounting information is downloaded from Worldscope and Amadeus, while 
stock market data is from Datastream . The accounting information is for the period 
until June 2005, the latest period available at the time of the study. Similarly, monthly 
stock market data  is collected from Datastream  until June 2005. Information about 
membership of the FTSE100 index is obtained directly from FTSE. The Fama-French
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factors as described later were calculated using the entire universe of UK companies 
from Datastream.
3-4-4 Descriptive statistics
We limit our analysis to the description of our measure of corporate governance to­
tal score and of the accounting information used in the analysis.11 Tables 3.1 and 3.2 
provide summary statistics of corporate governance characteristics. Of the to tal 1287 
firm-year observations, we could not classify 5 observations because of missing informa­
tion. Of the remaining 1282 observations, in 417 cases companies are fully compliant. 
Following the GIM methodology, we compute the total number of non-compliances, 
which are on average 1.2 per company. The mean of total score is 36.39 and, the me­
dian is 37. Non-compliant companies with a total score greater than 37 have mainly 
(85%) one non-compliance classified as type 3 or above. On the contrary, a company 
with just one compliance but with a classification below “type 3” will have a score equal 
of less than 37. The minimum value of total score is 10 and the maximum is 40. The 
distribution is skewed towards the maximum value. In 55 cases, non-compliant com­
panies have the highest score 40 (henceforth, TYPE5), which identifies the companies 
that carefully explain the reasons for departing from best practice. On the contrary, 
we identify 442 situations where companies either fail to  provide any explanation or 
provide and explanation of Type 1, in at least one non-compliant provision: we identify 
such companies as TYPEO. The mean total score of these companies is significantly 
lower (31.85).
Table 3.3 shows some accounting, financial, and board description of our sample. 
As the companies belong to the FTSE350 index, not surprisingly they are big in size, 
profitable in terms of ROA, and not highly levered.
We detect 377 cases of simultaneous membership to the FTSE350 and FTSE100 
indices, and 315 cases where they are also cross listed in the US. Boards are relatively 
big, with an average each board consists of 9.57 members, the m ajority of whom are 
not independent.
11 A detailed analysis of trends o f com pliance and cxplnnantion is present in Arcot and Brnno (2005). where, 
am ong others, we find an average 17% of com panies failing to provide any explanation  (T yp e 0) for the stated  
non-com pliance for each year.
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Finally, Table 3.4 illustrates the pairwise correlation among the variables. The tables 
shows there is no significantly high correlation between total score and accounting 
variables.
3.5 Methodology
We next discuss the econometric model used in our analysis. Our dependent variable 
measuring operating performance is industry adjusted return  on assets (ROA). As dis­
cussed in Barber and Lyon (1996) and Core et al. (2006), ROA is a preferred measure 
of operating performance because: first, ROA is not affected by leverage, extraordinary 
items, and other discretionary items; second, it has more desirable distributional prop­
erties than return on equity (total assets are strictly positive, while equity can be zero 
or negative). We define ROA as the ratio of earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) 
to total assets. We adjust for industry by subtracting the ROA of each company in 
each year with the median ROA of the respective Fama-French industry group it be­
longs to. Many papers in the literature use Tobin’s Q as the measure of performance. 
Tobin’s Q is not our preferred measure of performance since alongwith performance it 
also captures growth opportunities. Tobin’s Q is thus a valuation measure rather than 
a pure operating performance measure. Nevertheless we check the robustness of our 
results with Tobin’s Q by suitably controlling for growth opportunities.
To find how corporate governance is related to future operating performance, we run 
the following regression with time dummies,
P e r f  orm anceij+i =  a  +  f3 ■ CG^t +  S ■ Controlsi^ +  Eij, (3-2)
where P er f  ormanceiit+1 is next year industry adjusted ROA and CGij, is a vector of 
governance variables. The sign and the significance of the coefficient will highlight 
the existence, if any, of an association between governance and performance.
We measure corporate governance under three different perspectives:
• compliant vs. non-compliant companies (C/NC);
• the total number of non-compliances, (similar to the GIM methodology);
• total score, which takes into account the quality of the explanation given in case 
of non-compliance.
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We use pooled OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered a t the firm 
level to assess statistical significance. An alternative, would have been to use panel 
d ata  regression with firm fixed effects and time-varying coefficients. We did not use 
this alternative since our total score suffers from an invariant component over time as 
compliance is gradual, w ith few changes. In Chapter 2, we see th a t compliant companies 
remain compliant over time and that the adoption of the provisions in toto happens 
smoothly across tim e12, while a consistent portion in our sample are always or never in 
compliance. Moreover, the explanation provided in case of non compliance, and hence 
the overall score for non compliant companies, tends to remain the same. The inclusion 
of companies’ fixed effects would therefore force identification of the total score from 
only these changes. We therefore do the next best thing and control for industry fixed 
effects by using industry-adjusted measures of performance.
Endogeneity, omitted variable bias, reverse causality and sample selection bias are 
common and recognized problems when analysing the relation between governance and 
performance. There is indeed some evidence that governance choices are endogenously 
driven by the realized performance.13 To our knowledge, only Black et al. (2005) and 
Landier et al. (2005) make an attem pt to control for these problems. In the absence 
of appropriate instruments, we tackle the problem from several different perspectives. 
We first investigate the relation of current governance structure with future (next 
year) operating performance. The one year lag between the two variables should per se 
limit endogeneity problems. In Section 3.6.2, we perform robustness checks to address 
endogeneity, reverse causality, cross-sectional dependence issues and alternative con­
structions of our corporate governance score. We also use different control variables, 
the ones that are usual suspects for being connected to a company’s future performance 
and have been found to explain the cross-sectional and time-series variation in ROA: if 
our measure of governance is robust to the inclusion of these additional controls, this 
would indicate th a t the relationship is not spuriously caused by any of the omitted 
variables. In equation (3.2) we use the following control variables14:
• Firm size, captured by the logarithm of total assets and the age of a company.
Despite the fact that our sample consists of big companies in term s of capitaliza-
I "On average, loss than 10% of the com panies in our sam ple becom e com pliant every year.
II See Hermalin and W oisbach (2003) for a survey.
1 'For a detailed description and construction of the variables used in the analysis, refer to  A ppendix 2
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tion, relatively small or young companies may suffer from costs of compliance or 
need more time to consolidate their business and management structures.
•  Growth prospects, measured by the logarithm of market-to-book ratio and 1-year 
growth rate of sales. A firm’s growth prospect may affect the current performance 
or the governance’s decisions.
• Leverage. It is widely argued in the literature that highly levered companies are 
more monitored; hence there is potentially more pressure on performance. We 
use the ratio of long term debt to total assets to capture this effect.
•  Current profitability, defined as the ratio EBIT to sales or current ROA.
• Capital intensity, defined as the ratio of property, plants and equipment (PPE) 
to sales.
The evidence arising from equation (3.2), if any, will highlight the nature and the 
strength of the relation between corporate governance and future performance. In par­
ticular, it will illustrate if the above relation is driven by a mere adherence to provisions 
or a finer measure which takes into the value of explanations. If full adherence with the 
Code does not per se lead to superior corporate performance and the explanation adds 
significance to the governance-performance relation, then diversity plays an im portant 
role for future performance.
We then investigate the “com ply” and the “explain” aspects of the governance 
system more carefully. We first test the association between different types of expla­
nations and performance by using dummy variables that identify the various kinds of 
non-compliant companies. In particular, we use:
a) A dummy variable TYPE5  which takes the value 1 if a company is non compliant 
w ith a t least 1 provision but has maximum score 40 (giving all Type 5 explana­
tions). These companies thus follow both the letter and the spirit of the regulation 
(doesn’t comply but explains) and are hence is well-governed, which should be 
positively reflected in its performance The sign and the significance of the dummy 
variable coefficient will show the value of giving genuine (Type 5) explanations 
when departing from the one-size-fits-all approach, irrespective of the number of 
non-compliances;
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b ) A dummy variable N C 39 taking the value of 1 when the company does not provide
Type 5 explanations for all its non-compliances. These companies follow the letter 
but not the spirit of the regulation (don’t comply, but do not properly explain) 
and should have a lower performance than TYP E 5  companies. We compare the 
coefficient of the NC39 dummy with th a t of the TYP E 5  dummy;
c) A dummy variable TYPEO  taking the value 1 if a company does not provide an
explanation for any of its non-compliances or provides an explanation classified 
as Type 1, irrespective of the total number of non-compliances. These companies 
follow neither the letter nor the spirit of the regulation (don’t comply and provide 
very poor explanations), hence are more likely to have a bad governance structure, 
and the dummy coefficient should indicate a negative relation with performance.
To test the above, we run the following regressions:
R O — at -\- j3 ' T Y P E 5 itt T  & ■ Controls^f T (3.3a)
R O A ij+ i =  a + Pi ■ T Y P E b ij  + ' N C 39 ij + 5 ■ C o n tro ls^  + £i,t, (3.3b)
R O A i j t + 1 =  a + (3 ■ T Y P E 0 i:t + S ■ C o n tro ls^  + £i,t- (3.3c)
The controls for these regressions are the same as those used in equation (3.2), with 
W hite’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered a t the firm level.
We then look at the “comply” pillar of the governance regulation. We observe that 
fully compliant companies are not a homogeneous group: in the previous chapter we 
show th a t among the members of the FTSE350, only 10% of the companies fully 
adopted the provisions of the Code in 1998, with an increase to 55% in 2004. A large 
proportion of companies therefore became fully compliant with the Code provisions af­
ter its introduction. This decision can be the result of either an endogenous optimiza­
tion process or external pressures to comply.10 We therefore investigate from a per­
formance perspective whether always-compliant companies differ from those adopting-
1 ’There a n 1 innum erable exam ples arid anecdotal evidence of pressure to com ply rather than explain in the 
com panies' annual reports, in the press, and in the practitioners' reports (C oom hers and W ong. 2004).
For instance. Pearson pic sta tes in its 2002 annual report: " O u r  s e c o n d  n on -c om pl ian c e ,  w i th  the. C o m b i n e d  
C o d e  is that, we h o ve  not. n a m e d  a s e n i o r  in d epend en t ,  d i r e c to r  (S I D ) .  To d a le  we  h a ve  been sa t i s f i e d  w i th  the  
p r a c t i c e  th a t  i f  a n y  s h a r e h o ld e r  ra ises  a. co n ce rn  o r  m a k e s  a complaint, to the  c h a i r m a n ,  he is ob liged  to sh a r e  
i t  w i t h  the. o th e r  d i r ec to r s .  P e a r s o n  has  a ls o  f o r  s o m e  t i m e  been, h a p p y  f o r  n o n - e x e c u t i v e s  to m e e t  s h a r e h o ld e rs .  
H o w e v e r ,  r ecogn is in g  the  a p p e t i t e  to f o r m a l i s e  these, p ro cesse s ,  w e  do  n o w  in t e n d  to  a p p o in t  a SII)."
T h e following quote from the Financial T im es o f  10th March. 2005 illustrates the point L'A lso  there  is  a 
w id e s p r e a d  fee l in g  in  the B r i t i s h  b o ard roo m s  th a t  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  in v e s to r ’s arc r e s p o n d i n g  loo m e c h a n i s t i c a l l y
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compliance, and if the adoption of the Code provisions has a positive impact. To test 
these relations, we separately run the following two regressions:
RO A i t+\ — a  +  Pi ■ A D O P C O M P i t +  5 ■ C ontrols^  (3.4a)
R O A w  = a  +  P1 • A F T E R C O M P iyt + P2 ■ T Y P E b ^ t + P3 ■ N C 39i)t (3.4b) 
+5 • C ontrolsift +  ei>t,
where:
• ADOPCOM P  (Adopted Compliance) is a dummy variable assuming the value 1 
if a company became compliant with all the Code provisions during the period 
analysed, 0 otherwise;
• AFTERC O M P  (After Compliance) is a dummy variable assuming the value 1 
for a company after it became compliant with the all the provisions of the code, 
0 otherwise10;
• TYP E 5  and NC39 are dummy variables as defined before.
The reference group in each regression consists of:
• Equation 3.4(a) all the companies that did not change their status (either were 
always compliant or never compliant);
• Equation 3.4(6) all the companies that were always compliant with the code.
The controls for these regressions are again the same as those used in equation
(3.2), with robust standard errors clustered at the firm level The results of the above 
regressions will indicate how companies adopting compliance perform with respect to 
those who were always compliant and never compliant companies and whether or not 
complying with Code but giving a good explanation is better than  complying from a 
performance perspective.
to  th e  ' c o m p ly  o f  e x p l a in 7 approach, o f  the  C o m b i n e d  ( lode ,  p a y i n g  to  l i tt le  a t t e n t i o n  to the. c i r c u m s t a n c e s  o f  
i n d i v id u a l  b u s in e ss e s  a n d  d i s rega rd in g  good  e x p l a n a t io n s  o f  n o n - c o m p l i a n c e .  ~
1,1 T he dum m y i.s therefore oqunl to  0 in caso o f nlway.s com pliant com panies, never com pliant com panies, and  
observations o f the com pany before; it becam e com pliant with all the provisions o f the Code;.
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3.6 Corporate governance and operating performance
3.6.1 R esults
We discuss here the results found from the various models described in the preceding 
section. Table 3.5 shows the main result of our investigation for the whole sample relat­
ing to  equation (3.2). The base model investigates if the separation between compliant 
and non-compliant companies is associated with performance, or if this relation is cap­
tured by the measure total score which takes into account the quality of explanations 
given. The tick-box exercise of splitting the companies between fully compliant versus 
non-compliant does not reveal any relation between corporate governance and future 
operating performance: the coefficient is not significant and even negative (—0.0029) 
(Panel A). Also the coefficient of the score constructed following the GIM methodol­
ogy is not significantly associated with performance (Panel B). On the contrary, the 
coefficient of total score, that does not penalise companies for not complying with good 
reasons, shows a positive (0.0015) and significant (at 5% level) relation with operating 
performance (Panel C, column 2). We first include the control variables th a t are are 
commonly recognized to affect a company’s corporate governance (see GIM, Core et 
al., Landier et al.): firm size, growth opportunities, and current profitability (Panel 
C, column 1). We then add further control variables, capturing leverage, development 
prospects, external monitoring and capital intensity (Panel C, column 2). The coeffi­
cient of total score remains positive and significant even after the inclusion of all the 
above control variables. One standard deviation increase in total score, increases indus­
try  adjusted ROA by 0.0072, a 15% increase relative to the sample average of 4.9%. 
Consistent w ith prior research (e.g., Lang and Stulz (1994) or Black et al. (2005)), the 
coefficient on size is negative and significant. The coefficient of market-to-book ratio is 
positive and highly significant: the firm’s growth prospects affects its future operating 
performances. A similar relation is found with the current profitability. Leverage is 
positive and significant and adds to the overall goodness of fit of the regression. The 
magnitude of the impact of total score on ROA is higher (0.0021) and highly significant 
(at 1%) within the sample of non-compliant companies (Panel C, column 3), highlight­
ing the im portance of giving narrative descriptions especially when departing from best 
practice, and how the explanation itself has to be considered as an indication of the 
quality of corporate governance.
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The evidence we have shown so far suggests there is a positive relation between 
total score and operating performance, in other words, th a t explanation m atters. This 
relation is robust to measurements specifications (see Section 3.6.2), an alternative 
measure of operating performance (net profit margin), and it is particularly strong 
within the sample of non-compliant companies.
We now investigate the performance association of giving different types of expla­
nations when non-complying with the Code. The results in Table 3.6 show th a t non- 
compliant companies with a total score of 40 ( T Y P E 5 ) perform better than  all the 
others, including the fully compliant ones. In particular, T YP E 5  companies are mak­
ing an estim ated industry adjusted ROA of 2.6% more than non TYPE S  companies 
on average (Panel A). In Panel B, the test of differences of the coefficients TYP E 5  
and NC39 (non-compliant companies with score less than  40) has a p-value of 0.13. 
On the contrary, companies th a t either fail to provide an explanation for a t least 
one of their non-compliances or provide a poor quality explanation ( TYPEO) are the 
worst performers: they make an estim ated industry adjusted ROA of 1.3% less than 
non -TYPEO  companies on average (Panel C). These results highlight the positive and 
negative aspects of flexibility. In a flexible system, some companies do not comply for 
genuine reason, whereas others simply take advantage of the regulation by not com­
plying and not explaining properly. We clearly observe that a positive use of flexibility 
( TYP E 5  companies) leads to higher future performance, whereas a misuse of flexi­
bility {TYPEO) is associated with lower future performance. These results therefore 
provide further confirmation th a t compliance is not necessarily a prerequisite for having 
a good governance structure, and underline the importance of seeking better quality 
of explanations.
So far we have conjectured the existence of companies th a t abuse the flexibility 
allowed in the system, by neither complying nor explaining. These companies are asso­
ciated with lower future operating performance than any other. It is however puzzling 
to observe th a t non compliant companies with total score 40 perform even better than 
fully compliant ones, which suggests th a t the picture is more complex and leads us to 
investigate the compliant group of companies in more detail. Such group consists of 
companies th a t have been always in compliance with the Code since its introduction, 
and companies that at some point and for some reason fully embraced its provisions.
3.6. Corporate governance and operating performance 125
In what follows we investigate the associations of these companies with performance 
(equation 3.4).
Panel A of Table 3.7 shows th a t companies th a t adopted compliance with the Code 
(ADO PCOM P ) perform significantly worse than those which remained always com­
pliant the Code. Further Panel B shows that TYPE5  companies are similar to  always 
compliant companies whereas companies adopting compliance even after they become 
compliant (A F TE R C O M P ) still underperform both always compliant companies and 
TYPE5  companies. This evidence casts doubts on the wisdom of compliance with all 
provisions of the Code, since it does not lead to higher performance. P u t differently, 
full adherence to  the Code’s provisions might not necessarily be the optimal solution, 
which once again highlights the existence of heterogeneity even amongst the suppos­
edly “homogenous” group of compliant companies. If evidence from Table 3.6 calls for 
more attention on explanations, the low performance association found in companies 
that adopted a  one-size-fits-all model of corporate governance advocates less pressure 
towards compliance.
3.6.2 Robustness checks
3.6.2.1 Endogeneity and reverse causality
We first run the same regression for different specifications of the dependent variable 
and the controls to check if the governance measure is still robust to companies char­
acteristics, this reduces causality problems. We first include the measure of return on 
assets as control (ROA) at time t instead of the measure EBIT/Sales: if the corpo­
rate governance variable is still statistically significant, it means th a t our results are 
less likely to  be affected by autocorrelation issues. The coefficient of our measure of 
corporate governance is still positive and significant. We also use the logarithm of to­
tal sales instead of the logarithm of total assets and the ratio D ebt/Equity  instead of 
Debt/Assets: again our results are robust to these alternative specifications. We finally 
use net profit margin as an alternative measure of operating performance, defined as 
the ratio of net income upon sales.
We conduct a further analysis. We address the possible critique th a t performance 
directly determines a company’s governance choice (hence invalidating the previous 
analysis) by performing a panel data  version of causality test a la Granger in time
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series analysis. This test is used by Landier et al. (2005) and consists of running the 
following two regressions:
ROAi (£+i) — cl b  * CGij -(- c * ROAift -t- Controlsi^i -I- e ^  (3.5a) 
CGi t^-i-i) — 6 (3 * C G ij +  5 * RO Ai i -f- Controls^^ -f- (3.5b)
where R O A ij  is the company *’s ROA a time t and CG^t is the measure total score of 
corporate governance at time t for the company i. If corporate performance influences a 
company’s governance choice, we should not reject the hypothesis th a t S > 0 and 6 =  0. 
On the contrary, if 5 is not significant while 6 is, it makes more economic sense to talk 
about the positive effects of corporate governance on performance. Table 3.8a shows 
th a t indeed it is not past performance that generate today’s corporate governance. 
The results suggest that changes in total score happen before changes in corporate 
performance. This does not completely rule out the possibility th a t governance changes 
occurs in response to an expectation of future bad performance. However, w ithout an 
instrum ent we cannot completely address this critique.
3.6.2.2 Sample selection bias
The main objective of our investigations is to establish the relation between gover­
nance and performance, which is different from inferring causality. After observing a 
positive relation between total score and future performance, we state  th a t higher score 
companies have higher future ROA. This of course does not exclude selection effects, 
due to which other unobserved variables directly affect the governance’s choices and 
performance. To correct for selection bias which may potentially overestimate the OLS 
coefficients and standard errors, we use the Heckman maximum likelihood estim ation 
with robust standard errors. We prefer this method to  the two-step estim ation for two 
reasons. First, we observe the performance variables of all the companies in our sample 
(compliant, non compliant, adopting compliance), therefore the problem of unobserved 
dependent variables is not present. Second, maximum likelihood is more efficient than 
two-steps under the assumption of joint normality of the error term s.17 As we do not 
have proper instruments, we conjecture the more plausible variables th a t might predict 
selection. In Chapter 2 we saw th a t membership to  the FTSE100 index is slightly as­
1 1 See W ooldridge, i ' r o n o w e t i i c  A n a l y s i s  o f  Crosx  Sect ion, a m i  P a n e l  D a ta  for fi detailed description.
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sociated with higher compliance to  the Code. Moreover, size is an im portant factor for 
the companies to sustain compliance costs (smaller of just listed companies may prefer 
to postpone compliance with the Code in order to stabilize the internal structure; for 
them, the costs of appointing for instance new executive directors may be too oner­
ous). Finally, current performance may trigger instantaneous changes in the internal 
corporate governance, especially in case of bad performance.
Table 3.86 shows the results of the Heckman selection model, considering the mem­
bership to the FTSE100 index, the logarithm of total assets and ROA as selected 
variables. Our total score of internal corporate governance is still significant and posi­
tive. It is therefore very likely that our analysis does not suffer from sample selection 
bias.
3.6.2.3 Cross-sectional dependence
Following the technique used by GIM (2003), we also use a variant of the Fama- 
MacBeth (1973) method by estimating annual cross section of our model, with sta­
tistical significance assessed within each year and across all years, and robust standard 
errors.
We therefore run our total score on one year future industry-adjusted ROA (IAROA), 
obtained by subtracting the median for this measure in the corresponding Fama-French 
industry group alongwith controls. In the spirit of Fama-MacBeth (1973), we use aver­
ages of the annual coefficients and time-series of the standard errors to draw inferences. 
However there is a potential concern about the autocorrelation of the coefficients. Since 
we have only six observations the estim ate of autocorrelation based on those is likely to 
be imprecise. We therefore follow Fama-French(2002) and use a less formal approach. 
We assume th a t the standard errors of the average slopes have a first-order correla­
tion of about 0.75, which is very conservative (our actual sample indicates th a t the 
first-order autocorrelation of the slopes is around 0.33). If we assume 0.75 than the 
standard error is inflated by 2.645718. We therefore deflate our estimates of standard 
error by 2.6457 and then test for significance. The Fama-MacBeth average coefficient 
and standard error is shown in Table 3.8c. The unadjusted (raw) T-statistic based on 
the standard errors in Column 1 is 5.86 which after the adjustment is 2.21 and is still 
significant at the 10% level.
lfi Refer to  Fania-French(2002) footnote  1 for details o f correction.
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The average coefficient is thus significant and positive and very close to the estim ate 
obtained in the basic regression and thus confirms the positive relation between our 
score and future operating performance.
3.6.2.4 A lternative constructions of the corporate governance score
Our classification of the explanations given in case of non-compliance is based on six 
levels of informativeness. To limit further the subjectivity in the criteria used and show 
the our results are not driven by the chosen scaling factor, we group explanations using 
a narrower three-scale classification. The total score rescaled emphasises the level of 
verifiability of the explanations. Non compliances with lack of any explanation, remain 
classified as Type 0, and thus get zero points. Explanations which are general (Type 
1), inline w ith the Code (Type 2) or whose content is not related to the company’s 
unique circumstances (Type 3), are not fully verifiable. We then give them one point. 
Transitional situations (Type 4) and genuine explanations (Type 5) are all verifiable 
and therefore are given two points. Under the narrower classification, the maximum 
(resp. minimum) value of total score rescaled is 16 (resp. 5), with a mean of 15.04 and 
a standard deviation of 1.21.
For comparison with the TYPE5  dummy, we define a dummy variable N C I6, which 
takes the value 1 if a company is non compliant with a t least 1 provision but has 
maximum rescaled score 16 (giving all Type 4 and 5 explanations). The new dummy 
N C I 6 has 158 observations equal to 1. We finally define a dummy variable NC15, which 
take the value of 1 if a company has a total score rescaled less or equal than 15.
Table 3.8d shows the results of regressions (3.2), (3a), and (3b) when using the 
rescaled variables defined above. The analysis confirms the results shown in Tables 3.5 
and 3.6. Total score rescaled shows a positive (0.0052) and significant (at 10%) relation 
with operating performance (Panel A). The coefficient of the impact of total score 
rescaled on industry adjusted ROA is higher (0.0075) and significant (at 5%) within 
the sample of non-compliant companies (Panel B), highlighting again the importance 
of giving narrative descriptions especially when departing from best practice. Panel C 
shows that non-compliant companies with a maximum total score rescaled of 16 (N C I6) 
perform better than all the others, including the fully compliant ones. In particular, 
N C l 6 companies are making an estimated ROA 2.0% more than non N C I 6, on average 
(Panel C).
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3.6.2.5 Corporate governance and Tobin’s Q
As discussed above a lot of the papers in the literature relate corporate governance 
to Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is a valuation measure which incorporates the future growth 
opportunities facing the firm. Similar to ROA, we estim ate the following model with 
Tobin’s Q, tim e dummies and robust standard errors clustered a t the firm level.
In d u stry  A djusted Qi,t+ 1  = a + /3 - C G ij +  S ■ C ontro lsij +  e^t, (3.6)
where C G ij is a vector of governance variables described above. The sign and the 
significance of the coefficient /3 will highlight the existence, if any, of an association 
between governance and performance. We follow Kaplan and Zingales (1997) method 
for the computation of Tobin’s Q and also compute the median Q in each year in each 
of the 48 Fama-French industry classification. Industry adjusted Q is then defined as 
the firm Q minus industry-median Q.
However, as pointed we need to control for growth opportunities in the above model. 
Therefore, in addition to the standard controls for size proxied by log o f Assets and 
log of Age, we use R&D Expenditure to Sales ratio, Capex to Assets ratio and average 
long term growth estimates of the company’s earnings by analysts available in IBES 
dataset as controls for growth opportunities. These are typically the most commonly 
used measures for growth opportunities in the literature. Both R&D expenditure and 
Capital expenditure are likely to be higher for growing companies whereas the long term 
growth is a direct estimate of the company’s growth in the coming years. The problem 
we face is th a t since data  for both R&D expenditure and long term  growth ra te not 
being available for a lot of companies the sample size for the analysis is considerably 
reduced.
The results of the analysis are shown in Table 3.8e. The results are very similar to 
those with operating performance (ROA). The coefficient of the dummy measuring 
overall compliance is negative and not significant. The coefficient of total number of 
non-compliances is negative but not significant. However, the total score coefficient is 
positive as well as statistically significant (at the 10% level). These results once again 
confirm our earlier analysis i.e. a measure of governance based solely on compliances 
is not associated with Q whereas one based on both compliance and explanation is 
associated with Tobin’s Q.
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3.6.2.6 Corporate governance and agency costs
One of the potential explanations given for better performance by well-governed firms 
is lower agency costs. A possible way of inferring agency costs is to  analyse capital 
expenditure. Managers may undertake inefficient projects to extract private benefits.
To examine the empirical relationship between capital expenditure and governance, 
we follow GIM and regress capital expenditure scaled by sale adjusted for net Fama- 
French industry median on our measure of governance - total score. To control for 
growth opportunities and capital expenditure on current assets we include the log of 
market-to-book and PPE /Sales as control variables. We thus estim ate the following 
equation additionally using year dummies and robust standard errors clustered at the 
firm level.
In d u stry  A djusted  C A P E X JS a les^ t  =  a+{31*CGiyi+(32*\og(M TB)ijt+ (33*PPE/SaleSitt+eitt
(3.7)
where CG is measured using Total Score. We further run the above model by using 
dummies TYPE5  and TYPEO (both defined in Section 3.5) instead of total score.
Our results of the above estimation are shown in Table 3 .8 /. The coefficient of total 
score (see Panel A) is negative and significant (at the 10% level) which suggests that 
high total score firms have lower capex than low total score firms. Further, Panel B 
shows that TYPE5, which as per our earlier results are the best performing firms, have 
the lowest capital expenditure compared to everyone else. Finally, the coefficient of 
TYPEO  companies (Panel C) is positive (though not significant) indicating that they 
have the highest capital expenditure.
The above results alongwith our earlier analysis tell a consistent story. Managers of 
well-governed firms are less likely to undertake wasteful projects. In particular managers 
of TYPE5  firms are the ones who are least likely to undertake unnecessary capital 
expenditure.
3.7 Corporate governance and stock market returns
In this section we perform an analysis to test if the market participants pay attention 
to the information being provided in the corporate governance statem ents. We must 
point out th a t the nature of the analysis in this section is different from that in the
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previous sections. Whereas so far we investigated the impact of corporate governance 
on operational performance, the focus of this section is stock returns which is related to 
information being captured in stock prices and has implications for market efficiency. 
We test whether the compliance information and explanations given by companies in 
their annual reports (public information) is reflected in stock prices. These tests should 
reveal whether such information is used by the market in monitoring the companies.
We conjecture th a t both shareholders and markets do not seem to pay sufficient 
attention to explanations. Using stock market returns we can test if this is actually 
true with the following caveats. First, stock market returns are a noisy measure of 
performance and might be affected by different factors which are difficult to disentangle. 
Second, if markets are efficient, prices should have already incorporated the impact of 
various governance decisions (including explanations) into prices. This means th a t we 
should not be able to detect any differences in returns between the various groups. Our 
results would hence indicate whether market participants incorporate the information 
conveyed through the corporate governance statem ents into the price.
3 .7.1 Methodology
The event study methodology is a common technique used for such an investigation. We 
are however unable to carry out an event study because we do not know the exact day 
of the corporate governance decision. Typically such decisions are taken by companies 
throughout the year and announced immediately to the market, while we capture such 
information only from the companies’ annual reports, which are usually published 4 — 6 
months after the financial year-end. Hence our analysis would suffer from measurement 
errors. Nevertheless, most companies provide explanations about their non-compliances 
only in their annual reports.
To overcome these problems, we use the long run event study methodology used by 
GIM (2003). We first separate companies into two portfolios based on the respective 
governance parameter. We construct the portfolios and calculate their value-weighted 
returns from July of t to June of t 4- 1 based on compliance as at the end of calendar 
t — 1. We perform this analysis for a six year period from July 1999 to June 2005. We 
begin in July 1999 since we have compliance data from December 1998 onwards. We 
then estimate the following four-factor model of Carhart(1997).
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R t  —  oc - ( -  Pi  *  R M R F t  - k  f32  *  S M B t - k  / ? 3  *  H M L t  - k  /34  *  M O M t  - k  £t ( ^ * ^ )
where R M R F t, S M B t (small minus big), H M L t (high minus low) and M O M t (mo­
mentum) are the monthly Fama-French factors for the UK representing the market, 
size, and book-to-market factors respectively. Rt is the monthly excess return from a 
strategy involving going long in the compliant companies portfolio and short in the 
non-compliant companies portfolio. Therefore the alphas in this model can be inter­
preted as the monthly abnormal return in excess of what could be achieved by passive 
investment in these factors. If we observe a positive and significant alphas after con­
trolling for the market factor, a firm’s market capitalisation, book-to-market ratio and 
momentum then the specific governance param eter is not incorporated in the stock 
prices.
3.7 .2  Fama-French Factors
Unlike the US the Fama-French factors, S M B t (small minus big), H M L t (high minus 
low) and M O M t (momentum) are not readily available for the UK. To estim ate the 
model we calculated the Fama-French factors based on all listed UK companies for 
which data  was available on Datastream . Briefly, the procedure we follow is given 
below.
The Fam a/French factors are constructed using the six value-weight portfolios formed 
from the intersection of size (market capitalisation) and book-to-market ratio. The 
portfolios, which are constructed a t the end of each June, are the intersections of 2 
portfolios formed on size (market capitalisation) and 3 portfolios formed on the ratio 
of book equity to market equity. The size breakpoint for year t is the median market 
equity at the end of June of year t. The book-to-market breakpoints are the 30th 
and 70th percentiles calculated based on book values at the end of the last fiscal year 
divided by market values at the end of December t-1.
SMB (Small Minus Big) is then the average return on the three small portfolios 
minus the average return on the three big portfolios.
S M B  = l/3 (Sm allV a lue+ Sm allN eu tra l+ Sm allG row th ) — l/3 (B igV a lue+ B igN eu tra l+ B igG row th )
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HML (High Minus Low) is the average return on the two value portfolios minus the 
average return on the two growth portfolios,
H M L  =  1 /2 (Sm allV alue + B igV alue) — 1 /2 (Sm allG row th  4- B igG row th )
RMRF, the excess return on the market, is the return from the FTSE All Share 
index minus the one-month Treasury bill rate.
To construct the MOM (momentum) factor we use six value-weight portfolios formed 
on size and prior (2-12) returns. The portfolios, which are formed monthly, are the 
intersections of two portfolios formed on size (market capitalisation) and 3 portfolios 
formed on prior (2-12) return. The monthly size breakpoint is the median market 
equity. The monthly prior (2-12) return breakpoints are the 30th and 70th percentiles.
MOM is the average return on the two high prior return portfolios minus the average 
return on the two low prior return portfolios,
M O M  =  1/2 (Sm allH igh  +  B ig H ig h ) — 1/2 (Sm allLow  + BigLow)
Further details of the construction of these factors are available in Fama and French 
(1993) and Carhart(1997).
3 .7.3  Results
To test the effect of corporate governance on stock market returns we form the following 
two portfolios. The first portfolio is formed by going long in fully compliant companies 
and short in companies that are not fully compliant and calculate the monthly value- 
weighted returns from such a strategy. We then regress these monthly excess returns on 
the three Fama-French factors as in equation (3.8). Similarly, we form portfolios based 
on the total score, i.e., go long in the high score portfolios and short in the low score 
portfolio. We use the median score 37 as the cutoff. High score portfolio consist of all 
companies having a total score greater than 37 and the low score portfolio comprising 
of companies with scores equal to or lower than 37. We again estim ate the model (3.8) 
using monthly value-weighted returns obtained by going long in the high score portfolio 
and shorting the low score portfolio.
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If markets care about a particular governance param eter then this information should 
be incorporated into stock prices and we would not expect to find any abnormal returns 
by investing in such a strategy. Our results are presented in Table 3.9a. It is clear from 
the table th a t the abnormal return (a) of the portfolio formed on the basis of overall 
compliance as well as the total score are both not statistically significant. This means 
th a t the investment on the basis on only compliance does not generate abnormal returns 
and th a t the market has already incorporated theses effects into prices.
Since it is our contention the m arket’s monitoring is not based on explanations, but 
rather on compliances we should observe differences in stock market returns among 
various types of explanations. We therefore test if TYP E 5  explanations m atter more 
by forming three sets of portfolios. In the first, we go long in non-compliant companies 
and having a total score of 40 ( TYPE5), in other words companies th a t give the highest 
quality explanations and go short in all other companies. The second set of portfolios 
comprises of going long in the T Y P E 5 companies and going short in fully compliant 
companies. The third set consists of going long in the TYP E 5  companies and short 
in those companies which do not give any explanation a t all on a t least one provision. 
As above we use returns from these strategies to estim ate the model in equation (3.8). 
The results are shown in Table 3.9&.
The alphas from all three regressions are positive and significant in all the three 
cases. The results indicate th a t TYP E 5  out-perform all others. They perform as ex­
pected better than companies giving no explanations and in those cases generating an 
abnormal return of 1.33% per month significant a t the 10% level. Next they also out­
perform fully compliant companies producing higher monthly returns to the extent 
of 1.33% significant at the 5% level. Finally the T Y P E 5 companies generate 1.10% 
higher returns per month as compared all other companies in the sample, significant 
at the 10% level. This provides further support to  our contention, th a t the m arket’s 
monitoring is not based on explanations but rather on compliance with the code.
To check for the robustness of the above results, we calculate returns from equally- 
weighted portfolio returns (instead of value-weighted returns) for all the above spec­
ifications. We then follow the same procedure as above and estim ate equation (3.8) 
again. As can be confirmed from Table 3.10 we find results which are similar to those 
found with value-weighted portfolios. This shows that the tests are robust to alternative 
specifications.
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To summarise, we find evidence th a t there is no difference in performance between 
Compliant and Non-Complaint portfolios and also between High Score and Low Score 
portfolios. However, we find significant differences in performance between TYP E 5  
companies and other. We confirm th a t TYPE5  companies out-perform all others. This 
suggests th a t the m arket’s monitoring is based on compliance with the code rather 
than  explanations.
Finally, as already discussed above we must inject a note of caution here. Results 
using stock returns have market efficiency implications.19 To quote GIM: “I f  corporate 
governance matters fo r firm  performance and this relationship is fully incorporated by 
the market, then a stock price should quickly adjust to any relevant change in the firm ’s 
governance [...] However, i f  governance matters but is not incorporated immediately 
into stock prices, then realized returns on the stock would differ systematically from  
equivalent securities. ”
3.8 Conclusions
The research for the link between corporate governance and performance has been 
a constant topic of the recent academic and non-academic literature. The key issue 
for all these studies has been the identification of an appropriate measure of good 
governance. In this paper, we contribute to the literature by developing a new measure 
of corporate governance under a framework, which assumes that companies are not 
homogeneous. We find evidence that a measure of corporate governance, which takes 
into account heterogeneity in governance choices, is positively associated with corporate 
performance.
Our analysis provides support for the principle that in corporate governance regu­
lation one-size-does-not-fit-all. We find th a t companies th a t depart from best practice 
because of genuine circumstances outperform all others. On the contrary, mere ad­
herence to general accepted principles of good corporate governance is not necessarily 
associated with superior performance.
1!lOur results are also obviously conditional on the asset pricing m odel. M ost papers in the literature use the 
Fam a-French m odel as we have done. A better approach would be to test if to ta l score is one o f the risk factors 
like H A I L  and S A I B .  To make to ta l score a risk factor we would require data for all the UK com panies, which  
we do not currently have. Besides, th e point o f our tests  is to  explore market m onitoring rather than explain ing  
asset prices.
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Finally this chapter also sheds light on the workings of a flexible regulatory regime. 
From a policy perspective, we highlight th a t flexibility, as opposed to mechanical ad­
herence to a code of best practice, and the quality of information disclosed by firms 
are crucial for the success of such a regime. The microeconomic determ inants of het­
erogeneous governance choices are left for future research.
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3.9 Tables
TABLE 3.1. Descriptive Statistics: Corporate Governance Index
T his tab le  show s th e governance characteristics o f our sam ple, which we could collect from th e com panies' 
annual reports, and which, we classify according to  the to ta l number o f observations (O bs), the number of 
observations if a specific dum m y is equal to  one (D u m m y = l) . m edian value, m ean value, standard deviation  
(Std. D ev .), m inim um  (M in) and m axim um  (M ax) value. D um m y C /N C  is a dum m y variable which takes the  
value 1 of a com pany does not com ply w ith all the provisions o f th e Com bined C ode o f best practice, and 0 
otherw ise. N um ber of non-com pliances ind icates the average number o f provisions a com pany is non-com pliant 
w ith . T o t a l  S co re  is the governance score, constructing according a six  points scale (from 0 to  5), which gives th e  
m axim um  score (5) per provision in presence o f com pliance as well non com pliance w ith  adequate explanation. 
T o ta l  S co r e  (A ll sam ple) refers to  the entire sam ple, T o ta l  S co re  (NC only) refer to  the subset, o f non-com pliant 
com panies. T Y P E S  is a dum m y variable which takes the value 1 if  a com pany is non com pliant, but has the  
sam e T o t a l  S co re  as a fully com pliant one. T Y P E O  is a dum m y variable which takes th e value 1 if  a com pany  
either fails to  provide an explanation for any o f its non com pliances or provides th e lowest quality explanation  
i.e. type 1.
O bs D u m m y  = 1 M e d ia n M ea n S td . D ev . M in M ax
Dummy C/N C 1282 417 0.3253 0.4687 0 1
Number of non-compliances 1282 1 1.2230 1.3032 0 7
Total Score (All sample) 1282 37 36.3947 4.8183 10 40
Total Score (NC only) 865 36 34.6567 5.0124 10 40
TYPE5 1282 55 0.04290 0.2027 0 1
TYPEO 1282 442 0.3448 0.4755 0 1
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TABLE 3.2. Descriptive Statistics: D istribution of Total Score
T his tab le show s the distribution o f the governance variable T o ta l  S core  o f the pooled sam ple o f 1282 observations 
for which we could classify the explanations according a six points scale (from 0 to  5). T he score varies from a 
m axim um  of 40 to  a m inim um  of 10. Total Score of 40 (A ll Sam ple) ind icates all the eom pany-year observations  
w ith m axim um  score 40, including th e non com pliant ones, tota l Score o f 40 (NC only) indicates all the com pany- 
year observations w ith m axim um  score o f 40 for the subset o f non com pliant com panies.
T o ta l score O bs
40 (Compliant) 417
40(Non-compliant) 55
39 89
38 61
37 142
36 128
35 129
34 39
33 55
32 46
31 21
30 14
29 12
A II to oo 74
T o ta l 1282
TABLE 3.3. Descriptive Statistics: Accounting and other variables
This table shows accounting and financial characteristics, m em bership to  the the F T SE 100  index, cross-listing  
in the US, board features o f the non-financial F T SE 350 UK com panies analysed over the period 1998-2004.
V ariab le O bs N os. M ea n S td . D ev . M in M ax
T o ta l a sse ts  ( £  m illion) 1281 3669.48 12100 18.32 172065
A ge (y ears) 1154 39.52 34.57 1 124
M a rk e t to  b o o k  ra tio 1275 4.57 9.73 0.29 118.47
E B IT /S a le s 1276 0.083 0.50 -11.99 0.57
D e b t/A s s e ts 1281 0.20 0.16 0 1.04
G ro w th  o f Sales 1276 0.18 0.81 -0 .8 6 18.18
P P E /S a le s 1276 0.71 1.38 0.0012 16.37
R e tu rn  on  A sse ts  (R O A ) 1281 0.096 0.088 -0 .49 0.64
In d . A dj,R O A * 1281 0.049 0.099 -0 .5 7 0.65
C a p e x /S a le s 1264 10.73 26.53 0 414.14
In d . A d j. C a p e x /S a le s 1264 4.38 24.50 -73 .4 377.29
F T S E 1 0 0 1282 377 0.29 0.46 0 1
C ro ss lis te d  in  th e  U S 1282 315 0.25 0.43 0 1
B o a rd  size 1286 9.57 2.46 4 21
*Industrv adjusted ROA is return on assets adjusted by subtracting the m edian of the respective Fam a-French
industry group
TABLE 3.4. Descriptive Statistics:Correlation between Variables
This tabic shows the pairwise correlation coefficients betw een the variables used in the analysis.
Total Ind Adj. Ind. Adj. Ln(Total Ln Ln E B IT / D eb t/ Growth P P E / C apex/
Score ROA* ROA*+i Assets) (Age) (M TB) Sales Assets of Sales Sales Sales
Total Score 1
Ind Adj. ROA* 0.010 1
Ind. Adj. R O A t+i - 0 .0 0 5 6 0.8631 1
Ln(Total Assets) 0 .2972 -0 .1 6 8 1 -0 .1 6 1 0 1
Ln(Age) - 0 .0 2 4 2 - 0 .0 5 9 7 -0 .0 6 7 7 -0 .0 3 5 6 1
Ln(M TB) - 0 .1 4 4 4 0.3482 0.3515 - 0 .2 3 0 9 -0 .0 7 2 3 1
E B IT /Sales - 0 .0 3 3 1 0 .3385 0 .2955 0.1291 10.0468 0 .0095 1
D ebt/A ssets 0 .0040 - 0 .0 8 5 5 -0 .0 6 6 5 0.1916 -0 .1 0 1 3 - 0 .0 7 2 6 0 ,1023 1
Growth of Sales - 0 .0 1 2 2 - 0 .0 8 1 4 -0 .0 9 4 9 - 0 .0 9 0 0 -0 .1 2 4 8 0 .0368 - 0 .4 0 8 7 -0 .0 5 3 8 1
P P E /S ales 0.0761 - 0 .2 0 0 2 -0 .1 7 1 9 0 .1822 -0 .1 4 5 2 -0 .2 8 3 1 -0 .0 3 6 4 0.3253 0 .0276 1
Ind. Adj. C apex/Sales 0.02 - 0 .2 1 7 7 - 0 .1 9 2 6 - 0 .0 8 3 6 -0 .1 0 1 9 - 0 .0 8 6 5 -0 .4 2 8 3 0 .0727 0 .2725 0 .4116 1
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TABLE 3.5. Corporate Governance and Operating Performance
Ordinary least squares regression o f one year future industry-adjusted Return on A ssets (RO A) (adjusted by 
subtractin g the m edian of the respective Fam a-French industry groups) on: P a n e l  A: C / N C .  a dum m y variable 
identifying full com pliant co m p a n ies= l and non com pliant com pan ies=0; or P a n e l  B: the tota l number of 
non-com pliances, i.e. th e  corporate governance score constructed following the G om pers-Ishii-M etrick (GIM ) 
m ethodology: or P a n e l  C:  the corporate governance variable to t a l  s core  that takes into account the com panies' 
heterogeneity, and control variables and year dum m ies. Robust standard errors c lu s te re d  a t the f i r m  leve l  are 
reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote that the coefficient is sta tistica lly  significant at the 1, 5 or 10 
percent levels respectively.
Panel A Panel B Panel C
D ependent variable
Intl. Adj. 
R O A t+ i
Ind. Adj. 
ROA*+ i
Intl. Atlj. 
R O A f+ i
Ind. Atlj. 
ROA*+ 1
Ind. Atlj. 
ROAt+ 1
C /N C -0.0029
(0.0098)
Num ber o f non-com pliances -0.0023
(0.0034)
Total Score 0.0014*
(0.00081)
0.0015**
(0.00074)
0.0021***
(0.00081)
Ln (T otal assets) -0.0065*
(0.0040)
-0.0071*
(0.0042)
-0.0079*
(0.0041)
-0 .043
(0.0042)
-0.0053
(0.0049)
Ln (Age) -0.0049
(0.0044)
-0.0046
(0.0043)
-0.0047
(0.0042)
-0.0052
(0.0042)
-0.0026
(0.0045)
Ln (M T B ) 0.036***
(0.0064)
0.036***
(0.0064)
0.036***
(0.0064)
0.037***
(0.0063)
0.040***
(0.0077)
E B IT /S a les 0.057***
(0.010)
0.057***
(0.010)
0.057*** 0.060***
(0.013)
0.054***
(0.011)
D e b t/A sse ts -0.15***
(0.037)
-0.14***
(0.037)
Growth o f sales -0.0000041
(0.000049)
-0.00019
(0.000050)
P P E /sa le s 0.0028
(0.0020)
0.0053*
(0.0031)
Sam ple  
Year effects 
O bservations  
R 2
All
Yes
1064
0.26
All
Yes
1064
0.26
All
Yes
1064
0.27
All
Yes
1063
0.31
NC only  
Yes
717
0.34
NC is non-com pliant, M TB  is m arket-to-book ratio anti P P E  is property, plant and equipm ent.
99
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TABLE 3.6. Corporate Governance and Operating Performance
T his table presents the regressions results o f one year future industry-adjusted Return on A ssets (RO A) (ad­
justed by subtractin g th e m edian of the respective Fam a-French industry group) on three different com panies 
classifications, control variables, and year dum m ies. In P a n e l  A ,  com panies are classified under two sets, non  
com pliant w ith t o t a l  score. 40 and all the others (fully compliant, and non-com pliant w ith T o ta l  S co r e  less or 
equal than 39); T Y P E S  is a dum m y variable assum ing the value equal to  1 if  a com pany is non com pliant 
w ith  a T o ta l  Score, o f 40 (in other words a non-com pliant com pany giving the highest quality explanation), 
and zero in all other cases. In P a n e l  B  we include tw o dum m y variables: T Y P E S  (as before) and N C 3 9 .  which  
assum es the value 1 if a com pany is non-com pliant w ith a T'otal S co re  less than or equal to  39. C om panies 
that are fully com pliant are therefore the reference group. Finally, in P a n e l  C  we classify com panies under a 
different perspective: regardless o f the tota l number of non-com pliances, we analyse the effect o f poor quality  
explanations on at least one provision o f the Code. T Y P E O  is a dum m y w ith  value 1 if a com pany either fails 
to  provide an explanation  or provides an explanation classified as typ e 1, and the value 0 for all others. Robust 
standard errors c lu s te re d  a t  the  f i r m  le ve l  are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * d enote that the coefficient 
is s ta tistica lly  significant at th e 1. 5 or 10 percent levels respectively.
Panel A Panel B Panel C
In d . A dj. In d . A dj. In d . A d j.
D e p e n d e n t v a riab le R O A t+i R O A f+i R O A f+i
R e fe ren c e  G ro u p Non-TYPE5 Fully compliant Non-TYPEO
T Y P E 5 0.026**
(0.013)
0.025*
(0.014)
N C 39 -0.0014
(0.0079)
T Y PE O -0.013*
(0.0078)
C ontro ls* Yes Yes Yes
S am p le All All All
Y ear effects Yes Yes Yes
O b se rv a tio n s 1063 1063 1063
R 2 0.31 0.31 0.21
^Controls used are ln(Total A ssets ), ln (A ge), ln (M T B ). E B IT /S a les , D eb t/A sse ts , Growth of Sales and
P P E /S a le s .
3.9. Tables 142
TABLE 3.7. Corporate Governance and Operating Performance
T h is table presents the regressions result s of one year future industry-adjusted Return on A ssets (R O A )(adjustcd  
by subtracting th e m edian o f the respective Fama-French industry groups) on specific corporate governance 
dum m y variables, w ith  control variables and year dum m ies. In P a n e l  A ,  A D O P C O M P  is a dum m y assum ing  
the value 1 if  a com pany has becom e com pliant w ith all th e C ode provisions during the period analysed. T he  
reference group thus consists o f all th e com panies that were either a lw a y s  c o m p l ia n t  or n e v e r  c o m p l ia n t  w ith  
the Code. In P a n e l  P ,  A F T E R C O M P  is a dum m y variable that takes th e  value 1 for a A D O P C O M P  com pany  
(defined above for Panel A) after it becom es com pliant. T Y P E 5  is a dum m y variable assum ing th e value equal 
to  1 if a com pany is non com pliant w ith a T o t a l  Score  of 40 (in other words a non-com pliant com pany giving  
the highest quality  explanation), and N C 3 9 ,  assum es the value 1 for a com pany which is non-com pliant w ith  
a T o t a l  S co re  less than or equal to  39. T he reference group in P a n e l  B  is thus the a lw a y s  c o m p l ia n t  company. 
Robust standard errors c lu s te re d  a t the f i r m  le ve l  are reported in parentheses. ***. ** and * denote  that the 
coefficient is sta tistica lly  significant at the 1. 5 or 10 percent levels respectively.
Panel A Panel B
In d . A dj. In d . A d j.
D e p e n d e n t v a riab le R O A i+i R O A ^ i
Companies not
R efe ren c e  G ro u p changing their status Always Compliant
A D O P C O M P -0.022**
(0.010)
A F T E R C O M P -0.025*
(0.015)
T Y P E 5 0.0066
(0.019)
N C 39 -0.015
(0.014)
C ontrols* Yes Yes
Y ear effects Yes Yes
O b serv a tio n s 1124 1124
R 2 0.16 0.16
^Controls used are ln(Total A ssets). ln (A ge), E B IT /S a les. D e b t/A sse ts . Growth of Sales and P P E /sa le s .
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TABLE 3.8a. Robustness Checks: Granger Causality
Ordinary least, squares regression w ith year dum m ies on a) T he dependent variable is industry-adjusted ROA. 
ROA is adjusted by subtracting the m edian value of the corresponding Fam a-French industry and is regressed on 
To ta l  S co r e  of corporate governance and ROA at tim e t; b) One year future T o ta l  Score, o f corporate governance  
on T o ta l  S co re  o f corporate governance and ROA at tim e t. R obust standard errors clustered, a t the  j i n n  le ve l  
are reported in parentheses. *** and * denote that the coefficient is s ta tistica lly  significant at the 1 or 10 percent 
levels respectively.
D e p e n d e n t v a riab le ROA*+i T o ta l Score*+i
T o ta l Score* 0.0013** 0.76***
(0.00055) (0.034)
ROA* 0.67*** -2 .3 3
(0.079) (1.65)
C o n tro ls  * Yes Yes
S am ple All All
F F  in d u s try  effects Yes Yes
Y ear effects Yes Yes
O b serv a tio n s 1069 842
R 2 0.51 0.73
♦ Controls used arc ln(T otal A ssets). In(A ge), ln(AITB), D e b t/A sse ts . Growth o f Sales and P P E /S a les.
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TABLE 3.8b. Robustness Checks: Heckman selection
Heckman partial m axim um  likelihood estim ation  w ith year dum m ies and robust standard errors clustered at 
firm level. T he dependent variable is industry-adjusted ROA ROA is adjusted by subtracting th e m edian value  
of the corresponding Fam a-French industry. We use the sam e controls as in Table 2. T he lower part o f the tab le  
reports th e selection  equations. R obust standard errors c lu s te re d  a t the  f i r m  le ve l  are reported in parentheses. 
***. ** and * denote th at th e coefficient is s ta tistica lly  significant at the 1, 5 or 10 percent levels respectively.
D e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le R O A (+i R O A f+i
T o ta l S core 0.0014*
(0.0016)
0.0014**
(0.00074)
L n  (T o ta l a sse ts) -0.0078*
(0.0041)
-0.0044
(0.0042)
L n  (A ge) -0.0046
(0.0042)
-0.0051
(0.0042)
L n  (M T B ) 0.035***
(0.061)
0.036***
(0.0061)
E B IT /S a le s 0.057 . 
(0.010)
0.059***
(0.013)
C ontrols* No Yes
Y ear effects Yes Yes
S elec tio n  e q u a tio n
F T S E 1 0 0  d u m m y 0.21
(0.26)
0.23
(0.26)
L n  (T o ta l asse ts ) -0.15*
(0.086)
-0.14*
(0.08)
R O A -5.90***
(0.73)
-5.61***
(0.78)
S am p le All All
O b se rv a tio n s 1079 1078
Log p seu d o lik e lih o o d 1111.85 1143.56
P 0.72
(0.076)
0.71
(0.077)
♦ Controls used are E B IT /S a les , D eb t/A sse ts . Growth of Sales and P P E /S a le s.
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TABLE 3.8c. Robustness Checks: Fama-M acBeth Regression
O rdinary least squares regression o f the industry-adjusted ROA at t +  1 on T o ta l  S co re  and control variables. 
ROA is adjusted by subtracting the m edian value o f the corresponding Fam a-French industry. T he coefficients 
on T o t a l  S co re  and their robust standard errors (in parentheses) arc reported. R egressions are run each period  
separately, and th e Fam a-M acB eth coefficient is com puted. T he t-sta tistic  o f the Fam a-M acB eth coefficient is 
adjusted (based on Fama-French (2002)) assum ing a coefficient o f auto-correlation o f 0.75. ***, ** and * denote  
th at the coefficient is sta tistica lly  significant at the 1, 5 or 10 percent levels respectively.
D e p e n d e n t V ariab le
In d . A d j. 
R O A f+i O bs
In d . A d j. 
RO A f+i O bs
1998-99 0.0077
(0.0012)
129 0.0018*
(0.0011)
118
1999-00 0.00030
(0.00085)
163 0.00056
(0.0018)
136
2000-01 0.0019*
(0.0011)
183 0.0023**
(0.0010)
139
2001-02 0.0024**
(0.0010)
192 0.0033
(0.0013)
128
2002-03 0.00031
(0.0014)
204 0.00015
(0.0021)
115
2003-04 0.00094
(0.0021)
196 0.0051
(0.0032)
84
F am a-M a cB e th 0.0011*
(0.00019)
1067 0.0025**
(0.0036)
720
R aw  T -s ta tis t ic  
A d ju s te d  T -s ta t is t ic  
S am ple
5.86
2.21*
All
6.83 
2.58** 
NC only
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TABLE 3.8d. Robustness Checks: Total Score Rescaled
O rdinary least squares regression, w ith control variables, o f one year future industry adjusted Return on A ssets  
(R O A ) (adjusted by subtracting the m edian value of the corresponding Fam a-French industry) on: - T o ta l  S co r e -  
R es ca led ,  the governance score constructed according a three points scale (from 0 to 2), which gives the m axim um  
score (2) per provision in presence o f com pliance as well as non com pliance w ith  adequate explanation . T he  
regression is run on the entire sam ple ( P a n e l  A )  and w ith in the subset o f non-compliant. com panies. P a n e l  13: - 
N C l G ,  a dum m y assum ing the value 1 if a com pany is non-com pliant w ith to ta l score-rescaled 16, 0 otherw ise. 
T h e om itted  variable consists o f all the com pliant com panies and non com pliant com panies w ith  score less than  
16. P a n e l  C :  - N C I 6  and N C I 5, where N C I 5  takes 1 if a com pany is non com pliant w ith to ta l score-rescaled  
less or equal than 15 ( P a n e l  D ) .  R obust standard errors c lu s te re d  a t the  f i r m  le ve l  are reported in parentheses. 
***,**, and * denote that the coefficient is s ta tistica lly  significant at the 1, 5 or 10 percent, levels respectively.
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D
D e p e n d e n t v a riab le
In d  A dj. 
ROA*+i
In d  A dj. 
R O A t+i
In d  A dj. 
R O A t+i
In d  A dj. 
R O A t+i
T o ta l S co re  - R esca led 0.0052*
(0.0031)
0.0075**
(0.0034)
N C 1 6 0.020*
(0.011)
0.016
(0.011)
N C 15 0.0075
(0.062)
L n  (T o ta l asse ts ) -0.0042
(0.0042)
-0.005
(0.0048)
-0.0039
(0.0039)
-0.0041
(0.038)
L n  (A ge) -0.0053
(0.0042)
-0.0027
(0.0045)
-0.0057
(0.0043)
-0.0060
(0.043)
L n  (M T B ) 0.037***
(0.013)
0.040***
(0.077)
0.036***
(0.063)
0.036***
(0.063)
E B IT /S a le s 0.060***
(0.034)
0.055***
(0.011)
0.060***
(0.013)
0.061***
(0.013)
D e b t/A s s e ts -0.15***
(0.037)
-0.14***
(0.037)
-0.15***
(0.037)
-0.15***
(0.037)
G ro w th  o f Sales -0.000004
(0.00005)
-0.00020
(0.000051)
-0.000006
(0.00005)
-0.000006
(0.00005)
P P E /S a le s 0.0028
(0.0020)
0.0053
(0.0032)
0.0032
(0.0020)
0.0033
(0.0020)
S am p le  
Y ear effects 
O b se rv a tio n s  
R 2
All
Yes
1063
0.31
NC only 
Yes 
717 
0.34
All
Yes
1063
0.31
All
Yes
1063
0.31
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TABLE 3.8e. Corporate Governance and Tobin’s Q
Ordinary least squares regression of industry-adjusted  T obin’s Q (adjusted by subtracting the m edian o f the  
respective Fam a-French industry groups) on: P a n e l  A: C / N C .  a dum m y variable identifying full com pliant 
co m p a n ies= l and non com pliant com pan ies= 0; or P a n e l  B:  the total number o f non-com pliances, i.e. the 
corporate governance score constructed follow ing the G om pers-Ishii-M etrick (GIM ) m ethodology; or P a n e l  C:  
the corporate governance variable lo t a l  s co r e  th a t takes into account the com panies’ heterogeneity, and control 
variables and year dum m ies. Robust standard errors c lu s te re d  a t  the f i r m  le ve l  are reported in parentheses. ***, 
** and * denote th a t the coefficient is s ta tistica lly  significant at the 1, 5 or 10 percent levels respectively.
Panel A Panel B Panel C
In d . A dj. In d . A dj. In d . A dj.
D e p e n d e n t v a r iab le T o b in ’s Q T o b in ’s Q T o b in ’s Q
C /N C -0.0349
(0.3041)
N u m b e r  o f n o n -co m p lian ces -0.1475
(0.1627)
T o ta l Score 0.0845*
(0.0469)
L n  (T o ta l asse ts ) -0.2779*
(0.1549)
-0.2966*
(0.1562)
-0.3349**
(0.1652)
L n  (A ge) 0.0001 0.0127 0.0090
(0.0870) (0.0872) (0.0845)
R & D  E x p /S a le s 0.1588
(0.1157)
0.1742
(0.1294)
0.1720
(0.1276)
L ong  T erm  G ro w th 2.8486 2.4656 2.3465
(3.8515) (3.5874) (3.6171)
C a p e x /A s s e ts 0.1314
(0.0864)
0.1334
(0.0881)
0.1345
(0.0877)
S am p le All All All
Y ear effects Yes Yes Yes
O b se rv a tio n s 284 273 273
R 2 0.20 0.21 0.22
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TABLE 3.8f. Corporate Governance and Agency Costs
P a n e l  A show s ordinary least squares regression of industry adjusted C a p i t a l  E x p e n d i t u r e  to S a le s  r a t i o ( adjusted  
by subtractin g th e m edian value of th e corresponding Fam a-French industry) on: T o t a l  S co re  th e  corporate
governance variable th at takes into account both com pliance and the quality o f explanations provided in case  
of non-com pliance. ln(market. to  book ratio), P P E /S a le s  and year dum m ies. P a n e l  D show s th e regression of 
one year future industry adjusted capital expenditure to  sales ratio on a dum m y variable T Y P E 5 . controls and  
year dum m ies. 7 ' Y P E 5  is a dum m y variable assum ing the value equal to  1 if  a com pany is non com pliant w ith  
a T o ta l  S co re  o f 40 (in other words a non-compliant, com pany giving the highest quality  exp lanation), and zero 
in all other cases. P a n e l  C  show s the regression of one year future industry adjusted capital expenditure to  
sales ratio  on a dum m y variable T Y P E O ,  controls and year dum m ies. T Y P E O  is a dum m y w ith  value 1 if a 
non-com pliant com pany either fails to  provide an explanation or provides an explanation  classified as T ype 1. 
and 0 otherw ise. R obust standard errors c lu s te re d  a t the  f i r m  leve l  are reported in parentheses. and *
denote that the coefficient is s ta tistica lly  significant at th e 1. 5 or 10 percent levels respectively.
Panel A Panel B Panel C
In d . A d j. In d . A d j. In d . A d j.
D e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le C ap ex  /  Salest+i C ap ex  /  Sales£+i C ap ex  /  Salesf+i
R e fe ren c e  G ro u p Non-TYPE5 Non-TYPEO
T o ta l S co re —0.2453*
(0.1482)
T Y P E 5 -6.8956**
(2.8890)
T Y P E O 2.4823
(1.6475)
L n  (M T B ) 0.4181 0.4514 0.4616
(1.1022) (1.1056) (1.1035)
P P E /S a le s 7.2967*
(3.9211)
7.2227*
(3.9055)
7.2856*
(3.9181)
S am p le All All All
Y ear effects Yes Yes Yes
O b se rv a tio n s 1186 1186 1186
R 2 0.18 0.18 0.18
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TABLE 3.9a. Corporate Governance and Stock Market Performance
We estim ate th e Fam a-French three factor regressions (see equation 3.8 o f text,) for value-w eighted m onthly  
returns o f portfolios o f firms. T he portfolios are formed based on either overall com pliance (i.e. com pliance  
with all provisions) or com panies w ith high t o t a l  score. ( >  37) (w hich is th e m edian). T he portfolio  returns 
are value-w eighted returns which are the result of taking a long p osition  in com pliant com panies (or high  
score com panies) and a short position  in non-com pliant com panies (or low score com panies). T he portfolios are 
reset in July o f every year based on com pliance at the end o f the last calendar year. T he explanatory variables 
are R M R F, SM B ,H M L  and M O M . T hese variables are zero-investm ent portfolios designed to  capture market, 
size, book-to-m arket and m om entum  effects respectively. T h e sam ple period is from July 1999 to  June 2005. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and significance at th e 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels is 
indicated by *, ** and *** respectively.
a R M R F SM B H M L M O M
O v era ll co m p lian ce  v / s  
N o n -co m p lian ce
-0.0030
(0.0042)
-0.1152
(0.0943)
-0.0927
(0.1033)
-0.5587***
(0.0988)
-0.0629
(0.0627)
H ig h  sco re  (> 37) v / s  
Low  sco re  (<  37)
0.0087
(0.0059)
0.0113
(0.1329)
0.3622**
(0.1456)
-0.3815***
(0.1393)
-0.1243
(0.0885)
TABLE 3.9b. Corporate Governance and Stock Market Performance
We estim ate the Fam a-French three factor regressions (see equation 3.8 of text) o f value-w eighted m onthly  
returns o f portfolios o f firms. T he portfolios are formed based on tota l scores. T he portfolio returns arc value- 
weighted returns which are the result o f tak ing a long position in high score portfolios and a short position  in low  
score portfolios. T he portfolios are reset in July of every year based on score at the end of the last calendar year. 
The explanatory variables are R M RF. SM B. HML and M O M . T hese variables are zero-investm ent portfolios 
designed to  capture market, size, book-to-m arket effects and m om entum  respectively. T he sam ple period is from 
July 1999 to  June 2005. Standard errors arc reported in parentheses and significance at th e 10 percent. 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels is indicated by *. ** and *** respectively.
OL R M R F SM B H M L M O M
T Y P E 5  v / s  
A ll o th e rs
0.0110*
(0.0058)
0.3745*
(0.1295)
0.0285
(0.1419)
-0.4048***
(0.1357)
-0.1171
(0.0862)
T Y P E 5  v / s  
F u lly  co m p lian t
0.0134*
(0.0059)
0.3872**
(0.1332)
0.0857
(0.1459)
0.0552
(0.1396)
0.1638*
(0.0886)
T Y P E 5  v / s  
T Y P E O
0.0133*
(0.0072)
0.4071**
(0.1629)
0.2783
(0.1784)
-0.7151***
(0.1707)
-0.1026
(0.1084)
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TABLE 3.10. Corporate Governance and Stock Market Performance: Robustness Checks
To check th e robustness for the estim ates of alpha we run the Fam a-French three factor regressions (see equation  
3.8 o f tex t) using equally-w eighted m onthly returns o f the above portfolios. A ll other details are sim ilar to  
table 6A. T he sam ple period is from July 1999 to June 2005. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and 
significance at th e 10 percent. 5 percent and 1 percent levels is ind icated by *, ** and *** respectively.
a R M R F SM B H M L  | M O M
O v era ll co m p lian ce  v / s  
N o n -co m p lian ce
-0.0018
(0.0033)
-0.1449*
(0.0747)
-0.0339
(0.0814)
-0.1161
(0.0783)
-0.0618
(0.0495)
H ig h  sco re  (> 37) v / s  
Low  sco re  (<  37)
0.0020
(0.0019)
-0.0768*
(0.0433)
0.1136**
(0.0472)
-0.1336***
(0.0454)
-0.0421
(0.0287)
T Y P E 5  v / s  
A ll o th e rs
0.0132***
(0.0043)
0.1673*
(0.0963)
0.1789*
(0.1050)
-0.3626***
(0.1010)
0.0375
(0.0639)
T Y P E 5  v / s  
F u lly  co m p lian t
0.0140**
(0.0054)
0.2804**
(0.1227)
0.2071
(0.1337)
-0.2493*
(0.1286)
0.0965
(0.8130)
T Y P E 5  v / s  
T Y P E O
0.0141**
(0.0054)
0.1690
(0.1213)
0.2637**
(0.1322)
-0.4209***
(0.1271)
-0.0106***
(0.0804)
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Appendix 3.A Appendix to Chapter 3 
3.A .1  A ccounting Variable D efin itions
Variable Definition Source D ata Item
Sales W orldscope SALES
E BIT Earnings before interest and taxes W orldscopc O PEIN C
Total A ssets B ook Value o f A ssets W orldscope T O T A S T
BOA E B IT /T o ta l A ssets W orldscope O P E IN C /T O T A S T
N et Profit M argin N et In com e/T ota l Sales W orldscope N E T IN C /S A L E S
M arket-to-Book ratio M arket V a lu e /B o o k  Value o f Com m on Stock W orldscope M C A P E Q
T obin’s Q (T otal A ssets  +  Market Value o f Equity- 
B ook Value o f E q iiity )/T o ta l A ssets
W orldscope As show n in 
definition
E B IT /S a les Earnings before Incom e and T axes/S a les W orldscope O P E IN C /S A L E S
D e b t/A sse ts Long Term D e b t/B o o k  Value o f A ssets W orldscope L T D E B T /T O T A S T
Growth o f Sales 1 year grow th rate o f sales W orldscope N SA LG B
P P E /S a le s Property, P lant and E quip m ent/S a les W orldscope N E T P E Q /S A L E S
Age Year of incorporation A m adeus Y E A B IN C
C ap ex/S a les C apital E xpcndit ure/Sa les W orldscope C A PE T A
C a p ex /A sse ts C apital E x p en d itu re/T ota l A ssets W orldscope C A PE T A
B iiD /S a le s B & D  E xp en d itu re/S a les W orldscope B D SA L E
Long Term Growth Long term grow th estim ate  o f earnings IBES LTG
E xternal F inance
D ependence
(Ba jan-Zingales 1998)
C apital E xpenditure minus cash flows from 
op cra tio n s/C a p ita l E xpcndit ure.
Cash flow from operations  
is defined as the sum  of cash flow 
from operations plus decrease in stocks, 
decreases in receivables 
and increases in payables
W orldscope (C A P E X -F F O -  
ID W C A P )/C A P E X
References
[1] Agarwal, A. and C. R. Knoeber, 1996, Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Con­
trol Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders, Journal o f Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis, 31(3), 377-397.
[2] Barber B. M., J. D. Lyon, 1996, Detecting long-run abnormal operating perfor­
mance: The empirical power and specification of test statistics, Journal o f F inan­
cial Economics, 41, 359-399
[3] Bebchuk, L. A, and L. Stole, 1993, Do Short-Term Managerial Objectives Lead 
to Under- or Over-Investment in Long-Term Projects? Journal o f Finance, 48, 
719-729.
[4] Bebchuk, L.A., A. Cohen, and A. Ferrell, 2004, W hat M atters in Corporate Gov­
ernance?, Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 491
[5] Becht, M., P. Bolton and A. Rbell, 2003, Corporate governance and control, Hand­
book o f the Economics o f Finance 1A, George Constantinides, Milton Harris, and 
Rene Stulz, eds. (Elsevier Science, London).
[6] Berglof, E., and E. L. von Thadden, 2000, The Changing Corporate Governance 
Paradigm: Implications for Transition and Developing Countries, ABCDE Pro­
ceedings, The World Bank.
[7] Berglof, E., and S. Claessens, 2004, Enforcement and Corporate Governance, Pol­
icy Research Working Paper Series 3409, The World Bank
References 153
[8] Bhagat, S., and B. Black, 2002, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence 
and Long-Term Firm Performance, Journal o f Corporation Law 27, 231-273.
[9] Black, B. S., 2001, The Corporate Governance Behavior and Market Value of 
Russian Firms, Emerging Markets Review , 2, 89-108
[10] Black, B. S., H. Jang and W. Kim, 2005, Does Corporate Governance Predict 
Firm s’ Market Values? Evidence form Korea, forthcoming Journal of Law, Eco­
nomics and Organization.
[11] Boone, A., L. C. Field, J. M. Karpoff, C. G. Raheja, 2005, The Determinants 
of Corporate Board Size and Composition: An Empirical Analysis, forthcoming 
Journal o f Financial Economics.
[12] Boot, A. W. A, R. Gopalan, A. V. Thakor, 2006, The Entrepreneur’s Choice 
between Private and Public Ownership, Journal o f Finance, 61(2), 803-836.
[13] Brickley, J., J. Coles, and G. Jarrell, 1997 Leadership structure: separating the 
CEO and chairman of the board, Journal o f Corporate Finance, 4,189-220.
[14] Burkart, M., D. Gromb, and F. Panunzi, 1997, Large shareholders, Monitoring, 
and the Value of the Firm, Quarterly Journal o f Economics, 112, 693-728.
[15] C arhart, M.,1997, On Persistence in M utual Fund performance, Journal o f F i­
nance, 52(1), 57-82
[16] Chhaochharia, V., Y. Grinstein, 2005, Corporate Governance and Firm Value-the 
Im pact of the 2002 Governance Rules, forthcoming Journal o f Finance.
[17] Chidambaran, N. K., D. Palia and Y. Zheng, 2006, Does Better Corporate 
Governance ’Cause’ Better Firm Performance?, mimeo, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com /abstract=891556
[18] Claessens, S., 2003, “Corporate Governance and Development” , Global Corporate 
Governance Forum Working Paper
[19] Coombes, P., and S. C. Wong, 2004, Why codes of governance work, McKinsey 
Quarterly, 2, 48-53
[20] Committee on Corporate Governance, 1998, Final Report [Hampel Report], (Gee 
Publishing, London).
References 154
[21] Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Cadbury Com­
m ittee), 1992, Report with the Code of Best Practice [Cadbury Report], (Gee 
Publishing, London).
[22] Conyon, M. and C. Mallin, 1997, A review of compliance with Cadbury, Journal 
o f General Management 22, 24-37.
[23] Conyon, M. J. and S. I. Peck, 1998a, Board control, remuneration committees and 
top management compensation, Academy o f Management Journal, 41(2), 146-157.
[24] Conyon, M. J. and S. I. Peck, 1998b, Recent developments in UK corporate gover­
nance, Britain’s Economic Performance, T.Buxton, P. Chapman and P. Temple, 
eds. (Routledge, London, New York).
[25] Core, J., G. Wayne and T. Rusticus, 2006, Does Weak Governance Cause Weak 
Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm Operating Performance and Investors’ 
Expectations, Journal o f Finance, 61, 655-687.
[26] Cremers, K. J. M. and V. B. Nair, 2005, Governance Mechanisms and Equity 
Prices, forthcoming Journal o f Finance
[27] Dahya, J., J. J. McConnell and N. G. Travlos, 2002, The Cadbury committee, 
corporate performance and top management turnover, Journal o f Finance 57(1), 
461-483.
[28] Dedman, E., 2000, An investigation into the determinants of UK board structure 
before and after Cadbury, Corporate Governance 8(2), 133-152.
[29] Dedman, E., 2003, Executive turnover in UK firms: the impact of Cadbury, Ac­
counting and Business Research 33, 33-50.
[30] Demirguc-Kunt, A. and V. Maksimovic, 1998, Law, finance, and firm growth, 
Journal o f Finance, 53(6), 2107-2137.
[31] Developing Corporate Governance Codes of Best Practice, 2005, Global Corporate 
Governance Forum Toolkit, The World Bank
[32] Djankov, S., C. McLiesh, and A. Shleifer, 2006, Private Credit in 129 Countries, 
NBER Working Paper No. 11078
References 155
[33] Durnev A., and E. H. Kim, 2005, To steal or not to steal: Firm attributes, legal 
environment and valuation, Journal o f Finance 60(3), 1461-1493.
[34] Fama, E. F., and J. D. MacBeth, 1973, Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical 
Tests, Journal o f Political Economy, 81, 607-636.
[35] Fama, E. F., and K. R. French, 1993, Common Risk factors in the Returns on 
Bonds and Stocks , Journal o f Financial economics, 53, 3-53.
[36] Fama, E. F., and K. R. French, 2002, Testing Trade-off and Pecking Order Pre­
dictions about Dividend and Debt, Review o f Financial Studies 15, 1-37.
[37] FRC, 2003, The Combined Code on Corporate Governance July 2003, Financial 
Reporting Council, London.
[38] Gillan, S., J. Hartzell, and L. Starks, 2003, Explaining corporate governance: 
boards, bylaws, and charter provisions, Working Paper, University of Delaware 
and University of Texas.
[39] Gompers, P., J. Ishii and A. Metrick, 2003, Corporate governance and equity 
prices, Quarterly Journal o f Economics 118(1), 107-155.
[40] Grinstein Y., and P. Hribar, 2004, CEO Compensation and Incentives: Evidence 
from M&A Bonuses, Journal o f Financial Economics, 71, 119-143.
[41] Hannes, S., 2002, The Hidden Virtue of Anti-takeover Defenses, Harvard Law 
School Discussion Paper No. 354.
[42] Hermalin, B., and M. Weisbach, 1991, The Effects of Board Composition and 
Direct Incentives on Firm Performance, Financial Management, 20, 101-112.
[43] Hermalin, B., and M. S. Weisbach, 2003, Boards of Directors as an Endogenously 
Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature, Economic Policy 
Review, 9, 7-26.
[44] Hermalin, B., and M. S. Weisbach, 2005, Corporate Reform and Governance, 
Working Paper
[45] Himmelberg, C., R. G. Hubbard, and D. Palia, 1999, Understanding the determi­
nants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance, 
Journal o f Financial Economics, 53, 353-384.
References 156
[46] Higgs, D., 2003, Review o f the Role and Effectiveness o f Non-executive Directors, 
DTI, London.
[47] Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav­
iour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal o f Financial Economics, 3, 
305-360.
[48] Jones, I. and M. Pollitt, Understanding how issues in corporate governance de­
velop: Cadbury report to Higgs review, Corporate Governance, 12(2), 162-171.
[49] Klapper, L. F. and I. Love, 2004, Corporate Governance, Investor Protection and 
Performance in Emerging Markets, Journal o f Corporate Finance, 10, 703-728.
[50] Klein A., 1998, Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure, Journal of 
Law & Economics, 41(1), 275-303.
[51] La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer, 1998, Law and finance, Journal 
of Political Economy 106, 1113-1155.
[52] Landier, A., D. Sraer and D. Thesmar, 2005, Bottom-Up Corporate Governance, 
Working Paper
[53] Lang, L., and R. Stulz, 1994, Tobin’s q, Diversification and Firm Performance, 
Journal o f Political Economy, 102, 1248-1280
[54] Levine, R., 2004. The Corporate Governance of Banks - a concise discussion of 
concepts and evidence, Policy Research Working Paper Series 3404, The World 
Bank
[55] Larcker, F, A. Richardson, and I. Tuna, 2004, Does corporate governance really 
m atter?, mimeo, The W harton School, University of Pennsylvania
[56] OECD, 2004, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance.
[57] Owen G.,T. Kirchmaier and J. Grant, 2005, Corporate Governance in the US and 
Europe: Where Are We Now?, Palgrave Macmillan Ltd, England.
[58] Parkinson, J., and G. Kelly, The Combined Code on corporate governance, Cor­
porate Governance, Political Quarterly 70(1),101-107.
[59] Petersen, M. A., 2005, Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel D ata Sets: 
Comparing Approaches, NBER Working Papers 11280
References 157
[60] Rajan, R. and L. Zingales, 1998, Financial Dependence and Growth, The American 
Economic Review , 88, 559-586.
[61] Rajan, R. and L. Zingales, 1998, Which Capitalism? Lessons from the East Asian 
Crisis, Journal o f Applied Corporate Finance, 11, 40-48
[62] Romano, R. 2004, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, New York University Law and Economics Working Papers, Paper 3.
[63] Tirole, J., 2001, Corporate Governance, Econometrica, 69(1), 1-35.
[64] Titman, S. and R. Wessels, 1998, The Determinants of Capital S tructure Choice, 
Journal o f Finance, 43, 1-19
[65] Tonks, I., 2002, Performance Persistence of Pension Fund Managers, UBS PR P 
Discussion Paper N o.l, FMG London School of Economics
[66] Yermack D., 1996. Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of 
Directors, Journal o f Financial Economics, 40, 185-211.
[67] Wooldridge, J. M., 2002, Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, 
The MIT Press
